United States v. EdwardsUnited States v. Edwards
Case Information
*1 Before WIDENER, WILLIAMS, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
COUNSEL Dennis E. Jones, DENNIS E. JONES & ASSOCIATES, Lebanon, Virginia; Wade T. Compton, C. EUGENE COMPTON, P.C., Leba- *2 non, Virginia, for Appellants. John L. Brownlee, United States Attor- ney, Eric M. Hurt, Assistant United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Mark Edwards, Jr. and Mark Edwards, Sr. (collectively, Appel-
lants) were both convicted of travelling in interstate commerce to
commit a crime of violence ("Travel Act violation"), in violation of
I. Venue
Appellants challenge the venue for their convictions for the Travel Act violations and for use and discharge or brandishing of a firearm during a violent felony. In addition, Edwards, Jr. сhallenges the venue for his conviction for being an unlawful user of controlled substances in possession of a firearm.
With regard to a charge under the Travel Act, vеnue lies in any dis- trict in which the travel occurred. United States v. Burns , 990 F.2d 1426, 1436-37 (4th Cir. 1993). Appellants travelled from their home *3 in Bristol, Virginia, which is in the Western District of Virginia, to Tennessee to forcibly retrieve drug monеy using firearms. Thus, the district court properly found that venue was proper in the Western District of Virginia.
Regarding the
Finally, Edwards, Jr. claims that venue was improper in the West-
ern District of Virginia for his conviction for possessing a firearm
while being an unlawful user of a cоntrolled substance. To determine
the place of proper venue in criminal proceedings, we examine "the
nature of the crime alleged and the location of the overt acts charged
and completed by the defendant."
United States v. Stewart
, 256 F.3d
231, 241 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks omitted),
cert. denied
To support a conviction under the Travel Act, the Government
must prove three elements: (1) interstate travel; (2) intent to promote
unlawful activity, i.e., a business enterprise; and (3) performance or
attempted performance of an unlawful act.
United States v. Gallo
, 782
F.2d 1191, 1194 (4th Cir. 1986). "Business enterрrise" has been
defined as a continuous course of conduct rather than a sporadic,
casual involvement in the proscribed activity.
United States v. Corbin
The jury heard evidence that, a few dаys after Donald Edwards was arrested for selling drugs and had been released on bond, Appellants became aware that a known drug dealer had robbed Donald Edwards of $1200 in cash in a drug deal gone bad. Instead of notifying the police, Appellants armed themselves and accompanied Donald Edwards to Tennessee. Once in Tennessee, Edwards, Jr. made a state- *5 ment indicating that the stolen money was his. In addition, Edwards, Jr. recognized that Donald Edwards was involved in activities where he might need proteсtion. Finally, Edwards, Jr. admitted his own involvement in distributing cocaine base. We conclude that, from these facts, a rational jury could have found that Appellants were awаre of Donald Edwards’ drug business and its ongoing nature and that they aided him in its continuation by going to Tennessee to help settle a drug robbery.
Edwards, Jr. next argues that the only evidence supporting his drug conspiracy and possession with intent to distribute convictions were his uncorroborated statements. See Smith v. United States , 348 U.S. 147, 152 (1954) (citing cases holding that accused may not be con- victed on his own uncorroborated confession). Edwards, Jr.’s state- ments, however, were not uncorroborated. To the contrary, his statements regarding the names оf his sources were corroborated by a co-conspirator’s testimony that she knew the individuals named by Edwards, Jr. and knew them to be drug dealers. In addition, others testified that Edwаrds, Jr. went to Tennessee to recover drug proceeds and, in fact, referred to the drug money as his own. Thus, there was sufficient evidence both corroborating Edwards, Jr.’s сonfession and supporting his conspiracy conviction.
Finally, Edwards, Sr. challenges his conviction for possession of a
firearm by a user of controlled substancеs, arguing that there was no
evidence that he was a user of controlled substances at the time he
possessed the firearm in question. In order to sustain a conviction
under § 922(g)(3), the Government must prove that the Defendant’s
drug use was sufficiently consistent, "prolonged," and close in time
to his gun possession to put him on notice that he qualified as an
unlawful user of drugs under the statute.
United States v. Purdy
, 264
F.3d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that statute may not
encompass a Defendant whose illegal drug use was "infrequent" or in
the "distant past");
see also United States v. Jackson
, ___ F.3d ___,
A co-conspirator testified that Edwards, Sr. was illegally using drugs two weeks before the firearm рossession described in the indict- *6 ment and that the drug use was not an isolated incident. Donald Edwards testified that Edwards, Sr. was a daily crack cocaine user during the relevant time period. In addition, Donald Edwards testified that his father is the one who decided where to go to get weapons and ammunition for their trip, showing prior knowledge of avаilable fire- arms. Therefore, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to show that Edwards, Sr. was an unlawful drug user at a time in reasonable proximity to his possession of firearms.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Appellants’ convictions and sen- tences. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions adequately are presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED