United States v. Fernandez
121 F.3d 777 | 1st Cir. | 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
No. 96-1655
UNITED STATES,
Appellee,
v.
MARTIN FERNANDEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. William G. Young, U.S. District Judge]
Before
Cyr and Lynch, Circuit Judges,
and McAuliffe, District Judge.
Miriam Conrad, Federal Defender Officer, for appellant.
Robert E. Richardson, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom Donald
K.
Stern, United States Attorney, was on brief for
appellee.
August 6, 1997
Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.
McAULIFFE,
District Judge
. Martin Fernandez pled guilty
to an unarmed bank robbery charge in February of 1996. See 18
U.S.C. S 2133(a). The district judge (Young, J.), confronted with
Fernandez' criminal history, found him to be a career offender and
sentenced him accordingly. See U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1.
On appeal Fernandez challenges his sentence, arguing that
he did not qualify as a career offender under the sentencing
guidelines. He says the district court's contrary finding was
legally incorrect for at least two reasons: (1) the district judge
erred when he concluded that the Massachusetts crime of assault and
battery on a police officer (one of Fernandez' predicate offenses)
is, categorically, a crime of violence within the meaning of
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1; and (2) the district judge's alternate finding
(that the facts underlying Fernandez' offense establish it as a
crime of violence) was based on an impermissible judicial inquiry
into the discrete circumstances of his offense conduct.
Because we conclude that the Massachusetts crime of
assault and battery on a police officer is, categorically, a crime
of violence within the meaning of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, we need not
address Fernandez' contention that the trial judge's factual
inquiry was inconsistent with the mandate of Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), and we affirm the sentence.
Background
Fernandez' career offender status rested on two
underlying state convictions: assault and battery by means of a
dangerous weapon and assault and battery upon a police officer.
Fernandez did not object to classification of the former as a
"crime of violence" within the meaning of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1. He
did, however, object to consideration of his prior assault and
battery upon a police officer as a "crime of violence." The
district judge overruled Fernandez' objections, determined that he
was indeed a career offender, and sentenced him at the low end of
the applicable guideline range.
On appeal, Fernandez argues that because, under
Massachusetts law, the crime of assault and battery upon a police
officer can include both violent and non-violent variants, the
district judge erred when he classified the offense as one of
violence within the meaning of the career offender provisions of
the guidelines. Fernandez' guideline sentencing range would have
been more favorable to him if the offense had not been so
classified.
Discussion
Whether Fernandez' prior conviction for assaulting a
police officer is properly deemed a predicate "crime of violence"
under U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 is a question of law, which we review de
novo. See
United States
v.
Winter, 22 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994).
For purposes of the career offender provisions, the
sentencing guidelines define "crime of violence" as:
(1) [A]ny offense under federal or state law
punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year that --
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use,
or threatened use of physical force against
the person of another, or
(ii) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or
extortion, involves use of explosives, or
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otherwise
involves
conduct
that
presents
a
serious
potential
risk
of
physical
injury
to
another.
U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 (November 1, 1995) (emphasis supplied). Some
offenses are easily recognized as crimes of violence because they
are specifically listed in the guideline (e.g., arson), or because
an essential element includes the use or threatened use of force
against another person (e.g., armed robbery).
But an offense not listed, and which does not include
among its elements the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
force against another person, still might qualify under S 4B1.2 if
it involves conduct that "presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another." Whether such an offense qualifies on
that ground is determined according to a standard generic approach,
"in which inquiry is restricted to the statutory definition[] of
the prior offense[], without regard to the particular facts
underlying [it]." United
States v. Meader, No. 96-2123, 1997 WL
375003, at *6 (1st Cir. July 11, 1997); accord United
States v.
Schofield, 114 F.3d 350, 351 (1st Cir. 1997); Winter, 22 F.3d at
18;
cf.
Taylor v.
United States
, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990) (adopting
a similar categorical approach when determining whether a crime is
one of violence under the armed career criminal provisions of 18
U.S.C. S 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
As this court has previously held:
[R]ather than investigating the facts and
circumstances of each earlier conviction, an
inquiring court, in the usual situation, looks
exclusively to the crime as the statute of
conviction defined it; or, put another way,
the court examines only the statutory
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formulation of the predicate crime in order to
ascertain whether that crime is a crime of
violence for purposes of the federal
sentencing guidelines.
United
States v. DeLuca, 17 F.3d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1994) (footnote
omitted). Only under limited circumstances may a court look beyond
the elements of the crime as statutorily defined and examine
documents, such as charging papers or jury instructions, in an
effort to determine whether the predicate offense should count for
career offender purposes. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602; United
States v. DeJesus, 984 F.2d 21, 23 n.5 (1st Cir. 1993).
Here, Fernandez argues that assault and battery on a
police officer should not be classified as a crime of violence
under S 4B1.1 because the criminal statute defining his offense
(Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D) criminalizes both violent and non-
violent conduct. His point about the statute's scope finds support
in this court's opinion in United States v. Harris, 964 F.2d 1234
(1st Cir. 1992), where we noted: "The Massachusetts 'assault and
battery' statute covers two separate crimes -- one involving actual
(or potential) physical harm and the other involving a
'nonconsensual' but unharmful touching." Id. at 1236. Because
Under the Massachusetts criminal code, both simple assault and
battery (Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13A) and assault and battery upon
a police officer (Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D) are specific intent
crimes. Compare Commonwealth v. Chasson, 423 N.E.2d 306, 311 n.4
(Mass. 1981) ("A conviction of assault and battery requires a
finding of an intentional striking of the victim.") with
Commonwealth v.
Moore, 632 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994)
("The offense of assault and battery on a police officer requires
a specific intent to strike a police officer."). The only
substantive distinction between the elements of those offenses is
that with regard to the latter, the defendant must know that the
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both violent and non-violent conduct is covered by the statute, and
because his prior conviction could have been based on the non-
violent variant of assault and battery upon a police officer,
Fernandez says his prior offense should not have been counted in
deciding his career offender status.
Although we have not directly addressed the precise issue
Fernandez raises, we have implied that assault and battery upon a
police officer, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D, is
properly considered a "crime of violence" for federal sentencing
guidelines purposes. See United
States v. Santiago, 83 F.3d 20,
26-27 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding that although the defendant was
sentenced to less than one year in prison, his conviction for
assault and battery against a police officer constituted a
"predicate offense[] within the purview of the career offender
guideline."); United States v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 993 (1st Cir.
1990) (holding that defendant's state misdemeanor convictions, two
of which were for assault and battery on a police officer,
constituted predicate "crimes of violence" under U.S.S.G.
S 4B1.1.); see also United States v. Tracy, 36 F.3d 187, 199 (1st
Cir. 1994) (holding that defendant had adequate notice of the
government's intention, for sentencing purposes, to rely upon his
state conviction for assault and battery upon a police officer and
victim is a police officer, acting in the course of his or her
official duties. Accordingly, for the purposes of this discussion,
we will assume that our reasoning in Harris, supra, applies with
equal force to the crime of assault and battery upon a police
officer and, therefore, that it is possible to commit that crime by
means of a nonconsensual, but unharmful touching of a police
officer.
-6-
concluding that the district court did not err in considering
defendant's conviction in enhancing his sentence under the Armed
Career Criminal Act.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1717 (1995).
In any event, that Fernandez
might have been convicted of
the non-violent variety of assault and battery upon a police
officer (looking just at the record of conviction and the
Massachusetts statute) does not undermine our conclusion that the
crime is, for purposes of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1, properly categorized as
a crime of violence. As we have said, the important point
is not the breadth of the statutory sweep but
the degree of risk, expressed in terms of the
probability of physical harm presented by the
mine-run of conduct that falls within the
heartland of the statute. Applying this test
in the post- Taylor era, we have repeatedly
classified as crimes of violence offenses in
which actual or threatened force against
another person is likely, although by no means
certain.
DeJesus, 984 F.2d at 24.
It would seem self-evident that assault and battery upon
a police officer usually involves force against another, and so
meets that standard. At a minimum, assault and battery upon a
police officer requires purposeful and unwelcomed contact with a
person the defendant knows to be a law enforcement officer actually
engaged in the performance of official duties.
See
Commonwealth v.
Moore, 632 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994). While it is
true that neither violence, nor the use of force, is an essential
element of the crime as statutorily defined, still, violence, the
use of force, and a serious risk of physical harm are all likely to
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accompany an assault and battery upon a police officer. See,
e.g., Winter, 22 F.3d at 20 ("A categorical approach is not
concerned with testing either the outer limits of statutory
language or the myriad of possibilities girdled by that language;
instead, a categorical approach is concerned with the usual type of
conduct that the statute purports to proscribe.").
Our conclusion is entirely consistent with our holding in
United
States v. Harris, supra. While we acknowledge that
Massachusetts does criminalize both violent and non-violent
assaults upon police officers in the same criminal statute, we also
necessarily recognize that the conduct proscribed by the statute
nearly always involves the intentional striking of a police officer
while in the performance of official duty. This nearly always
poses a serious risk of actual or potential physical force and the
Recent Massachusetts cases in which the defendant was charged
with assault and battery upon a police officer reveal, not
surprisingly, the consistent involvement of physical force and risk
of injury. Each reported case involved actual (not merely
threatened) use of force by the defendant and a serious risk of
injury to the officer or another. See Commonwealth v. Gogan, 449
N.E.2d 365 (Mass. 1983) (defendant resisted arrest, struggled with
officer, and fell to ground on top of officer); Commonwealth v.
Gagnon, 643 N.E.2d 1045 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (defendant convicted
of masked armed robbery, assault with intent to murder, attempted
murder, and assault and battery upon a police officer), modified,
645 N.E.2d 696 (Mass. 1995);
Commonwealth v.
Moore, 632 N.E.2d 1234
(Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (defendant grabbed officer's wrist and
dragged him along road with his vehicle);
Commonwealth v.
Collins,
627 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (defendant head-butted officer
in jaw); Commonwealth v. McCrohan, 610 N.E.2d 326 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993) (defendant initiated a violent struggle with two police
officers); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 609 N.E.2d 489 (Mass. App. Ct.
1993) (defendant struck officer with car door, knocking him to the
ground); Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 500 N.E.2d 287 (Mass. App. Ct.
1986) (defendant struck officer).
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likelihood of physical injury -- to the police officer initially,
and to the perpetrator (and even the public) subsequently, when the
officer reacts or attempts to subdue the offender. That law
enforcement officers usually carry weapons when on duty only
heightens the serious risk of injury associated with such an
assault.
Accordingly, we hold that assault and battery upon a
police officer, in violation of Mass. Gen. L. ch. 265, S 13D, is
categorically a crime of violence within the meaning of the career
offender provisions of the sentencing guidelines, U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1,
notwithstanding that its statutory definition admits a non-violent
means of commission.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that an assault and
battery upon a police officer, in violation of Mass. Gen. L.
ch. 265, S 13D, is categorically a crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
S 4B1.1. Accordingly, the district judge's conclusion that
Fernandez is a career offender under the guidelines, and the
sentence imposed, are affirmed.
Of course, a defendant may, in an appropriate case, seek relief
under the guidelines by filing a departure motion if his or her
predicate offense actually involved the non-violent form of assault
and battery on a police officer. This, however, is not such a
case. Fernandez did not attempt to show that he actually committed
a non-violent form of assault and battery upon a police officer.
Instead, he has simply asserted that because the underlying state
statute criminalizes both violent and non-violent conduct alike,
that crime cannot, as a matter of law, constitute a "crime of
violence" for purposes of determining his career offender status
for federal sentencing purposes.
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