UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plаintiff-Appellee, v. ERIC VAUGHN, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 24-5090
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
October 29, 2024
24a0245p.06
Before: GRIFFIN, KETHLEDGE, and BUSH, Circuit Judges.
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b).
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Howard W. Anderson, III, TRULUCK THOMASON LLC, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Brian Samuelson, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY‘S OFFICE, Knoxville, Tennessee, for Appellee.
JOHN K. BUSH, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, Eric Vaughn contests special conditions of his supervised release. He argues that the sentencing сourt improperly delegated its judicial function to the probation office by not providing enough condition specifics. We disagree and AFFIRM the district court‘s judgment.
I.
Police pulled Mr. Vaughn over for speeding. Vaughn exited his car and ran from thе officers. Vaughn, who was a convicted felon, also scrapped a pistol mid-flight. The officers captured him and retrieved his gun. A grand jury indicted Vaughn for unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon.
Vaughn‘s appeal centers around Special Conditions 1 and 2 of his supervised release. He argues the first special condition improperly delegates power from the district court by giving the probatiоn officer the power to determine drug-testing frequency and whether he must receive alcohol treatment. Vaughn also contends that by giving the probation officer leeway to decide whether his mental-health treаtment is inpatient or outpatient, Special Condition 2 improperly delegates judicial power. Vaughn is not the first to lodge such arguments in this court.
At sentencing, Vaughn objected to part of Special Condition 1, asking the сourt to “wordsmith[]” the condition by providing “some sort of schedule rather than leaving it up to Probation.” Sentencing Tr., R. 50, PageID 298, 308. The district court overruled the objection but responded that if “Mr. Vaughn thinks he‘s being tested too often,” the cоurt “would be happy to consider giving the probation office some guidance on that when it comes up.” Id. at 308. Vaughn did not object to Special Condition 2.
II.
Generally, when a defendant challenges the sentencing court‘s legal authority to impose a supervised-release condition on constitutional or statutory grounds, we review de novo. See United States v. Carpenter, 702 F.3d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 2012). But if a defendant does not object to such a condition in the district court, we review for plain error. See
III.
Federal law affords probation officers extensive authority to “use all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions specified by the court,” to help defendants like Vaughn improve their “conduct and condition.”
A. Special Condition 1
1. Drug-Test Capping
Vaughn complains that Special Condition 1 does not cap his number of drug tests. That condition provides that Vaughn “shall participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for drug and/or alcohol abuse as directed by the probation officer until such time as the defendant is released from the program by the probation officer.” Sentencing Tr., R.50, PageID 310. It touches upon Mandatory Condition 3, a condition that derives from
The capping analysis boils down to Vaughn contesting a special condition. Congress distinguishes “between drug testing conducted as a mandatory condition of supervised releasе and drug testing performed in the course of a special condition of drug treatment.” Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 886. When issuing mandatory conditions, district courts must impose non-treatment drug testing on the defendant as part of supervised release.
Courts satisfy the special-condition requirement by employing the triggering “shall participate” language within the condition, requiring defendants to participate in substance-abuse testing and treatment. Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 885. Both Carpenter and Logins addressed special conditions without drug test caps that used language almost identical to Vaughn‘s condition.” Id. at 884; Logins, 503 F. App‘x at 353. Not only did we determine that
Vaughn‘s argument fails because he mistakes special conditions for mandatory ones. His own brief recognizes this mandatory-special distinction yet does not apply
And let us not forget that Vaughn‘s sentencing court created a safeguard. If Vaughn considers probation‘s drug-testing schedule too burdensome, the district court “would be happy to consider giving the probation office some guidance on that when it comes up.” Sentencing Tr., R. 50, PageID 308; cf. United States v. Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 575 (6th Cir. 2012). This statement is further evidence that the district court possesses ultimate authority over Vaughn‘s drug testing.
2. Alcohol Treatment
Vaughn also argues that Special Condition 1 improperly delegates the court‘s alcohol-abuse-treatment decision to the probation officer. Again, the special condition requires that Vaughn “shall participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for drug and/or alcohol abuse.” Judgment, R. 47, PageID 268. Vaughn takes issue with the “and/or” language. He says that language lets the probation officer “decide in thе first instance whether treatment—for drugs, for alcohol, or for both—will be required.” Opening Br. at 11; Reply Br. at 2. Because Vaughn did not raise this issue at sentencing, the district court was not on notice for any argued deficiencies relаting to Special Condition 1. Campbell, 77 F.4th at 432; see also Lindsay, 2024 WL 4225715, at *3. Because a party “must object with [a] reasonable degree of specificity,” the claim is unpreserved, and we review it for plain error. United States v. Corp, 668 F.3d 379, 387–88 (6th Cir. 2012). Vaughn must show that the district court made a cleаr error that affected his substantial rights and the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings below. Campbell, 77 F.4th at 432.
Vaughn does not show the district court plainly erred. This circuit is no stranger to affirming special conditions that require defendants to participate in substance-abuse treatment programs. See, e.g., Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 884. We have even held, albeit in an unpublished opinion, that a special condition identical to Vaughn‘s—“and/or” and all—was not an illеgal delegation of an alcohol-treatment decision. Lindsay, 2024 WL 4225715, at *1. Again, the district court need only order that Vaughn “shall participate” in a substance-abuse program, clearly deciding “whether such treatment is required.” Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 885. It can leave details “to the discernment of the probation officer” and the “expertise” of “professionals.” Id. Vaughn‘s argument fails because “drug and/or alcohol abuse” is synonymous with “substance abuse.” See Lindsay, 2024 WL 4225715, at *2. Our precedent clearly shows that a court does not delegate its Article III judicial power when it requires defendants, through the “shall participate” language, to participate in some form of substance-abuse program. Carpenter, 702 F.3d at 885. The district court expressed
B. Special Condition 2
Lastly, Vaughn argues that the district court impermissibly delegated its authority by failing to specify whether his mental-health treatment be inpаtient or outpatient. Because he did not raise the claim below, we review it for plain error. Campbell, 77 F.4th at 432.
Plain error review dooms Vaughn‘s claim. See Lindsay, 2024 WL 4225715, at *3. A “circuit split precludes a finding of plain error,” United States v. Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d 784, 794 (6th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted), and circuits are split on this inpatient-outpatient claim, compare United Statеs v. Aguilar-Cerda, 27 F.4th 1093, 1095–96 (5th Cir. 2022) (finding no impermissible delegation), and United States v. Cutler, 259 F. App‘x 883, 886–87 (7th Cir. 2008) (same), with United States v. Matta, 777 F.3d 116, 122–23 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding impermissible delegation). See Response Br. at 14 (collecting more cases). A “lack of binding case law” does the same, Al-Maliki, 787 F.3d at 794, and this circuit lacks binding case law holding that a district court cannot allow the probation officer to decide whether inpatient treatment will be required. But we do have Lindsay, which mirrors Vaughn‘s case identically—claims, briefs, counsel, and all—and that case already held the “standard of review dooms” Vaughn‘s same claim. 2024 WL 4225715, at *3. We find Lindsay persuasive in holding that this inpatient-outpatient claim does not overcome the plain-error standard.
IV.
In sum, district courts do not improperly delegate their judicial authority by failing tо cap substance-abuse testing within special conditions. And district courts do not plainly err when their special conditions do not specify whether mental-health treatment is outpatient or inpatient, or when they expressly state that the defendant “shall participate in a program of testing and/or treatment for drug and/or alcohol abuse.” We therefore AFFIRM.