United States v. Felix MadukaUnited States v. Felix Maduka
Ellen R. Meltzer, Esq., Special Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Renata Ann Gowie, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Houston, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
Felix Maduka pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to structure bank withdrawals to avoid reporting requirements and eight counts of structuring bank withdrawals to avoid reporting requirements. See
On appeal, Maduka asserts that the legislature did not intend for a person to violate
Next, Maduka argues that the district court erred in applying the two-level enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, an enhancement is appropriate if the defendant occupies a position of trust and the defendant abused that position in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. § 3B1.3; United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 165 (5th Cir.2009). Because Maduka objected to this enhancement in the district court, the district court’s application of § 3B1.3 to the facts is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 147-48 (5th Cir.2010); United States v. Dial, 542 F.3d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir.2008).
The district court did not clearly err when it applied the position of trust enhancement to Maduka’s sentence. Maduka was an administrator, authorized official, director, and owner of Joystar Home Health Service, LLC (Joystar), which was a Texas corporation that provided services to Medicare beneficiaries and received payments for such services from Medicare. Maduka’s position with Joystar provided him with broad discretion in structuring the currency withdrawals (in an unlawful manner) and the ability to act in a manner to conceal the unlawful structuring of currency withdrawals. United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 248-49 & n. 10 (5th Cir.2012). As for Maduka’s claims that there was no abuse of trust because there were no victims of his offense of conviction, this court has “never held ... nor do the guidelines explicitly require, that the determination whether a defendant occupied a position of trust must be assessed from the perspective of the victim.” United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 794 (5th Cir.2003). Further, there were collateral victims of the offense of conviction as a result of Maduka’s fraudulent healthcare scheme—patients of Joystar, Medicare, the government, Chase Bank, and Bank of America. See United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 193, 209 (5th Cir.2013); Miller, 607 F.3d at 149; United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 459-61 (5th Cir.2007); Buck, 324 F.3d at 795; United States v. Gieger, 190 F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir.1999); United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 647, 655-56 (5th Cir.1997). Accordingly, Maduka has failed to show that the district court clearly erred when it assessed a two-level increase to his offense level under § 3B1.3 for abuse of position of trust.
Lastly, Maduka contends that his within-guidelines sentences are substantively unreasonable because they are greater than necessary to satisfy the sentencing goals set forth in
Generally, appellate courts review the sentence for reasonableness, under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Where, as here, the district court imposes a sentence within a properly calculated sentencing guidelines range, this court “will give great deference to that sentence,” and the sentence is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 F.3d 337, 338-39 (5th Cir.2008); United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th Cir.2009). The fact that this court might reasonably conclude that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal. United States v. Williams, 517 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir.2008); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51, 128 S.Ct. 586.
The record shows that the court heard and considered Maduka’s mitigating arguments and the
Additionally, to the extent Maduka argues that the district court erred by failing to grant a downward departure, and to the extent Maduka requested a downward departure, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of a request for a downward departure unless the denial was based on the district court’s incorrect belief that it lacked authority to grant the departure. United States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 350 (5th Cir.2008). Maduka does not assert and nothing in the record suggests that the district court believed it could not grant a request for a downward departure. See id. at 350-51; United States v. Landerman, 167 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir.1999).
Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.