Defendant, thirty-two years of age, assaulted his girlfriend with a piece of firewood. Harvey Marden, the girlfriend’s seventy-one-year-old father, was in bed at the time. Hearing the assault, he rose from bed and attemptеd to intervene. Defendant threw the firewood at Mr. Marden, striking him in the face and putting out his right eye.
Defendant was charged in a three-count indictment with assault resulting in serious bodily injury, assault with a dangerous weapon with intent tо do serious bodily harm, and assault with a dangerous weapon. He pleaded guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), and the government agreed to dismiss the other two counts. In calculating defendant’s tоtal offense level, the district court added two points because Mr. Marden was a vulnerable victim, see U.S.S.G. § 3Al.l(b), and four points for use of a dangerous weapon, see U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B). The district court sentenced defendant to 60 months in рrison. Defendant appeals. Our circuit precedent requires that we reverse and remand the vulnerable victim enhancement because the district court did not make particular findings as to the victim’s unusuаl vulnerability. We affirm the district court’s conclusion that the piece of firewood thrown at the victim qualifies as a dangerous weapon.
I. Assaulting a Vulnerable Victim
Defendant objects to the district court’s finding that the seventy-one-yeаr-old victim was unusually vulnerable. We review this factual finding for clear error.
United States v. Brunson,
Section 3Al.l(b) of the Sentencing Guidelines allows a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant knew or should have known that a victim of the offense was unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition, or that a victim was otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct.” This circuit has ruled that a victim’s elderly status, without morе, is insufficient to justify a vulnerable victim enhancement.
United States v. Smith,
In this case, the government did not present any evidence of the victim’s individual or persоnal vulnerability. The presentence report notes only that the victim was seventy-one years old at the time of the assault, and on that basis, recommends the vulnerable victim enhancement. The amended presen-tence report adds that the victim “was particularly vulnerable due to his age, when one considers the defendant’s age, health, and history of aggressive behavior.” 1 Addendum to Presentence Rеport at 2. At the sentencing hearing, the district court found only that “considering the age of the defendant and the age of the victim, ... it was a vulnerable victim.” Ill R. at 7.
A comparison of the defendant’s age with the victim’s is an insufficiently particularized finding of the victim’s vulnerability. As in
Smith,
the district court here did little more than “equate[] the victim’s ‘elderly’ status with per se vulnerability.”
The government urges us to uphold the vulnerable victim enhancement because the presentence report, adopted by the district court, contains additional facts about the defendant’s age, health, and criminal record, all of which the probation officer relied upon in concluding that the victim was vulnerable. We agree that information about a defendant
*762
may be relevant in assessing a victim’s vulnerability.
See United States v. Coates,
The government argues that a particularized finding of vulnerability should not be required for victims of violent crimes — that membership in a class of elderly persons should be enough in such eases to support enhancement. Most of our prior eases have not involved victims of violent offenses.
See, e.g., United States v. Hardesty,
We agree with the First Circuit that “[i]n some cases the inference to be drawn from the class characteristics may be so powerful that there can be little doubt about unusual vulnerability of class members within the meaning of section 3A1.1.”
United States v. Gill,
II. Using a Dangerous Weapon
Defendant raises two challenges to the increase of his base offense level for use of a dangerous weapon. He argues that the fire- *763 wocJ he threw at the victim should not be treated as a dangerous weapon under U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B) because it is not inherently dangerоus, and that the increase of his offense level for use of a dangerous weapon in the course of an aggravated assault amounts to impermissible double counting.
The Guidelines define “dangerous weаpon” as “an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury. Where an object that appeared to be a dangerous weapon was brandished, displayed, or possessed, treat the object as a dangerous weapon.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1, comment, (n.l(d)). Based on this definition, there is no question that a piece of firewood qualifies as a dangerous weapon when it is used to inflict serious bodily injury, as it was in this case.
See United States v. Dayea,
Next, defendant argues that even if the firewood qualifies as a dangerous weapon, the district court impermissibly double counted the weapon by relying upon it both to categorize the assault as an aggravated assault and to increase the base offense level. Here, we need not decide whether the Guidelines allow the district court to consider the dangerous weapon in both selecting and increasing the base offense level because the district court did not double count the weapon.
The Guidelines assign a fifteen-point base offense level for aggravated аssault and a three or six point base offense level for minor assaults. U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.2, 2A2.3. An aggravated assault is a felonious assault that involves “(a) a dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (i.e. not merely to frighten), or (b) serious bodily injury, or (c) an intent to commit another felony.” § 2A2.2, comment, (n.l). Here, the assault involved serious bodily injury. Defendant pleaded guilty to assault resulting in serious bodily injury and he has not challenged the finding in the presenteneе report that the victim in fact sustained a serious bodily injury. Thus, the Guidelines required the district court to treat the assault as aggravated, warranting a fifteen-point base offense level. That the assault also involvеd a dangerous weapon makes little difference because the assault was aggravated even without regard to the dangerous weapon. The district court did not double count the weapon by relying on it to increase defendant’s base offense level four points. 3
We REVERSE the vulnerable victim enhancement and REMAND for farther proceedings consistent with this opinion. We AFFIRM on all other grounds.
Notes
. The presentеnce report documents that at the time of the offense defendant was 32 years old, in good health, 5 feet 8 inches tall, 180 pounds, and had a history of arrests for violent alcohol-related offenses.
. Raising a second challenge to the vtdnerable victim enhancement, defendant argues that the enhancement should only apply if he targeted the victim because of his vulnerability. This circuit recently decided, however, that the vulnerable victim enhancement does not require a finding the defendant targeted the victim because of his vulnerability.
Hardesty,
. The aggravated assault Guideline requires that additional points be аdded to the base offense level if the assault involves certain "specific offense characteristics,” such as more than minimal planning; brandishing, discharging, or otherwise using a weapon; or inflicting various degrees of bodily injury. § 2A2.2(b). In defendant's case, the district court added four points for "otherwise using a weapon,” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(2)(B), and four more points because the , victim sustained serious bodily injury, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2(b)(3)(B). We need not decide whether the district court impermissibly double counted the victim's serious bodily injury in using it to both select and increase the base offense level, because defendant has not raised that argument.