UNITED STATES оf America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dwight Stuart NORDLOF, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 18051.
United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.
Jan. 5, 1971.
Rehearing Denied March 31, 1971.
440 F.2d 840
“In setting aside his conviction, this court in a habeas corpus proceeding recognized that the cases upon which it relied all involved felony convictions, but it was оbserved that the rule did not depend on a felony-misdemeanor dichotomy.”
The court also referred to its previous decision in McDonald v. Moore, 5 Cir., 353 F.2d 106, where the defendant had been convicted of a misdemeanor under the State law of Florida, the illegal possession of whiskey. As to that case the court stated (400 F.2d page 597):
“Again we held that the conviction and sentence were invalid due to the failure of the state to advise the appellant of his right to the assistance of counsel.”
I would affirm the order of the district court.
Knoch, Senior Circuit Judge, dissented and filed an opinion.
William J. Bauer, U. S. Atty., Michael P. Siavelis, Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., for plaintiff-appellee; James R. Thompson, 1st Asst. U. S. Atty., Chicago, Ill., John Peter Lulinski, Jeffery Cole, Asst. U. S. Attys., of counsel.
Before KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge, KILEY and KERNER, Circuit Judges.
KILEY, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Nordlof appeals from his conviction, without a jury, of refusing to submit to induction into the armed forces in violation of
Nordlof registered for the draft November 18, 1963, and was classified I-A. He was later reclassified II-S, student defеrment, until August, 1968, when he was reclassified I-A. His appeal from that classification was denied. There1after he was ordered to report for induction on October 28, 1968. He reported, but refused to submit.
At the induction center, Nordlof wrote and presented to a Selective Service System official a six-page statement containing his claim оf conscientious objection to war. Presumably Nordlof‘s claim did not reach, and was not considered by, his local board.
On July 1, 1969, Nordlof was indicted for failure to submit to induction. Before his trial Nordlof moved for remandment to the local board for its determination on his conscientious objection claim. The motion was denied. At trial, his defense testimony in support of his conscientious objection claim was stricken on the ground that Selective Service Regulation
Section 1625.2 provides, in relevant part:
* * * The classification of a registrant shall not be reopened after the local board has mailed to such registrant an Order to Report for Induction * * * unless the local board first specifically finds there has been a change in the registrant‘s status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control.
32 C.F.R. § 1625.2 .
The courts of appeals are divided in their holdings on whether this section permits a local board to reopen a regis
In Schoebel this court decided conscientious objections resulting from “the promptings of a registrant‘s conscience” cannot be a “* * * change in * * * status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control;” and accordingly that Schoebel‘s board could not have reopened his classification under § 1625.2 on his claim made for the first time after the order to report for induction. The deсision in Porter v. United States, 334 F.2d 792 (7th Cir. 1964), which the district court relied on in its decision against Nordlof, was based on authority of Schoebel, as was the earlier case of United States v. Porter, 314 F.2d 833 (7th Cir. 1963).
Nordlof urges that Schoebel should be overruled. He relies principally upon the holding of the Second Circuit in United States v. Gearey, 368 F.2d 144 (2nd Cir. 1966). In Gearey, reaffirmed in United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215 (2nd Cir. 1968), the court held that a conscientious objector claim can “mature” or “crystallizе” after a registrant has received his notice to report for induction, and that this may be a change in status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant has no control within the meaning of
The governmеnt argues, on the other hand, that the ruling in Schoebel is sound and should not be overturned. It relies heavily upon the reasoning in the Ninth Circuit‘s recent en banc decision (five of thirteen judges dissenting) in Ehlert v. United States, 422 F.2d 332 (1970). The court in Ehlert considered, but declined to follow, the Second Circuit‘s decision in Gearey. The court stated that Ehlert as a rational human being is in “completе charge of his own thinking” and therefore a belated claim for conscientious objector classification is a circumstance within his control. The court also thought that conscientious objection claims pose more difficulty of adjudication for boards than other claims because of the necessity of determining sincerity with a depth inquiry into claimant‘s family life, religious training, etc. The court went on to say that if it were to follow Gearey the local board would be required to determine when the registrant‘s beliefs crystallized, or more accurately, when the registrant claims that his beliefs crystallized; and that such a procedure would be unduly burdensome for local boаrds.
We cannot accept the reasoning of the Ehlert court. Even assuming that the majority is correct in stating that man is in complete charge of his own thinking, it does not follow that man can control his conscience. We think conscience is not the same as thinking. Webster defines conscience as “a knowledge or feeling of right and wrong, with a compulsion to do right; moral judgment that prohibits or opposes the violation of a previously recognized ethical principle.”3 Implicit in this definition is the notion that the dictates of conscience are involuntary and compulsory and outside the control of the holder of
We therefore favor the views of Judge Seitz, expressed in Scott: “one cannot sincerely turn his consciеnce on and off at will;” and of Judge Merrill in his dissent in Ehlert: “Conscientious objection, in truth, is a contradiction of control. Just as a conviction honestly dictated by conscience cannot be banished at the will of the holder, so, conversely, a belief conveniently subject to the control of the holder is not conscientiously entertainеd.” 422 F.2d at 339. We conclude that conscience is beyond the control of the registrant.
It is our further view that a conscientious objection belief may mature and crystallize after the registrant receives his Order to Report for Induction. The general formation of conscience is said by Freud to commence early in childhood, and devеlopment is a continuous process of meeting particular moral decisions.6 The late Paul Tillich said “The constitution of a person as a person never comes to an end during his whole life process,” it is a “process of self-integration * * * a continuous struggle with disintegration,” in which he is free to develop “the moral side of the function of self-integration” in the totality of acts which face him in life.7 This view is supported by other eminent authority.8
It follows that a conscientious objection to war, while developing before, can mature after, a registrant has received an Order to Report for Induction. As Judge Seitz in Scott states: “Although a registrant may have no conscientious objector leanings at all when he registers, his beliefs may later begin to evolve toward conscientious objection.”9 This view is impliedly accepted by the Supreme Court in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 336, 90 S. Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308 (1970). The term of this particular development can be due, in part, to the receipt of the notice itself. As Judge Kaufman in Gearey, 368 F.2d at 150, says: “Realization that induction is pending, and that he may soon be asked to take another‘s life, may cаuse a young man finally
We think Nordlof‘s readings in the Bible and his discussions with Mr. Guzman could have given him a view different from what he previously had concerning his duty with respect to war. His conscience then could have begun to form with respect to the particular moral issue that was facing him, and might have reached its fruition only when his induction was at hand.
We conсlude that crystallization of conscientious objection beliefs may be a change in status resulting from circumstances over which the registrant had no control. We therefore overrule Schoebel as the law of this circuit.10
We are not impressed by the government‘s argument that, practically speaking, belated crystallization is “highly improbable if not impossible.” We cannot speculate that Nordlof‘s board upon consideration of his claim would view it as “highly improbable.” Moreover, such a determination goes to the merits of Nordlof‘s claims, which are not to be considered unless a reopening is granted. Mulloy v. United States, 398 U.S. 410, 416-418, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 26 L. Ed.2d 362 (1970); United States v. Freeman, 388 F.2d 246, 248-249 (7th Cir. 1967).
Nor do we think the government is aided by the fact that once a claimant is inducted he has the “absolute right” to file a conscientious objection claim which, if he persuades the military to grant it, will result in discharge from combat service. This post-induction process effectually presupposes that Nordlof‘s claim is not sincere, for if he sincerely objectеd to participation in war, he would not enter the military. Moreover, Army Regulation 635-20,11 which concerns post-induction claims for conscientious objection status made while in the army, might be interpreted to preclude claims that crystallized prior to induction but were denied by the Selective Service System because made after аn induction order was mailed.
And even if a board determination of the sincerity of a conscientious objection claim is burdensome to local boards, we cannot agree with the Ehlert court that this is a relevant ground for turning away the claim. The only question is whether a recently formed conscientious objection belief is, or may be, а change in status resulting from a circumstance which is beyond the control of the registrant, thereby entitling the registrant to a reopening. This is the criterion set forth in
We reject also the government‘s argument that Nordlof had time between his registration and induction ordеr to inform his board of his “newly acquired beliefs,” and that by failure to do so has waived his right to have the board consider his claim. This argument presupposes the correctness of the Schoebel rule, that a crystallization of belief after induction order cannot as a matter of law amount to a circumstance over which Nordlof hаd no control. It also presupposes that Nordlof‘s conscience was formed before receipt of the induction order so as to render his claim
Finally, we see no merit in the government‘s contention that Nordlof did not at any time file his claim with the board. The administrative process had not terminated when he filed his claim with an official within the Selectivе Service System who should have forwarded it to the board.12 United States v. Stafford, 389 F.2d 215, 218, 219 (2nd Cir. 1968).
The judgment is reversed.
KNOCH, Senior Circuit Judge (dissenting).
Reluctantly I find myself in disagreement with the majority. I do not believe that our decision in United States v. Schoebel, 201 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1953) should be overruled at this time.