Case Information
*1 Before: SILVERMAN, MILLER, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.
Earl Joseph appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. Reviewing de novo, see United States v. Ratigan , 351 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2003), we affirm.
*2 Joseph contends that aiding and abetting armed bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2113 and 2, does not qualify as a predicate crime of violence for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). As Joseph acknowledges, this court has held that armed bank robbery is a categorical crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). See United States v. Watson , 881 F.3d 782, 786 (9th Cir. 2018). Notwithstanding Joseph’s contention that Watson was wrongly decided, we are bound by that decision because Joseph has not shown that it is “clearly irreconcilable” with intervening higher authority. See Miller v. Gammie , 335 F.3d 889, 900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc); see also United States v. Buck , 23 F.4th 919, 929 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that a statute analogous to federal armed bank robbery requires intentional wrongdoing and is a crime of violence). Moreover, “there is no distinction between aiding-and- abetting liability and liability as a principal under federal law,” and therefore a defendant who aids and abets armed bank robbery “is deemed to have committed a crime of violence under § 924(c)’s elements clause.” Young v. United States , 22 F.4th 1115, 1122-23 (9th Cir. 2022).
Because Joseph’s § 924(c) convictions were predicated on qualifying offenses, we affirm the denial of § 2255 relief.
AFFIRMED.
2 19-16967
[*] This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
[**] The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).