UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Deryke Matthew PFEIFER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 15-14666
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.
Date Filed: 09/26/2016
Non-Argument Calendar
We have stated, post-Booker,1 that the government bears the burden of proving the applicability of sentencing enhancements by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Washington, 714 F.3d 1358, 1361 (11th Cir. 2013). Under that standard, the burden is satisfied if the trier of fact “believe[s] that the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312, 1315 (11th Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Due process requires the evidence presented bear “minimal indicia of reliability,” and the defendant be given the opportunity to refute that evidence. United States v. Rodriguez, 751 F.3d 1244, 1261 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, U.S., 135 S.Ct. 310, 190 L.Ed.2d 225 (2014); see also United States v. Giltner, 889 F.2d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir. 1989).
The district court did not err in crafting Williams’ sentence. First of all, the court employed the correct standard of proof as stated in our precedent. Furthermore, below, Williams encouraged the court to employ the preponderance of the evidence standard, inviting the use of that standard. Pensacola Motor Sales Inc. v. E. Shore Toyota, LLC, 684 F.3d 1211, 1231 (11th Cir. 2012) (“A party that invites an error cannot complain when its invitation is accepted.“). As for the court‘s finding that Williams was involved in the shooting of the victim, the evidence supports a finding that he perpetrated the shooting by a preponderance of the evidence. Williams was apprehended fleeing from a car that had left the site of the shooting at a high speed, which suggests involvement. He was apprehended after discarding a gun while being chased on foot by a police officer, which again implies guilt; traces of DNA obtained from the gun matched Williams‘. Gunshot residue was found on Williams’ hands and clothes, which confirms that he was near a gun that had discharged. While Williams is correct that this evidence may not have been enough to satisfy the beyond a reasonable doubt standard, the Government was not required to meet that high a burden. Under the preponderance standard, the evidence was sufficient.
Because the district court did not err in sentencing Williams, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
Stephen Ganter, Christine A. Freeman, Federal Defender Program, Inc., Deryke Matthew Pfeifer, Montgomery, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before MARCUS, WILLIAM PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Deryke Pfeifer appeals the district court‘s order granting the government‘s motion to involuntarily medicate him to restore him to competency to stand trial for his charged offense of threatening the President of the United States in violation of
This Court reviews de novo the district court‘s determination of the first Sell factor. United States v. Diaz, 630 F.3d 1314, 1331 (11th Cir. 2011). The government bears the burden of proving the factual findings underlying the Sell factors by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1331-32.
In Sell, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of involuntary medication to restore competency. Two earlier cases—Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 110 S.Ct. 1028, 108 L.Ed.2d 178 (1990), and Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 112 S.Ct. 1810, 118 L.Ed.2d 479 (1992)—had established that an individual has a significant constitutionally-protected liberty interest in “avoiding the unwanted administration of
First, a court must find that important governmental interests are at stake. The Government‘s interest in bringing to trial an individual accused of a serious crime is important. That is so whether the offense is a serious crime against the person or a serious crime against property. In both instances the Government seeks to protect through application of the criminal law the basic human need for security.
Courts, however, must consider the facts of the individual case in evaluating the Government‘s interest in prosecution. Special circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest. The defendant‘s failure to take drugs voluntarily, for example, may mean lengthy confinement in an institution for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the risks that ordinarily attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious crime. We do not mean to suggest that civil commitment is a substitute for a criminal trial. The Government has a substantial interest in timely prosecution. And it may be difficult or impossible to try a defendant who regains competence after years of commitment during which memories may fade and evidence may be lost. The potential for future confinement affects, but does not totally undermine, the strength of the need for prosecution. The same is true of the possibility that the defendant has already been confined for a significant amount of time (for which he would receive credit toward any sentence ultimately imposed, see
18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) ). Moreover, the Government has a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring that the defendant‘s trial is a fair one.
123 S.Ct. at 2184 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
The district court here determined that the Government had an important interest in bringing Pfeifer to trial. The court acknowledged Pfeifer‘s 14-month stay in prison, which amounted to a “sizeable portion of his expected sentence.” Order at 16. And it recognized that Pfeifer would likely be institutionalized indefinitely. Id. After reciting Pfeifer‘s charged and uncharged offenses—which included threats to other governmental entities and assaults on family members—the court concluded that Pfeifer‘s conduct “upset the basic human need for security” of those he threatened. Id. at 17 (quoting Sell, 539 U.S. at 180). The court concluded that the Government‘s interest in prosecuting Pfeifer is not only for protection of the president but to uphold the integrity of our system of government. Id. (citing United States v. Gillenwater, 749 F.3d 1094, 1101 (9th Cir. 2014)).
Contrary to Pfeifer‘s arguments, the district court did not ignore the special circumstances of his case. Pfeifer identifies as
AFFIRMED.