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United States v. Fernando Ortiz and Roberto O. Martinez
236 F.3d 420
8th Cir.
2001
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MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judge.

Fеrnando Ortiz and Roberto Martinez were arrested in the course of a police undercover оperation and were subsequently convicted of distributing cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appеal, Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez argue that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions. Mr. Ortiz argues аdditionally that the district court erred by fading to submit the question of drug quantity to the jury and by refusing to grant him a reduction in his sentence for his minor role in the crime. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 2

I.

Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez contend that the evidence presented against them at trial was insufficient to warrant their convictions. “We review the sufficiеncy of the evidence de novo, examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury verdict and giving the verdiсt the benefit of all reasonable inferences,” United States v. Robinson, 217 F.3d 560, 564 (8th Cir.2000), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 497, 148 L.Ed.2d 468 (2000). We will reverse the convictions only if we conсlude that no reasonable jury could ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍have found that Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez were guilty beyond a reasonable dоubt. See id.

In its case against Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez, the government presented evidence that they were the acсomplices of others who sold drugs to the police. Police officers testified that they observed Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez acting in a suspicious manner while waiting in Mr. Ortiz’s car, which was parked across the street from thе place where the drug sale occurred. The officers also testified that they saw one of thе individuals who sold drugs to the police walking over to Mr. Ortiz’s car during the course of the drug sale and talking to the people in it.

Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez assert that none of this evidence tended to show that either of them knew about the drug sale that the arresting officers witnessed or that either of them handled any of the cocаine involved in it. They fail to mention, however, that there was considerable other testimony linking them to the crime. As part of the government’s case, for instance, several police officers testified thаt they saw Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez driving a car to pick up cocaine and then deliver it to the place where the drugs were sold. The police officers further testified that they witnessed Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez serving as lookоuts while the sale of the drugs was occurring. The government also provided unchallenged evidence thаt the police found cocaine in Mr. Ortiz’s car, all around the area next to where Mr. Martinez was sеated.

Reviewing the record of the trial, it appears clear to us that the jury chose to believe the testimony of the police officers over the theories that Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez advanced. It is not our province to assess the credibility of witnesses, see United States v. Washington, 197 F.3d 1214, 1217 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 575, 148 L.Ed.2d 492 (2000), and we have held that “a jury verdict ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍should not be ovеrturned lightly,” United States v. Sykes, 977 F.2d 1242, 1247 (8th Cir.1992). The application of these principles to the instant case leads us to conclude that the jury was not unreasonable in finding Mr. Ortiz and Mr. Martinez guilty based on the evidence before it.

*422 II.

Mr. Ortiz also argues thаt the trial court erred when it declined to submit the question of drug quantity to the jury. In making this argument, he relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), in which the Supreme Court held that “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum must bе submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Because the maximum penalty for an offense under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) increases according to drug quantity, Mr. Ortiz contends that the trial court was obligated under Apprendi to let the jury determine the amount ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍of cocaine attributable to him.

We disagree. We have explаined previously that “[t]he rule of Apprendi only applies where the non-jury factual determination increasеs the maximum sentence beyond the statutory range authorized by the jury’s verdict,” United States v. Aguayo-Delgado, 220 F.3d 926, 933 (8th Cir.2000), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 121 S.Ct. 600, 148 L.Ed.2d 513 (2000). In this case, the trial court gave Mr. Ortiz a sentence of 63 months of imprisonment, which is less than the 20-year maximum that the statute authorizes. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). Apprendi therefore has no application here.

III.

Mr. Ortiz asserts thаt the trial court incorrectly refused to grant him either a two-or four-level reduction to his sentence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. Under this provision, a sentencing court may decrease the offense level of a defendant if it finds that the defendant is only ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍a minor or minimal participant in the criminal activity. Mr. Ortiz maintains that he deserves a lower sentence than the one that the trial court gave him because the evidence at trial demonstrated, at most, that he played only a small part in the sale of cocaine to the police.

We have held that whether a defendant should be characterized as a minor or minimal participant in an offense is a question of fact, and we review the sentencing court’s faсtual finding under a clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1329 (8th Cir.1995); see also United States v. Hale, 1 F.3d 691, 694 (8th Cir.1993). In this case, the trial court determined that Mr. Ortiz was neither a minоr nor minimal participant in the crime because he was the driver of the vehicle used for transpоrting the cocaine and seemed to be quite aware of what was happening during the drug sale. Because the trial court’s finding does not leave us with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been сommitted,” United States v. Westerman, 973 F.2d 1422, 1428 (8th Cir.1992), we are unable to say that it was clearly erroneous.

IV.

For the reasons stated abovе, we affirm ‍‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌​‌‌​​‌​‌​‌‌‌​​‌​‌​‌​​‌‌​‌​​​​​​‌‌‌​‌‌‍the judgment of the trial court.

Notes

2

. The Honorable Joseph F. Bataillon, United States District Judge for the District of Nebraska.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Fernando Ortiz and Roberto O. Martinez
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
Date Published: Jan 3, 2001
Citation: 236 F.3d 420
Docket Number: 00-2297, 00-2330
Court Abbreviation: 8th Cir.
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