514 F.2d 270 | D.C. Cir. | 1975
Lead Opinion
Appellant was one of seven defendants charged with various offenses relating to the burglary of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) in the Watergate office building. He was named in six of the eight counts of indictment: Count 1 — conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970); Counts 2 and 3 — burglary in violation of 22 D.C.Code § 1801(b) (1973); and Counts 4, 5, and 8 — illegal interception of oral and wire communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1970). The trial commenced on January 8, 1973. Several days later Hunt, along with four of his co-defendants,
The issues raised by appellant have been considered at length in our opinions in the cases involving his co-defendants.
Under the circumstances, the judgment of the District Court is affirmed except as to Counts 3, 4, and 5.
Affirmed.
. The remaining two co-defendants were convicted after a jury trial.
. Appellant also claims that his guilty plea to Counts 3, 4, and 5 was improperly coerced by the District Judge’s refusal to accept his compromise plea, agreeable to the Government, to Counts 1, 2, and 8. For this contention appellant relies on United States v. Ammidown, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 497 F.2d 615 (1973). As the judge imposed concurrent sentences on all counts, we need not reach this contention. Instead, we hereby vacate appellant’s sentences on Counts 3, 4, and 5. See United States v. • Greene, 160 U.S.App.D.C. 21, 33-34, 489 F.2d 1145, 1157-1158 (1973).
. Hunt’s suggestion that “outrageous conduct” by “Government officials” in seizing and destroying his records and “perjuring themselves before the grand jury” requires reversal of his conviction hardly needs to be taken seriously. Since the argument on this appeal Hunt has testified under oath in the trial of United States v. Mitchell et al., D.D.C. Criminal No. 74-110, that he not only participated in the burglary of the DNC offices, but also that he participated in a conspiracy to suppress evidence of that burglary involving perjury and destruction of records.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially):
The foregoing opinion refers to opinions previously issued by this court in Barker, supra, and McCord, supra. I filed a dissent in Barker and a special concurrence in McCord. I concur in the result of the foregoing opinion, subject to such differing views as I expressed in my opinions in Barker and McCord.
Concurrence Opinion
(concurring specially):
The foregoing opinion refers to opinions previously issued by this court in United States v. Barker, et al. I concur in the result of the opinion herein, subject to such differing views as I expressed in my dissenting opinion in Barker.