UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Edward John JOHNSTON, III, also known as Easy, also known as EZ, also known as Charles Edward Johnson, III, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 99-20810.
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.
July 13, 2001.
258 F.3d 361
Edward John Johnston, III, El Paso, TX, pro se.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges, and FISH,* District Judge.
DeMOSS, Circuit Judge:
Edward John Johnston, III, a federal prisoner, moves for a certificate of appealability (“COA“), claiming that the government violated his constitutional rights and
I. BACKGROUND
Johnston was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana. He was sentenced to 135 months of imprisonment, five years of supervised release, a $6,000 fine, and a $50 special assessment. On direct appeal, we affirmed Johnston‘s conviction and sentence. The Supreme Court denied his petition for a writ of certiorari. See Johnston v. United States, 522 U.S. 1152, 118 S.Ct. 1174, 140 L.Ed.2d 183 (1998).
Johnston timely filed a motion under
II. DISCUSSION
Before considering the substance of Johnston‘s motion for a COA, we must first address whether the motion is properly before us. Although neither party has challenged the magistrate judge‘s prerogative to finally adjudicate Johnston‘s
A. Section 2255 is a Civil Matter for Purposes of § 636(c)
Very few courts have directly addressed this precise issue. In United States v. Bryson, 981 F.2d 720, 723 (4th Cir.1992), the Fourth Circuit indirectly found that a
In United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 (1952), the Supreme Court discussed the history of the writ of habeas corpus in America and the evolution of
Although we have not addressed the specific issue before us, we have generally construed a
Clearly, if we were to follow narrowly the advisory committee note‘s statement, then the issue would appear resolved. But other courts and commentators have suggested against overly relying on the advisory committee‘s note regarding any distinction between a
We, likewise, have found consistency in defining
Here, the context of the issue centers on the jurisdictional provisions pertaining to magistrate judges. Congress amended the Federal Magistrates Act in 1979 to include
B. Article III Strictures Preclude Delegation of § 2255 Proceedings to Magistrate Judges
Even though
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the constitutionality of civil trial authority of magistrate judges, but it has made passing reference to the authority of such judges to preside over civil jury trials with the consent of the parties under
Assuming that
First, unlike the average civil case or a
On the other hand, we have previously held that once the parties provide consent and the district court specifically designates a magistrate judge to conduct the civil proceedings, the magistrate judge is not bound by the prior opinions expressed by the district court in the case. See Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 378 n. 6 (5th Cir.1995); 12 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Richard L. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3072, at 416 (2d ed. 1997) (“Certain rulings by a presiding judge are inherently subject to reconsideration, such as limits on discovery. Should parties consent to proceedings before a magistrate judge after the assigned district judge has made such a ruling, the magistrate judge must have authority to modify the order.“); see generally Hill v. City of Pontotoc, 993 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir.1993) (noting that judges of coordinate jurisdiction will defer to another‘s interlocutory rulings out of deference, not obedience). But see Taylor v. National Group of Companies, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 411, 413-14 (N.D.Ohio 1990) (finding that a magistrate judge‘s jurisdiction is not merged with that of the district court to vest the magistrate with authority to reconsider and set aside a prior decision of the district court). We may, however, distinguish Cooper from cases involving
Even if the ability of a magistrate judge to overturn an Article III jurist‘s prior ruling does not raise Article III issues, the notion that a
Third and finally, the consensual delegation of
The fact that a magistrate judge may essentially overturn the judgment of an Article III district court in a criminally related case detracts from the reasons supporting constitutionality of consensually delegated civil matters. Consensual delegation of
The primary structural guarantee of Article III is to ensure respect for separation-of-powers principles “by barring congressional attempts to transfer jurisdiction [to non-Article III tribunals] for the purpose of emasculating’ constitutional courts, and thereby preventing the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other.” Schor, 106 S.Ct. at 3256 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We recognize that the magisterial scheme is said not to be the “paradigmatic separation of powers case, where the integrity of one branch is threatened by another which attempts an arrogation of power to itself.” Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 544. That is because in situations like the consensual delegation of general civil matters, the authority of Article III courts is not challenged. Instead, the only conceivable threat to the independence of the judiciary concerns the danger to the independence of the magistrate judges from within, rather than from without, the judiciary itself in the form of Article III district judges. Cf. Raddatz, 100 S.Ct. at 2417 (Blackmun, J., concurring). But when magistrate judges, who do not have lifetime tenure or undiminishable compensation, may reconsider and vacate Article III judges’ rulings pertaining to criminal matters, particularly felony convictions, we tread in different waters. By allowing consensual delegation of
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the consensual delegation of
PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge, specially concurring:
I share the majority‘s concern over the constitutionality of allowing magistrate judges to dispose of
I would read
The impetus to push the trial of civil cases in federal courts upon magistrate judges is puzzling. According to data compiled by the Administrative Office, each active Article III judge presided over an average of only nine civil trials last year;2 the median length of a civil trial was one or two days.3 The criminal docket offers little explanation, for Article III judges presided over an average of only six criminal trials, jury and bench.4 Despite mounting “case” filings, the number of civil and criminal trials has declined markedly over the past thirty years in all categories of cases.5 The shrinking number of trials is the subject of a larger debate over the changing role of the United States district courts.6
This is not to suggest that the Article III trial judges are not working. Rather, this phenomenon calls into question the rationale for the type of work we urge upon magistrate judges. More to the point, the empirical data highlights the wisdom of the structural component of Article III, limiting as it does, or should, the authority of consent by the parties. It is one thing for two parties to agree to resolve their civil dispute outside the courthouse. It is another to accept their agree-
I join the holding that petitions for relief from federal criminal convictions under
