171 F.2d 285 | 2d Cir. | 1948
We dismissed the plaintiff’s petition on October 28, 1947, because we thought that it was properly a part of a second possible appeal in the action, over which we should have no jurisdiction.
The prayer for relief is twofold: (1) That we direct the district court to strike out from Article XII of the judgment a clause, which gives leave to “Alcoa” to apply to the district court “for a determination of the question whether it still has a monopoly of the aluminum ingot market in the United States”; and (2) that we direct the court to dismiss “Alcoa’s” petition, filed in accordance with the leave so granted. The purport of the article as a whole may be compressed as follows: after the Surplus Property Administrator shall have propounded an overall plan for the disposal of government owned aluminum plants, the Attorney General may ask the district court (1) to dissolve “Alcoa” in whole or in part; (2) to enforce the plan, “if the same shall
We also deny the prayer to direct a dismissal of “Alcoa’s” petition. The plaintiff apparently wishes the initiative to rest in its hands alone; but we know of no principle, either at law or in equity, that a defendant may not bring on an action or any proceeding in an action, for determination, when the plaintiff unreasonably delays doing so. If it be the plaintiff’s understanding that it stands in this respect upon a footing different from that of a private suitor, we cannot agree. Only by virtue of the challenged passage in Article XII does “Alcoa” retain any power to stir the plaintiff to action; and it was within its rights to avail itself of that power as it did. Now that the Attorney General has also made use of the leave given him to move under Article XII, there is no reason why the court should not proceed to decide the two petitions together.
The petition is denied.
United States v. Caffey, 2 Cir., 164 F.2d 159.
334 U.S. 258, 68 S.Ct 1035.