United States v. DentUnited States v. Dent
Case Information
*1 Before REAVLEY, SMITH, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge. [*]
Chаrles Dent was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm after a one-day jury trial. Before trial, he moved to supрress the firearm and other ev- idence found at the scene. The district court denied the motion. Dent appeals that decision and the admission of evidence regarding fingerprints on the fire- arm. Finding no error, we affirm.
I.
Dent, a convicted felon, was a passenger in his friend Twilly Curry’s car when Officer Mark Mitchell pulled the car over for making an illegal turn. Mit- chell testified that as he approached the vehicle, he noticed Dent trying to hide something in the back seat. He therefore asked the two to step out of the car to perform a protective pat-down, which did not uncover anything.
Mitchell, according to his usual practice, asked Curry whether he could search thе vehicle. Curry consented out of Dent’s hearing. A search of the car uncovered a loaded .357 handgun wrapped in cloth inside a рurse belonging to Dent’s wife. Mitchell called for assistance, and Detective Mark Nobles arrived. While Nobles spoke to Curry, Mitchell reаd Dent his Miranda rights. Although Mitchell does not recall Dent’s admitting ownership of the gun, Nobles testified to Dent’s on-scene confession.
Dent was transportеd to the police station, where Nobles obtained a three- page statement from him. The statement was usual practice fоr the police de- partment and consisted of a computer-generated form with a series of questions to be asked by the offiсer and typed responses. One of the questions was “DO YOU WANT TO CALL A LAWYER?” Nobles entered “YES.” Nobles testified at trial this was a typographical error, and he should have entered “NO.” The next question was “DO YOU KNOW THAT YOU DO NOT HAVE TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT TO US AND THAT ANYTHING YOU SAY MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU?” Dent answered “YES.” The questions continued, and Dent agreed to make a statement even though he was informed that he was not ob- liged to do so. Dent’s statement was “I had the gun in my wife’s purse and had taken it with me. The gun was mine.”
Based on his confession, Dent was indicted and tried. Before trial, he moved to suppress evidence of the handgun, which the court denied. The jury found him guilty.
II.
Dent appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the gun. “When review-
ing a district court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, this court reviews questions
of law
de novo
and factual findings for clear error. We view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the party who prevailed in the district court.”
United
States v. Barrera
,
A.
Routine traffic stops are analyzed under
Terry v. Ohio
,
Dent argues that Mitchell did not have probable cause to make the traffic stop. Mitchell stopped Curry’s car pursuant to a Mississippi law thаt provides that “[n]o person shall turn a vehicle from a direct course upon a highway unless and until such movement can be made with reаsonable safety and then only . . . after giving an appropriate signal . . . in the event any other vehicle may be af- fected by such movеment.” M ISS . C ODE A NN . § 63-3-707.
Dent does not claim Curry used his left turn signal when making the turn; rather, he alleges the turn signal is required only when another vehicle could be affected by the turn. Because Mitchell testified at the hearing that the failure to use the turn signal did not affect him and that he could not recall whether others were at the intersection such that they could be affected, Dent argues that the left turn signal was not required.
Dent misreads the statutе and mischaracterizes the officer’s testimony.
First, the statute requires only that another vehicle “may be affected” by the
turn. Second, Mitchell testified that although the turn may not have affected
him, it might have affected others, because it occurred at a busy intersection.
Dent does not deny that description of the intersection; instead, he asks us to de-
termine that Curry’s turn did not affect anyone. The statute does not require
such a finding, and the traffic stop, pursuant to a perceived violation of Missis-
sippi law, was valid.
See Zucco
,
B.
Dent argues that Mitchell did not have reasonable suspicion to search the
car. As a passenger, Dent has no standing to challenge the search of the сon-
tents.
United States v. Roberson
,
C.
Dent claims his written confession is legally defective because he was de-
nied his Fifth Amendment right to counsel. In his motion to suppress, however,
he argued that the written statement should be suppressed because it was ob-
tained in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The district court fоund that Dent’s
Sixth Amendment rights had not been violated. Dent does not raise the Sixth
Amendment argument on appeal; rather, he challenges the confession on Fifth
Amendment grounds. The Fifth Amendment argument is waived. F ED . R. C RIM .
P. 12(e);
United States v. Chavez-Valencia
,
D.
Dent claims he did not confess at the scene of the traffic stop. The distriсt court held that this was a question of fact, because although Dent allegedly made the confession to Mitchell, the latter could not recall it. In fact, Mitchell testified that he asked Dent no questions about the gun’s ownership. The gov- ernment relies on Nobles’s testimony that he overheard Dent confess to Mitchell. The government’s argument is unpersuasive. Nevertheless, as Dent admits, his claim is not dispositive. He brings this argument рrimarily to use in the event we find his written confession defective, which we do not.
III.
Dent urges that the district court erred in allowing evidence of fingerprint
analysis performed on the handgun. We review evidentiary issues under an
abuse of discretion standard.
United States v. Yi
,
At trial, Nobles and Joe Frank, a Special Agent with the Bureau of Alco- hol, Tobacco and Fireаrms, testified that no fingerprints were found on the hand- gun. Dent’s counsel objected that this was hearsay because neither had per- formed the fingerprint analysis. On appeal, Dent maintains that objection and further alleges that the admission of that evidence violates his Sixth Amend- ment confrontation rights.
The problem with Dent’s claims is that his lawyer invited the questioning. During the cross-examination of Mitchell, Dent’s attorney, showing the officer the handgun, asked what the results of the fingerprint analysis were. Mitchell testified that he did not know. It was only later, when Nobles and Frank were on direct examination, that Dent’s counsel objected to the evidence.
The parties dispute the effectiveness of the objeсtion. Assuming arguendo that the objection was effective, any error in admitting the testimony was harm- less. If anything, by testifying that Dent’s fingerprints were not on the handgun, Nobles and Frank helped Dent’s case.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
[*] Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.