*2 speed. lights Bushnell then activated his MOORE, Before SEYMOUR and Circuit excessively and the truck over for BROWN,* Judge. Judges, District and improper tinted windows and lane travel. approached Bushnell asked SEYMOUR, Judge. Circuit registra- for Fernandez’s driver’s license and A. was in- Defendant Edemiro tion. Both documents were Fernandez’s grand possession jury dicted a federal felt a name. Bushnell “tension in the air” intent to in viola- of cocaine with distribute trembling and noticed Fernandez’s hand was 841(a)(1) (1988). § of 21 Fernan- tion U.S.C. registration. Aplt. when he reached for his to Af- suppress filed a motion evidence. dez App., Suppression Hearing, 1/8/92, evidentiary hearing, magistrate ter an (hereinafter Aplt.App.). Blanch, passen- judge denying recommended Fernandez’s ger, was on sleeping the front next seat to suppress. motion to The district court Fernandez, young boy and a was behind the adopted magistrate’s Report and Recom- During front seat. the encounter Blanch entirety. mendation in its Fernandez en- up appeared seeing woke startled guilty reserving plea a conditional his tered trooper in the window of the truck. He sat right to the denial of motion to appeal his stiffly during the encounter. Bushnell asked suppress grounds. on Fourth Amendment for and Blanch’s received identification. record, reviewing After reverse. In response inquiries, to Bushnell’s Fer- nandez Blanch informed Bushnell
I. boy they was Blaneh’s son and that were taking Angeles Chicago him from Los to to High- Bushnell of Utah Lance grandmother. visit his This seemed unusual way patrolling Patrol was on In- southbound to Bushnell who asked if it more wasn’t cost- Nephi, terstate 15 near Utah he ob- fly boy Chicago or to effective efficient pickup a blue with a served GMC truck driving. replied instead Mr. Fernandez camper traveling He no- shell northbound. they had checked on airline tickets appeared ticed the be tinted windows price mentioned a Bushnell then $500. permitted darker than under Utah law. patrol car returned with Fernandez’s turnaround, Bushnell went the next turned registration. license and Bushnell testified highway, north onto the and traveled about nervousness, occupants’ that due to the truck eight up caught nine miles before he suspicious he became and concerned for his truck, apparently traveling which safety. backup He therefore radioed for fast. At no time did clock requested computer on NCIC check speed plan speeding truck’s it for a occupants. vehicle and its eventually caught violation. When Bushnell truck, up pulled alongside with the Mangelson Officer arrived or sev- after six visually confirm were windows too en minutes to assist Bushnell. As truck, dark. He noticed the driver’s side window returned the driver’s side of the driver, Mangelson one third down and approached passenger side. Fernandez, glanced warning over at The truck Bushnell him. had a citation and Fernan- pulled partially emergency registration posses- then over into the dez’s license and in his right highway lane side of the He sion. also retained Blanch’s identifica- approximately quarter returning traveled there for papers, tion. Without these Bush- speed. mile at questions. reduced Bushnell had not nell started to ask series of He patrol any yet lights weapons activated if the truck vehicle. asked there were inquired Bushnell considered the un- also driver’s behavior there * Brown, Kansas, Wesley sitting by designation. Honorable E. Senior District trict Judge, United for the States District Court Dis- Report adopted and Recommendation in vehicle. contraband
drugs or other entirety. negative, and both its replied drugs. occupants did use said *3 why he was so Fernandez
Bushnell asked
II.
testimony
sup-
at
During his
the
nervous.
hearing,
could not recall
pression
Bushnell
reviewing
Fourth
In
the
Amendment
did recall that
response, but he
Fernandez,
uphold
Fernandez’s
factual
we
the
claims
unsatisfactory. Fernandez
was
they
the answer
findings
the
court
district
unless
get increasingly ner-
appeared
Walker,
to
and Blanch
clearly
erroneous. United States
continued.
(10th
as the encounter
Cir.1991),
vous
de
F.2d
815
cert.
—
nied,
-,
that Fernandez was not
testified
Bushnell
at
are mindful that
We
stopped.
once
had been
free to leave
he
hearing
suppress,
a
a
the credi
on motion
or
returning
license
Fernandez’s
Without
given
bility
weight
of the witnesses
identification, Bush-
registration, or Blanch’s
evidence,
as well as
inferences
to look
the truck.
permission
nell
asked
therefrom,
conclusions drawn
are matters
Blanch
to exit the
started
Fernandez
Werking,
judge.
the trial
verbally
answering Bushnell
vehicle without
(10th Cir.1990).
Howev
again,
you
“Do
so Bushnell asked
er, the ultimate determination of reasonable
to search
truck?”
understand
want
ques
is a
ness under
Fourth Amendment
understand, go
replied, “I
ahead.”
tion of law which we review de novo. Walk
(Magistrate Report
at
Aplt., App.
Brief
er,
stop
because the Utah
A.
Highway
Unit which Bushnell was
Patrol
pretextual stop
A
an offi
assigned regularly enforces
tinted win-
occurs when
justification
stop
arresting
issuing
legal
citations to
cer
some
dow law
uses
person
investigate un
warning out-of-state driv-
in order to
Utah drivers and
in violation of the law. The
related criminal matters for which the officer
ers who are
magistrate judge
suspicion.
that Fernandez’s
lacks
found
(10th
Guzman,
registration
driver’s
and vehicle
license
Cir.1988).
Guzman,
arrest,
him
but
we
the test
not returned to
until after
defined
pretextual stop.
applied
to claims of
held that Bushnell had reasonable
Finally,
investigative
To determine whether an
deten
justifying the continued detention.
pretext
ask
although
magistrate judge found that “at
tion is unconstitutional as
“
validly
to search Fernandez
‘not whether the officer could
have
the time of the consent
20-21,
detained,” Report
the same
being
was still
made
but whether under
circumstances
reasonable officer would
held that Fernandez’s consent
nevertheless
voluntary.
stop
He
made the
search was
denied
absence
”
purpose.’
(quoting
at 1517
Unit
suppress
motion to
the district court
invalid
Smith,
warning
each
these
ed States
citations resulted from
Cir.1986)).
of an out-of-state vehicle such as the
appeal,
truck at
appears
issue in this
test,
Applying the Guzman
the dis
regularly stops
warnings
issues
court
that the
was not
trict
concluded
such
significantly
motorists
more than his
pretextual.
It stated
counterparts.1 The evidence reveals a simi-
Highway
unit to
“Utah
Patrol
which
respect
lar trend
improper
to the
lane
Bushnell was attached enforced
Utah
travel
forty-four
violations. Bushnell issued
tinting
regular
Aplt.
on a
law
basis.”
window
warnings for improper lane travel in a five
8,11.
App. at
district court
that it
noted
period
month
while his five fellow officers
*4
policy
Highway
Utah
Patrol
is the
warnings.
issued between zero and five
assigned
to
to
Unit which Bushnell
issue
statistics,
In addition to these
the record
warning
tickets to out-of-state vehicles
reveals that Bushnell observed the tinted
and
violation of the tinted window law
highway
window violation from
across
sixty-three
warnings
issued
such
Bushnell
travelling
opposite
while
direction as
1991,
July and November of
as well
between
Fernandez’s truck. He then
to
drove
Thus,
appears
it
as seven citations.
turnaround,
highway,
next
crossed over the
stops
routinely
warning
issues
pursued
truck
approximately
for
citations to
for exces
out-of-state motorists
eight
actually
or nine miles before
pulling it
sively
practices
tinted
The routine
windows.
question
over. We
stop
whether such a
officer, however,
individual
will not
of an
would
as usual”
“business
for
reasonable
pretext
preclude
objectively
if an
officer under
same
circumstances. See
officer under the
circum
same
Werking,
880
—
denied,
(10th Cir.),
never held that
itself
creates
reason
cert.
956, 959
F.2d
230,
suspicion
activity.
of criminal
-,
impaired
noting
merely
such reliance “is
Bushnell
did
have a suffi-
that something
the manifestation of a hunch
objective
particularized
cient
sup-
basis
afoot”).
foul is
porting
suspicions,
his continued
of the lower court’s
detention of Fernandez therefore violated the
below,
points to
the dissent
two factors that
Fourth Amendment.
particularly unconvincing
we find
under the
First,
of this
circumstances
case.
dissent
C.
suggests
thought
that Bushnell’s initial
A
preceded by
search
a Fourth
might
driving
under the influ-
Amendment violation remains valid if the
justified
ence somehow
his continued deten-
voluntary
consent
search was
in fact under
though
tion. Even
been
totality
Guzman,
of the circumstances.
suspicious
possibility initially,
of this
howev-
1520;
Ward,
F.2d at
see
also
F.2d at
er, he testified that
was not
one of the
government
1534. The
bears the burden of
actually stopped
reasons he
Fernandez.
proving
consent,
voluntariness
Moreover,
Aplt.App. at 56.
after he made
Bustamonte,
Schneckloth
initial
Bushnell “administered no
sobriety tests;
request
roadside
did not
(1973), and that burden is heavier when con
blood, breath,
defendant submit to
or urine
given
illegal
sent is
after an
stop, United
tests;
driving
and issued no
citation
while
Recalde,
States
impaired.” Lyons,
Indeed,
at 975.
Cir.1985);
Deases,
see also
anything indicating
the record is devoid of
(10th Cir.1990)
(“Hav
n. 1
after their initial encounter
ing
concluded that the
initial
Deases’
thought
impaired
Fernandez was
or that he
lawful,
government
car was
does not have
question
continued to detain and
the ‘heavier burden’ in connection with
if
impaired.
to determine
he was
This factor
consent
issue which it would have if
totally
any analysis.
is therefore
irrelevant
—
denied,
Second,
unlawful.”),
initial
cert.
points
the dissent
to Bushnell’s con-
U.S. -,
safety
justification
for his
115 L.Ed.2d
cern
as a
for Fer-
government
nandez’s continued
must
detention. As the record
establish that
quite clearly
however,
reveals
supra
“sufficiently
n.
Fernandez’s consent to search is
safety
act of
purge
primary
Bushnell’s
stem from
free will to
concerns
taint
subjective hunch,
air,”
illegal [seizure],
“tension in
same
sup
must be
[or]
*8
already
pressed
and nervousness that
poisonous
we
dis-
as fruit of the
tree.”7
Mimms,
106, 110,
[by
always,
330,
A
Bushnell] I'm
when someone
v.
vania
434 U.S.
98 S.Ct.
gets
333,
always
nervous
me
(1977),
like that around
I’m
investigative
but an
my
being jeopardized,
safety
concerned for
sir.
supported by
detention must nonetheless be
rea
[byQ
Fernandez]
counsel for
This
Furthermore,
nervous-
suspicion.
contrary
sonable
to the
you
ness that
talked about?
suggestion,
holding today
dissent’s
our
does
Yes, sir,
A:
the air
tension in
and
capacity
stuff.
to diminish the
of officers to
added).
Aplt.App.
(emphasis
at 56-57
safety
deal
their
concerns. An officer
While Bushnell's hunch turned out to be cor-
here,
always
backup,
call for
did
as Bushnell
as
rect,
simply
can not conclude from his testi-
long
suspect
as the officer
detain a
does not
mony
"specific
that he acted
basis of
on the
addition,
suspicion.
without reasonable
In
if an
required by Terry
reasonable inferences” as
v.
lacking
officer
wishes to
Ohio,
1,
1868,
392 U.S.
88
20
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d 889
safety
by detaining
address his
a sus
concerns
pect
questioning
guns
drugs,
and
about
he
may attempt to do so
aon consensual basis. See
dangers police
6. The dissent notes the
officers
Soto,
United
(10th Cir.1989);
(informing an individual of his constitutional
also United States v.
see
(10th
448,
Cir.1993);
Lowe,
rights,
particularly
Fourth Amendment
F.2d
451
999
Mendoza-Salgado,
rights,
important
964
it shows the
v.
F.2d
because
(10th Cir.1992); Ward,
993, 1011
police
prepared
961
at
individual that
to
Walker,
1534;
respect
rights);
ond, absolutely intervening there were no illegal
circumstances between the
detention
BROWN,
WESLEY E.
Senior District
and Fernandez’s consent. Both of these fac
Judge, dissenting.
suggest
tors
that there was no “break in the
I respectfully dissent.
I would find that
causal
illegality
connection between the
the defendant’s Fourth
rights
Amendment
Recalde,
thereby
the evidence
obtained.”
violated,
were not
and I would affirm the
was “afoot.” 29. Bushnell majority erroneously discounts the factors felt Fernandez and “definitely Blanch were underlying the officer’s nervous,” yet he had no idea what safety. reasonable concern for his nervous about. Id. at 32. He stated with starting point Facts. The respect appellate to the nervous mannerisms he ob- review of ruling the district court’s must be served Fernandez and Blanch that: “I the facts as determined perceived they the finder of fact. something know that I don’t know, trooper’s Based on testimony, entire something there is making them ner- magistrate made officer, findings vous and extensive also as an of fact feel an obli- gation this case. He responsibility pursue found that whatever Thus, noticed that the them windows on the nervous.” at 29. defendant’s illegal very detention truck were quality trooper here “had a dark. The testified purposefulness” in that that the enough Bushnell continued to windows were dark that he *10 solely detain Fernandez based on a could not see tension inside the truck. Bushnell vague the air and his hunch decided something that the vehicle for a window-tint afoot, was with hope something “the that trooper, violation. The who traveling was might Brown, up.” south, turn 422 U.S. at pursued turned around and the vehicle 2262; Recalde, 1459; S.Ct. at see 761 F.2d at which was northbound. The vehicle was fast, trooper sufficiently Bushnell his very and it took the was concerned about
traveling
troop-
safety
backup.
eight
to overtake it. The
that he called for
Bushnell
nine miles
to confirm
pulled alongside the vehicle
check
er
also radioed for an NCIC
on the vehi-
too dark.
he
were
When
occupants,
that the windows
cle and
but he did
not receive
so,
“pulled
[his]
did
the defendant
reply.
up warning
wrote
citation
Bushnell
emergency
into the
lane
about two thirds
Sergeant
for the
Mangelson,
defendant.
signaled
trooper had not
though
even
officer,
backup
in six to
min-
arrived
seven
lights.
or turned on its
pull
vehicle to
over
arrived,
Mangelson
utes. When
Bushnell re-
veiy
the conduct
un-
trooper
The
considered
proceeded
turned to the vehicle and
to ask
suspicious.
trooper
The
usual and
gun in
if there was a
Fernandez
the vehicle.
vehicle and then
the defendants’
behind
any illegal drugs.
He also asked if there were
up.”
and sped
traffic lane
The
reentered the
When Fernandez stated
neither of these
trooper
might
the driver
be under
believed
vehicle,
present
trooper
items
alcohol or
other
the influence of
have some
given
asked for and was
consent to search
problem.
lights
turned
his
Bushnell
for them.
stopped
for the window tint and
the vehicle
majority
Investigative Detention.
The
operation.
ap-
improper
lane
trooper’s
that the
concludes
decision to de-
Fernandez,
driver,
proached
defendant
tain the defendant for a few
for the
minutes
registra-
for a driver’s license and
asked
purpose
asking
guns
drugs
about
was
purpose
stop.
tion
told him the
of the
than
trooper’s
based on
more
The
found that
magistrate
“[a]s
unparticularized hunch of
wrongdoing.
produced
license
his driver’s
his hand trem-
portions
concede
troop-
that selected
unusually
was
nervous
bled. Fernandez
testimony
suppression
er’s
hearing
at the
can
driving
which
the erratic
caused the
with
support
trooper
be used
view. The
trooper
something was ‘afoot.’
to believe
air,”
feeling
cited a
of “tension in the
why
trooper asked Fernandez
When the
sense,”
“something
“sixth
and his belief
nervous,
trooper
was
did not receive a
so
explanations
partial
was afoot” as
for his
satisfactory explanation.”
trooper
The
testi-
Clearly,
testimony by
conduct.
such
itself
fied that he discussed
the defendant
specific
would not constitute
and articulable
driving
was
whether the defendant
under
justify
facts sufficient to
are
detention. We
questioned
and also
the defendant
influence
required
evidence,
to look at all of the
howev-
why
off the
as to
he drove
road
er, to
if
facts
determine
warranted a
that he did.
manner
suspecting
officer in
that criminal
magistrate
determined that
The
activity
in believing
was afoot or
that his
threatening pres-
does not have
safety
danger. Moreover,
inwas
ence,
build,
height
of modest
that he is
required
uphold
suppression
if
ruling
put
that he tried
ease
there is
reasonable view the evidence
magistrate
stop. The
indicated
Neu,
it.
States
See United
nervousness
not abate”
Fernandez’s
“did
Cir.1989).
“excessive,”
and that
during the
objective justi-
Given the “minimal level of
Additionally,
“this
unusual.”
Mr.
required
fication” that is
for a brief detention
Blanch,
asleep when
who was
Bushnell first
here,
the type
Delgado,
at issue
see INS v.
driver,
approached
appeared
awoke and
L.Ed.2d 247
seeing
Blanch
startled
Bushnell.
(1984), as well as our
deferential review
popped up
rigidly.
in the seat and sat
He
magistrate,
the facts found
I have
erectly throughout
the en-
continued to sit
approach
some trouble with the
taken
His reaction was unusual. The
counter.
majority opinion.
magistrate
The
discounts
“Trooper
found that
Bushnell was
significance
of Mr.
very
Fernandez’s erratic
suspicious and concerned
his own
about
driving
safety.”
by stating
sufficiently
it “was
Bushnell testified that under the
only warning
minor to warrant
citation.”
the fact that
were two
circumstances
there
trooper
warning
him
adults in
truck caused
concern Whether or not the
issued a
some
point.
The
safety.
magistrate
point
citation
is that
noted
is beside
*11
provided
specific
indication
something
conduct
of
more
defendant’s
serious than a
to a
of
factual basis
contributed
only by
minor traffic
substituting
infraction”
suspicion
and reasonable con-
judgment
its
for that of an officer who has
safety.
cern for
officer’s
The defendant’s
made
stops
thousands of traffic
and whose
officer,
conduct was considered
who
testimony indicated that the defendant’s ac-
stops,
has made thousands of traffic
to be
very
tions were
unusual and caused him con-
Under
circum-
unusual and erratic.
safety.
majori-
cern for
In my
view the
stances,
trooper reasonably
attached
ty’s approach is inconsistent with the Su-
degree
suspicion
certain
of
to the defendant’s
preme
view
suspi-
Court’s
of the reasonable
majority
actions. The
from
confident
its
analysis:
cion
reading
typed transcript
of a
that the defen-
process
does not deal with hard cer-
innocuous, explaining
dant’s actions were
tainties,
probabilities. Long
but with
be-
highly plausible
that “it is
that Fernandez
probabilities
fore the
law
was articulated
thought
being pulled
he
over” and
such, practical
as
people formulated cer-
might
“an
well
innocent cautious driver
be-
tain common-sense conclusions about hu-
pulls along
lieve an officer who
beside him on
behavior;
jurors
man
as factfinders are
stays
highway
looking
there
at him
permitted
do
the same —and so are law
pull
intends
him to
over.”
for
Whether or
enforcement officers.
[T]he evidence thus
interpretation
speculative
not this
of the rec-
weighed
collected must be seen and
not in
true,1
clearly
ord
in
either ease it is
not
library
by scholars,
terms
analysis
but
dispositive.
always possible
It is
to construct
as understood
versed in
those
the field
explanation
an innocent
for what can also be
of law enforcement.
interpreted
reasonably
as behavior indicative
Ohio,
activity.
Terry
supra
criminal
v.
Cf.
Cortez,
411, 418,
United States
449 U.S.
(Three
street,
walking up
men
and down a
S.Ct.
window). Moreover,
looking in a store
such
in
legitimately
The officer
case
speculation
mark
misses the
because what
concerned about the
may
reason
the defen-
may
the driver
not
think-
have been
driving.
dant’s erratic
ing
proper
point
purposes
is not the
focal
Cf.
Brignoni-Ponce,
of the Fourth Amendment.
(1975) (In
2582,
reasonably
any suspicion
attached
to the de-
aliens,
illegal
to believe that a car contains
majority’s
fendant’s actions. The
dismissal
relevant,
may
“[t]he driver’s behavior
driving
the erratic
as a
factor
attempts
driving
erratic
obvious
evade
significance seems to me to substitute this
suspicion.”)
officers can
a reasonable
judgment
court’s
for that of the
officer
testimony
The officer’s
indicated that based
upon
quick
field—who was called
amake
driver’s actions he believed that the
training
experi-
decision based
driver
have been under the influence of
Sharpe,
ence. See
problem.2
alcohol or
some
had
other
He was
(1985)
(the
why
concerned as to
the defendant acted
court “should take care to consider
sight
such manner
the mere
offi-
acting
swiftly
whether the
in a
majority correctly
situation,
*12
us
light
of
sense tells
about
dispel the officer’s concerns or
what common
served
behavior,
ac- human
the excessive nervousness
for the defendant’s
explain the reason
rationally
contrary,
in this case can
be viewed
Mr. Fernandez’s
shown
To the
tions.
activity.
only
possible
of
criminal
as
indication
passenger’s excessive nervousness
the
Sharpe,
legitimate
United States v.
concerns.
the officer’s
increased
Cf.
1575, 84
105 S.Ct.
may
majority also undertakes what
The
(1985) (“[C]ommon
ordinary
hu
sense
discounting
systematic
a
be
as
best
described
govern
rigid
experience
man
must
over
crite
of the nervous behavior
significance
the
of
ria.”).
passen-
by
the
the defendant and
exhibited
noting
majority
reli
finds the district court’s
in
course of this traffic
ger
the
troubling
by
upon
particularly
that
itself
ance
nervousness
[ner-
have never held
that “we
suspicion of
contains no
that
a reasonable
because
record
evidence
creates
vousness]
token,
By
any prior knowledge
“had
of Fer
activity.”
the same
we Bushnell
criminal
be
nandez
Blanch to make an
of
held that nervousness cannot
evaluation
have never
discounting of
suspicion.
a
their behavior.” This
what
reasonable
sufficient
observed,
view,
Rather,
significance
my
in
particular
of the
be-
the officer
inconsis
ordinary
from the
with the maxim that
human
havior at issue must be determined
tent
case-by-
experience
govern
rigid
a
over
criteria.
totality
the circumstances on
of
Sharpe, supra.
If such a circumstance
See
case basis.
prevent
upon ner
were sufficient to
reliance
majority’s approach
disagree
I
only rarely
then
if
vousness
it would
ever
findings
by
made
I think the
because
Yet,
appropriate to consider such behavior.
testimony
magistrate were based on
of
many
upon signs
of our decisions have relied
specific
during
stop.
exhibited
behavior
supporting
of nervousness as
reasonable sus
contributes, at
least
some
That behavior
picion despite
fact
if
all
that most
suspi-
degree, toward a
reasonable
detaining
cases
no
of these
officer had
(and
it is un-
cion. The
asserts
knowledge
prior
suspect’s
mannerisms.
true)
citizens,
doubtedly
that most
Soto,
e.g.,
United States v.
flashing lights and from twice blasts promptly when officer activated his over- pull siren but the vehicle failed over. The lights Maj.Op. head and siren.” at n. 4.4 approximately car mile accurate, traveled and a hardly that statement it While over, pulling during explains half why investigative before which time detention opinion explicitly 3. investigative The Walraven does not state 975-76. An detention was warrant- justified by legiti- whether the detention was offi- ed in Walraven because the officer was mately cer's why reasonable belief that men were com- concerned with the reason the men mitting "perceived a crime pull immediately the officer's why failed to over well-being.” threat conferring to his own at were con- each other. Similar implicated cerns were case the defen- majority In a footnote the contends that Walra- driving dant's erratic and his nervous behavior. distinguishable by ven is other facts as well. The trooper legitimately The was concerned with the majority suspects states that in Walraven why reason the defendant drove over into actively “conferred with one another and ob- emergency trooper lane he saw police pursuit” served the officer sped up pulled highway then onto the back flight the court notes that such intentional trooper when the in behind him. guilt.” point "circumstantial evidence This only majority underscores the the de- reasonableness of also states that the officer in Walraven, "reasonably suspected tention in the instant case. In al- Walraven that the defen- couriers," though drug pointing specifically Maj.Op. there no facts dants were n. car, presence drugs although majority explain why to the the defendants’ does not we found that the defendants' failure reasonable for the officer in Walraven to case, (together suspicion. with their nervous and the mannerisms have such a As in instant experience) gave pointing specifi- officer's law enforcement rise there were no facts in Walraven cally presence to a drugs that the defendants defendants’ activity. Additionally, were involved in criminal id. at car. fails to mention stopped investigative that a reasonable officer would have justified but Walraven Maj.Op. Fourth truck. at 877. case violated the defendant’s in this detention material distinction I see no Amendment. Guzman, confronting the officer the situation between (10th Cir.1988), this court indicated that confronting the one in this case “arbitrary action” associated with “unfet- in Walraven.5 stop” whom to tered discretion as to *14 sum, find that the officer’s brief I would “is within In for traffic violations unreasonable of purpose meaning defendant for the the of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. detention illegal there were firearms or expressed asking whether at 1516. The court concern that I would justification was reasonable and legal in the car drugs could use some to officers court. investigate affirm the district stop person in order unrelat- a to ed The court therefore criminal matters. Stops. A—Pretext Section adopted determining for a standard whether majority’s holding ultimate in Section The and, “pretextual” stop consequently, a is un- to expressly decline decide” the A “we that “a court constitutional: should ask ‘not argument stop would seem to pretextual validly the whether officer could have made unnecessary. of pretext discussion make but under the cir- same However, majority’s analysis of the evi- a cumstances reasonable officer would have its conclusion that there is consid- dence and stop of in the absence the invalid made “suggesting stop this that erable evidence ”6 origi- purpose.’ (emphasis at 1517 in Id. appears me may pretextual” been to to nal). emphasized The court that this stan- expansive pretext of on an view the be based inquire dard did not into the actual state of Supreme Court that is at odds with doctrine stop mind of the officer but Moreover, the of an precedent. inclusion “properly preserves Supreme Court’s re- pretext sug- of issue discussion extended quirement objective inquiry of an into Fourth in it some role the resolu- gests played that activity.” Amendment view, my magis- In tion this case. of finding pretex- frankly I I stop that this was not must confess that have some trate’s by difficulty understanding sup- supported In how a court is tual evidence. is Deases, posed “a to determine whether Cir.1990), stop partic- a a we held a district court’s find- officer would have” made pretextual ular “in the of ing stop a cannot be violation absence the invalid clearly purpose.”7 Up is to until I unless found be now had least reversed proposi- to light In of this standard re- understood Guzman stand erroneous. majority stop supported by proba- is peculiar that the feels tion that a which view it seems to and to com- ble and which is based on some viola- compelled assess evidence cause foregone police “it not a conclusion” tion that have enforced with at ment that thus nervous man- Walraven shows that the court understood that in Walraven defendants' upon by perfectly this well were relied court the nature of the issue before it. nerisms suspicion. finding a of reasonable The explain why the nervous mannerisms of does not adopted 6. This standard was from United States supported in Walraven a reason- the defendants Smith, (11th Cir.1986), a case drug the defendants were able stop which the officer who made a did not have sig- but behavior is "limited couriers similar probable cause to believe that a traffic violation in this case. nificance” had been committed. See id. at 708-09. majority's district court 5.The intimation involving suggests may cases inval- that an officer somehow confused Common sense large puzzling. Maj.Op. at registrations id See 879- observe number of traffic violations given appears day and must make a choice as to which 80. No such confusion district fact, stop. stop opinion. ones the district court's reli- violators which court's suggests Any including legitimate poli- upon v. Walraven number of ance factors— cy exactly opposite. primary issue ad- influence an officer's considerations —could particular stop. are court Walraven was whether decision to make a How dressed this legal to determine when a reasonable officer "would there was basis for the defendant’s contin- pursuing trooper the lesser detention have been uninterested in ued confirmed after hope greater registration was valid. Id. at offense" absent a of- defendant’s particular The district reliance on fense? court's regularity would not be set least modicum doctrine forth in Guzman. Examination (“If id. at pretextual. pretext” of such actuality considered “evidence of is in required nothing in New inquiry Mexico more than an into routinely subjective stop cars Bushnell’s state of do most see mind when he and/or stop made the wearing in which the is not decision to driver his seat defendant in belt, this stop unconstitutionally Labeling case.9 then this was not the statistics relied “objective form Conversely, rarely this conclusion pretextual.... if officers subjective evidence” does stop alter the seat-belt violators absent some other inquiry. nature ap- this stop the car ... believe [the reason would proach Supreme conflicts with the pretextual].”) apparently Such Court’s not the stated ease, analysis: view Fourth however, Amendment given majority’s that the “evi- suggesting Whether a Fourth dence have been Amendment violation has pretextual” primarily objective occurred “turns on an consists statistics assess- *15 ment the showing Trooper light officer’s action in Bushnell and other the warnings confronting unit facts and circumstances him regularly members of his issue at time,” the [cite omitted] and not on type or citations for violations of the at the issue actual officer’s state mind the at time in ease. record indicates that this challenged the action was taken. particular unit issued a total of 172 citations warnings improperly tinted windows Macon, 463, Maryland 470, v. 472 U.S. 105 period for the five-month Al- (1985). 11/91. 7/91 S.Ct. See though specific majority the inference the also Villamonte-Marquez, United States v. unstated, from these divines statistics is “evi- 579, 2573, 3, 103 462 U.S. 584 n. S.Ct. 2577 n. arises, it, pretext” dence of as I understand (the 3, (1983) 77 22 L.Ed.2d fact that customs Trooper from the fact that Bushnell has is- boarding ship pursuant officers to statute “significantly warnings sued more” authorizing a the check of vessel’s documen period this five-month than have his fellow suspected tation that the vessel carried mari officers.8 juana not a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
If require the Guzman standard us would stop view in recently the this case as unconstitu- The Sixth Circuit abandoned the simply joined tional because statistics show that this Guzman test and those circuits hold- particular trooper warnings ing has long probable issued more that so as the officer has sug- troopers, respectfully than other then I cause to believe that traffic violation has occurred, gest may it pretext resulting stop be time re-examine the the is not unlawful Apparently amplify 8. order to the Maj. differences under the See officer same circumstances." troopers Op. specific Although between the other at reason for the out, unit, majority majority’s disapproval spelled in his is not the fact focuses the number trooper warnings pursued around previously disregards turned issued and eight ap- defendant's truck for or nine by troop- miles number of formal citations issued contrary majority’s parently proper recently to the view rejected approach ers. We such an procedure. law enforcement It not clear appellant: when was asserted an majority considered fact whether that it Defendant insists the officers' own tes- trooper took nine miles overtake truck timony, normally the Denver do not speed of the because rate of which defen- pres- issue written tickets in the circumstances traveling. dant was ent here. But whether the would nor- mally issue formal written tickets for such con- lines, Along these same I am as to the unclear pertinent duct is immaterial. The issue import majority opinion, of footnote two whether a reasonable officer would have made especially interesting "we comment find it conduct, stop for similar recall Bushnell could not Fernandez's re- would issued a formal citation sponse why when Bushnell asked into merely warning. an informal emergency I do lane.” not understand the Harris, 1004, Moreover, 995 F.2d 1005 of this relevance observation. ten- (10th 1993). Cir. suggests or of the remark that this court is en- Also, appraisal finding in addition to its gaging concerning various a factual Bushnell's statistics, credibility appears describes the manner be at odds —a which made the traffic in this case with the fact in this conclusions of finder of question suppos- and states: “We whether such a which at odds case and is also with the edly objective pretext inquiry. would be 'business as usual' for a nature of
890 Fourth Amendment. violate the and does (6th 8 Ferguson, F.3d 385 v. States United (en banc). Cir.1993) also United States (3rd 210, Cir.), Hawkins, cert.
v. 110, 833, denied, S.Ct. Rusher, (1987); United States — (4th Cir.), denied, 868, 876 cert. 351, -, 121 L.Ed.2d 113 S.Ct.
U.S. Causey, 834 F.2d (1992); Cir.1987) (en banc); (5th United (7th Trigg, 925 F.2d
States v. — U.S. -, denied, Cir.), cert. (1991); 116 L.Ed.2d Cummins, 498, 501 — denied, -, Cir.1990), cert. so 116 L.Ed.2d opined Circuit that Guzman’s
doing the Sixth “objective general evidence” of on the
focus reality “simply aggre
police practice is subjective
gation of the intentions of *16 regions.” majority’s Given the case, I record would
evaluation of the agree that the Guzman test
be inclined to inquiry into the officer’s sub
has become
jective mind and is inconsistent with state of interpretation Supreme Court’s I see
Fourth Amendment. justify a conclusion
record would the traffic of the defendant for was an unreasonable he committed
violations affirm district court.
seizure. would MEREDITH, E. Plaintiff-
Janis
Appellant, CORPORATION, AIRCRAFT
BEECH
Defendant-Appellee. Employment Opportunity
Equal
Commission, Amicus
Curiae.
No. 92-3288. Appeals,
United States Court
Tenth Circuit.
March cer. The notes Fer- developing such eases the appear nandez did not under influ- engage court should sec- unrealistic Thus, ond-guessing.”) majority able ence alcohol when Bushnell talked him. “[tjhis majority declare that is not a What the is that case where a fails add objective defendant’s evasive ... is an action that occurred course of thought stopped trooper If Mr. officer intended Fernandez.” The testified that over, pull why for him to did Mr. Fernandez improper he made the lane because of speed pull up and back onto the road change and the tinted windows. He did in behind him? testify, majority's might suggest, as the statement that he was unconcerned with reason for 2. The states that Bushnell testified that driving. defendant’s erratic actually "this one was not of the reasons he
