United States v. DupasUnited States v. Dupas
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Susan P. Graber, John R. Gibson, Consuelo M. Callahan
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California David O. Carter, District Judge, Presiding
Argued March 11, 2005; Resubmitted July 27, 2005 Pasadena, California
Filed August 3, 2005 Amended August 16, 2005
Before: John R. Gibson,* Susan P. Graber, and Consuelo M. Callahan, Circuit Judges.
Opinion by Judge Graber
*The Honorable John R. Gibson, Senior United States Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.
COUNSEL
Richard Y. Lee, Assistant United States Attorney, Santa Ana, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.
ORDER
The opinion filed on August 3, 2005, slip opinion at 9059, and appearing at 2005 WL 1845503 (9th Cir. Aug. 3, 2005), is amended as follows:
On slip opinion page 9066 n.3, appearing at 2005 WL 1845503, at *3 n.3, change “The Ex Post Facto Clause of the Fifth Amendment,” to “The Ex Post Facto Clause of
On slip opinion page 9069 n.5, appearing at 2005 WL 1845503, at *4 n.5, replace footnote 5 with the following:
Defendant raises two arguments about the procedure that the district court must follow in the event that the court agrees to resentence him. We leave those issues for the district court to decide in the first instance.
Petitions for rehearing and for rehearing en banc may be filed.
OPINION
Defendant Matthew Eugene Dupas appeals the sentence imposed after his conviction for possessing stolen mail in violation of
First, Defendant argues that the retroactivity principles of the
Second, Defendant challenges two conditions of supervised release pertaining to searches and to payments for substance abuse treatment. We affirm the former and, although we are uncertain whether the latter was an improper delegation of the district court‘s authority under
A. Factual and Procedural Background
Defendant and a co-defendant were stopped by a police officer for traffic violations. After the officer learned that an arrest warrant was outstanding for the co-defendant, he arrested the co-defendant and searched the passenger compartment of the car. He found mail, checks, and credit cards belonging to other people and, consequently, arrested Defendant as well. A search of the entire car revealed many similar items.
After the district court denied Defendant‘s motion to suppress, he entered a conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of stolen mail. In the plea agreement, Defendant and the government stipulated to an amount of loss not exceeding $5,000. Before accepting Defendant‘s plea, the district court warned him that the court was bound to apply the Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.“) and, therefore, could not guarantee that Defendant would receive the sentence agreed to in the plea agreement.2
The court also imposed several conditions of supervised release, two of which Defendant challenges on appeal. The conditions are reproduced below, in our discussion of Defendant‘s arguments.
B. Ex post facto principles do not prohibit resentencing under Booker and Ameline.
Some background is helpful to understanding Defendant‘s argument. After the Supreme Court invalidated Washington State‘s sentencing scheme in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), many courts and commentators correctly predicted that the Supreme Court also would hold that the federal system of sentencing guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment (as it ultimately did in Booker). Commentators discussed a variety of remedies, including sentencing trials at which a jury would be required to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts that determine the sentencing range. See, e.g., Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Beyond Blakely, 16 Fed. Sent. Rep. 316, 322-23 (2004) (discussing sentencing findings by juries). The Supreme Court did not select that remedy, preferring instead to excise the elements of the Sentencing Reform Act that had made the guidelines mandatory. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756-57.
Defendant is not satisfied with the remedy selected by the Supreme Court. The “advisory guidelines” remedy gives the sentencing judge discretion to sentence outside the guideline range, but still allows the sentencing judge (as distinct from a jury) to make the findings of fact necessary to determine the guideline range in the first place. In Defendant‘s case, where the parties agreed to a loss of no more than $5,000 but the district court instead found a loss of $49,306.95, Defendant would prefer a remedy that eliminates the court‘s power to make findings of fact at all. Under Ameline, the district court could make the same finding of fact at resentencing and, if it does, Defendant will have to rely on the court‘s discretion to receive a sentence lower than the range set by the guidelines. By contrast, under a system in which the guidelines were mandatory but a jury was required to decide the facts necessary to determine the sentencing range, Defendant would be assured of a sentencing range corresponding to a loss of $5,000 or less, because the government agreed not to argue that the amount of loss exceeded $5,000. In pursuit of that result, Defendant fashions a novel due process argument based on ex post facto principles. His argument proceeds in two steps.
In the second step of his argument, Defendant “essentially asks this court to apply Justice Stevens’ opinion in Booker retroactively, but refuse to apply Justice Breyer‘s opinion in Booker retroactively.” United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304 (11th Cir. 2005). He argues that we must apply different retroactivity analyses to Booker‘s two holdings. Specifically, he argues that, under Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 327-28 (1987), defendants in pending cases must be afforded the benefit of a constitutional rule such as Justice Stevens’ Sixth Amendment holding. But retroactive application of new judicial interpretations of criminal statutes, Defendant argues, is barred by the ex post facto principles that informed the Supreme Court‘s due process decision in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 353-55 (1964).3 In short, Defendant seeks the benefit of Justice Stevens‘s opinion—which, standing alone, would require the facts supporting his sentence to be admitted or proved beyond a reasonable doubt—without the burden of Justice Breyer‘s opinion—which instead resolves the Sixth Amendment problem by making the Guidelines advisory. Again, in Defendant‘s particular circumstance, that would ensure a lower sentence than that originally imposed because Defendant and the government stipulated to an amount of loss not exceeding $5,000 and the guideline range would be correspondingly lower.
[1] Defendant‘s argument suffers from three fatal flaws. First, as the Eleventh Circuit pointed out in responding to a very similar argument, “in Booker, the Supreme Court expressly stated that both holdings should be applied to cases on direct review.” Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1304. And our decision in Ameline, under which Sixth Amendment violations
can be cured by giving district courts the opportunity to resentence defendants under the now-advisory Guidelines, necessarily implies that appellate courts should apply both Booker holdings retroactively.
[2] Second, “[i]n United States v. Newman, 203 F.3d 700, 703 (9th Cir. 2000), we held that Bouie applied only to after-the-fact increases in the scope of criminal liability and not to retroactive sentence enhancements.” Holgerson v. Knowles, 309 F.3d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added);4 see also Webster v. Woodford, 369 F.3d 1062, 1069 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that
[3] Finally, even if we could distinguish Newman, the holding in Bouie would not entitle Defendant to protection from every change in sentencing law that might disadvantage him. In Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451, 458 (2001), the Supreme Court explained that, despite its expansive phrasing, Bouie did not “incorporate[ ] the specific prohibitions of the Ex Post Facto Clause” into the Due Process Clause:
[Bouie‘s] rationale rested on core due process concepts of notice, foreseeability, and, in particular, the right to fair warning as those concepts bear on the constitutionality of attaching criminal penalties to what previously had been innocent conduct.
Id. at 459 (citation omitted). Fair warning, then, is the touchstone of the retroactivity analysis under the Due Process Clause. See id. at 462.
[4] The Eleventh Circuit relied on Rogers’ clarification of Bouie to reject an argument similar to the one that Defendant makes here. Duncan, 400 F.3d at 1306-08. The defendant in Duncan had argued that “Justice Breyer‘s remedial interpretation, if applied retroactively, would increase the sentence authorized by the jury‘s verdict” to the maximum permitted by the statute of conviction. Id. at 1307. The court held that, because the relevant maximum at the time the defendant committed his offense was the statutory maximum enacted in the
[5] For those three reasons, we reject Defendant‘s argument and grant him a limited remand according to the procedures set forth in Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1084-85.5
C. The district court did not plainly err by imposing conditions of supervised release.
1. The search condition
[6] Defendant argues that the following condition, which provides for searches “with or without” cause, facially violates his Fourth Amendment rights:
The defendant shall submit person and property to search or seizure at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer with or without a warrant and with or without reasonable or probable cause[.]
The constitutionality of this condition is controlled by United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). There, we upheld an apparently identical condition of supervised release that required the defendant to submit to searches by any probation or law enforcement officer “with or without reasonable or probable cause.” Id.; see also id. (Fernandez, J., concurring and dissenting). We are bound by that holding.6
[7] Defendant also argues that we must remand for the district court to provide a statement of reasons why the condition was imposed. Under Rearden, an explicit statement of reasons is not absolutely required by
court lacked sufficient reasons for imposing the condition. Defendant‘s challenge rests only on the Fourth Amendment, and he does not explain how the absence of a statement of reasons furthers his constitutional challenge or distinguishes this case from Guagliardo.
2. The treatment condition
The court ordered Defendant to participate in substance abuse treatment and imposed the following condition regarding payment for that treatment:
As directed by the Probation Officer, the defendant shall pay all or part of the costs of treating the defendant‘s drug or alcohol dependancy to the aftercare contractor during the period of community supervision, pursuant to
18 USC 3672 .The defendant shall provide payment and proof of payment as directed by the Probation Officer[.]
Defendant argues that allowing the probation officer to determine Defendant‘s share of the treatment costs improperly delegates to the probation officer the court‘s exclusive authority under
[8]
respect to the probation system and its officers. Among other things, it gives the director “the authority to contract with any appropriate public or private agency or person for the detection of and care in the community of an offender” with substance abuse or psychiatric issues. After setting forth the various duties and powers of the director, the statute‘s final paragraph turns to the authority of the court to order payment for substance abuse and psychiatric treatment:
Whenever the court finds that funds are available for payment by or on behalf of a person furnished such services, training, or guidance, the court may direct that such funds be paid to the Director. Any moneys collected under this paragraph shall be used to reimburse the appropriations obligated and disbursed in payment for such services, training, or guidance.
There are good arguments on both sides of the question that Defendant raises. On the one hand,
specified authority. See, e.g., Gunning, 339 F.3d at 949 (“The language of the MVRA is categorical.“); United States v. Kassar, 47 F.3d 562, 568 (2d Cir. 1995) (“The statutory language of
[9] On the other hand, the only other circuit to address this precise question concluded that delegation to a probation officer was permissible under
court distinguished that directive from the one in Albro. In Albro, the district court had set a total restitution amount and directed the probation office to determine a payment schedule. Albro, 32 F.3d at 174. The Warden panel held that its case was different because the probation officer‘s only responsibility was to determine the offender‘s ability to pay. 261 F.3d at 366.
There are strong arguments in favor of Warden‘s position, not the least of which is our preference for avoiding circuit splits. Additionally, the context of the provision in
[10] Fortunately, our only task here is to determine whether the district court plainly erred. “Before [we] can correct an error not raised at trial, there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.” United States v. Jordan, 256 F.3d 922, 926 (9th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Only when all three conditions are met may
we reverse, and then only if the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation” of the proceeding. Id. We conclude that, even if the district court erred, the second condition is not met in this case. That is, the error, if any, is not “plain.” For an error to be plain, it must be “clear” or “obvious” under current law. United States v. Paul, 37 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). As our discussion above suggests, we are not persuaded that any error would have been “clear” under current law. See Warden, 291 F.3d at 365-66 (allowing delegation). Accordingly,
In summary, the district court did not plainly err by imposing the two conditions of supervised release that Defendant challenges on appeal. But under our holding in Ameline, a limited remand of Defendant‘s prison sentence is appropriate. That remedy is not barred by the ex post facto principles articulated by the Supreme Court in Bouie and Rogers.
Conditions of supervised release AFFIRMED; sentence of imprisonment REMANDED.