UNITED STATES of America v. Dennis T. MCDONALD, Appellant.
No. 71-1085.
United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.
Decided June 21, 1973.
Argued Feb. 25, 1972.
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I think, then, that if the fact that Stebbins was an unrepresented layman were the only pivotal consideration in the case, we would have to proceed, as Judge Bazelon does, to determine whether Stebbins was so knowledgeable that the absence of such a warning was nonprejudicial. I do not reach that question, however, because I agree with Judge Leventhal that an estoppel could not arise here, and reversal is in any event required.
Leonard W. Belter, Asst. U. S. Atty., with whom Thomas A. Flannery, U. S. Atty. at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry and David C. Woll, Asst. U. S. Attys., were on the brief for appellee. Harold H. Titus, Jr., U. S. Atty., also entered an appearance for appellee.
Marilyn Cohen and Robert M. Werdig, Jr., Washington, D. C., were on the brief as amicus curiae.
Before BAZELON, Chief Judge, WILKEY, Circuit Judge, and MATTHEWS,* Senior District Judge for the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
WILKEY, Circuit Judge:
On 13 November 1970 appellant was found guilty of robbery (
The District Court‘s reasons for imposing an adult sentence do not emerge clearly from the transcript. At times, the judge expressed a desire to insure that the defendant serve a minimum sentence in confinement.3 In other instances, the judge expressed his feeling that the defendant would benefit from sentencing under the Youth Corrections Act, which is inconsistent with a minimum period of incarceration. There is some indication that the judge felt that defendant was ineligible for youth corrections treatment as a matter of law. Since the decision to sentence McDonald as an adult was proper regardless of which description of the District Court‘s actions and motives is accepted, the judgment must be affirmed.
If the judge thought he had an option to sentence McDonald under the Young Adult Offenders statute, the fact remains that he declined to do so. His failure to make specific findings or to articulate his reasons for this decision was not in error. Under the broad discretion granted by the Young Adult Offender statute, a court which found that an offender would benefit from Youth Corrections Act treatment would still not be required so to sentence him. Furthermore, no finding on potential benefit is required, because “an offender older than 22 years but less than 26 years is, as a general proposition, to be treated as an adult.” United States v. Waters.4
If, on the other hand, the District Court concluded that the Young Adult Offenders statute did not apply because only D.C.Code violations were involved, this conclusion must be upheld as correct. Section 6 of Public Law 85-752 provides:
Sections 3 and 4 of this Act [the Young Adult Offenders statute] shall apply in the States of the United States, and in the District of Columbia so far as they relate to persons charged with or convicted of offenses under any law of the United States not applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia. [Emphasis added.]
Since the Young Adult Offenders statute applies solely to persons convicted of national crimes, and the defendant was charged with and convicted of purely D. C.Code offenses, this case comes squarely within that limiting statutory language.5
As to the first claim, amicus places strong reliance on dicta in United States v. Thompson.7 That case did involve the important question of the “extent to which Congress can treat residents of the District of Columbia differently from residents of the 50 states . . .”8 The court there held that the more lenient federal Bail Reform Act covered a defendant charged under national federal criminal statutes and that the more stringent bail provision of the District of Columbia Court Reform Act had to be construed as applying only to local D.C. offenses.
We would agree with appellant that excluding the District of Columbia from the nationally applicable provisions of the Young Adult Offenders statute might be suspect. But appellant‘s argument is completely confused: this has not been done; to the contrary, appellant is being treated exactly as he would be if he were a citizen of one of the 50 states. Appellant here is not a local resident convicted of a national offense claiming a right to uniform application of the statute. Rather, caught in a situation precisely the opposite of that in Thompson, McDonald is complaining that he has not been separated out for special treatment “based only on the situs of the crime.”9
Appellant overlooks the fact that the special mention of the District of Columbia in the Young Adult Offenders statute was required solely by the “anomaly” that certain “laws of the United States” are not national in character. The “special” provision relating to “any law of the United States” “applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia” does not create special treatment for D.C.Code offenders—it merely operates to place the District of Columbia in the same status as the other states. Under the clear words of the statute, citizens of the District are in the same situation as all others: a person convicted of violating a local law cannot claim the benefit of the Young Adult Offenders statutes, while a person convicted of violating a federal law in any jurisdiction can claim its coverage.
The second prong of appellant‘s constitutional argument concerns the statutory scheme‘s effect of distinguishing between two groups of offenders. Those persons under 22 years of age violating local D. C. law have a chance of receiving federal Youth Corrections Act treatment; while those between their 22nd and 26th birthdays, violating local law, do not. As amicus points out, Congress extended the Youth Corrections Act to local D.C.Code offenders. His accompanying argument is that a similar extension is required in the case of the Young Adult Offenders statute. That just does not follow.
Refusal to extend the Young Adult Offenders statute is a rational discrimination based on an age group, not one against D. C. offenders.12 So the Thompson court‘s requirements regarding special treatment of the District of Columbia—“the strictest possible review” and a “convincing” justification—do not apply. Further, the fact that Congress can enact special local legislation dealing with the District of Columbia does not mean that it must always do so.
The Young Adult Offenders statute is a cautious extension of the Youth Corrections Act.13 It is the sort of reform which Congress is allowed to take “one step at a time.”14 Congress has chosen a rational limit to the first step—applying the reform to national crimes and stopping short of applying it to the full range of common law street crimes, which are prosecuted by the Federal Government only in the District of Columbia.
There was nothing particularly novel about Congress’ choice to give special “youth” treatment to offenders between the ages of 18 and 21, and then later to extend it to the District of Columbia. Although there was practically no discussion of this point,15 extension of Youth Corrections Act treatment to local D. C. offenders in that age bracket
In short, to hold Congress’ action here unconstitutional would be tantamount to saying that Congress could not pass national legislation dealing only with the problems of national crimes without making that legislation applicable to local offenses committed in the District of Columbia. The statute challenged here is definitely not an experiment “with the rights of the voiceless residents of the District.”17 Rather, it constitutes a legislative judgment not to extend an experiment which concerns only those who commit federal offenses. Congress was as free to draw that line as it was to deny the benefit of the experiment to those offenders who had passed their 26th birthday. Acceptance of the contrary theory would nullify every enactment dealing with purely local D.C. offenses which is at variance with its national federal counterpart. We decline the invitation to so hold; accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is Affirmed.
BAZELON, Chief Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree that McDonald‘s conviction must be affirmed. I also agree that the trial judge‘s statements at the sentencing hearing were problematic. But I cannot agree that the sentence was nonetheless properly imposed.
The majority begins by asserting that the Young Adult Offender statute does not require that the sentencing judge state his reasons when he denies an eligible offender such a sentence.1 I cannot agree. Nor do I think that United States v. Waters, where the sole statute
But, more to the point, I do not think that this case involves the requirement that reasons be stated any more than did Waters. Under the majority‘s view of the present case, this issue is irrelevant, because they hold that McDonald was ineligible. Under my view, the requirement of reasons is not in issue because the trial judge did state reasons for his action. The problem in this case is that one of the stated reasons was the judge‘s belief that McDonald was ineligible.
I believe that this was error, and that the trial judge‘s reliance on this ground rendered the sentencing illegal.3 I would therefore vacate the sentence imposed and remand for resentencing. At that time the trial judge could properly weigh the value of a sentence under the Young Adult Offender statute against the value of the other sentences available, including the “minimum” he mentioned during the original sentencing hearing.4
I
McDonald was twenty-one years old at the time of the robbery, but did not come to trial for eleven months. Five weeks before the jury returned its verdict, he turned twenty-two and thus became ineligible for sentencing directly under the Youth Corrections Act,
In the case of a defendant who has attained his twenty-second birthday but has not attained his twenty-sixth birthday at the time of conviction, if ... the court finds that there is [sic] reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will benefit from the treatment provided under the Federal Youth Corrections Act sentence may be imposed pursuant to the provisions of such act.6
The trial judge instead imposed an adult sentence of two to six years imprisonment at an adult facility.7 Although the
As the majority indicates, one of those reasons appears to have been his belief that McDonald was barred from a Young Adult Offender statute sentence by section 6 of
On this appeal the Government contends that there are two statutory grounds that prohibit a Young Adult Offender sentence. The first is that McDonald‘s conviction for robbery brings him within the terms of an uncodified statute that denies Young Adult Offender status to individuals convicted of crimes for which a “mandatory penalty” is provided.9 The second is that violators of laws of the United States “applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia” are precluded from consideration for a Young Adult Offender sen-
tence by the statute discussed by McDonald‘s attorney at sentencing.10
The majority considers only the latter, finds it applicable and valid, and affirms. I would hold that the first is inapplicable and that the second is unconstitutional. My reasons follow.
II
The first alleged bar is section 7 of
This Act does not apply to any offense for which there is provided a mandatory penalty.11
The Government argues that McDonald‘s conviction for robbery is such an offense. The robbery statute,
Section 7 was added on the floor of the House of Representatives by amendment,13 and thus was not the subject of hearings or discussion in committee reports.14 The floor debates clearly indicate, however, that it was not intended to apply to McDonald‘s conviction.
When House Joint Resolution 424, which became
Although the ineligibility for probation and parole of second or armed violators of the mail robbery statute has
been called into question since section 7 was enacted,20 these events on the floor of the House clearly show that Congress intended to bar Young Adult Offender consideration only when the conviction was based on a statute that provided a mandatory minimum period of actual incarceration. In those cases in which the sentencing judge is given discretion to grant probation, suspend sentence, or provide some other form of supervision and rehabilitation—as opposed to a “mandatory penalty“—section 7 does not apply. This interpretation is, to me, compelling, for any other construction would lead to an irrational result. The sentencing judge would be forced to choose between immediate probation and a long prison term.21
A conviction for robbery,
III
The alternative alleged bar is section 6 of the same law,
Sections 3 and 4 of this Act [the latter being the Young Adult Offender statute] shall apply in the States of the United States, and in the District of Columbia so far as they relate to persons charged with or convicted of offenses under any law of the United States not applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.23
In contrast to the provisions of section 7 discussed above it is clear that section 6 was intended to cover the offenses of which McDonald was convicted.24
On its face, however, section 6 discriminates against those who violate laws “applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.” In United States v. Thompson,25 this court held that whenever Congress passes a statute of general applicability that purports to single out and discriminate against residents of the District of Columbia, this court must strictly and carefully scrutinize that legislation. Indeed, the court held that, where the interests infringed by that law are of sufficient importance, this discrimination cannot stand unless it is supported by convincing reasons.26
The classification here is admittedly different, as the majority is at pains to point out.27 The statute does not dis-
A. The Application of the Fifth Amendment
Congress is empowered under the Constitution “[t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,” over the District of Columbia.29 It is also empowered to enact “all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution” all powers granted it under the Constitution.30 When it exercises these powers, however, Congress acts subject to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, including its implicit guarantee of equal protection of the laws. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954); Washington v. Legrant, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1968) (consolidated with, and reported sub nom., Shapiro v. Thompson).31
The majority at several points suggests a contrary view by comparing the District of Columbia with “the other states.”32 This view conceives of Congress as two distinct legislative bodies, one exercising the police power of a sovereign state over the District of Colum-
bia, and the other the limited power of the federal government. As between a state and the United States, of course, there is no guarantee of the equal protection of the laws. Thus, the classification imposed by section 6 would not have to comply with the requirements of equal protection. But the District of Columbia is not a state.
The majority also suggests that application of the Constitution to nullify section 6 would also “nullify every enactment dealing with purely local D.C. offenses which is at variance with its national federal counterpart.”32 On the contrary, I do not doubt that in exercising its power over the District of Columbia Congress may enact a separate body of legislation and apply it only within that jurisdiction.33 Indeed, in enacting a separate body of law for the District Congress apparently also has the power to enact laws substantially identical to its national legislation, to provide differing penalties for their violation despite that identity, and to require that both sets of laws be enforced in the District of Columbia.34 The question in this case, however, is whether Congress can go further and establish such distinctions arbitrarily or even for impermissible purposes.
The Constitution contains no provision specially immunizing from fifth amendment scrutiny discrimination against interests unique to the District of Columbia. Nor have the courts imported such
There is a simple answer to this proposition. Such a license to discriminate has never existed. Nor is it needed. The Government‘s purposes for enacting any particular statute are fully and adequately protected by the equal protection test. When those purposes justify a discriminatory impact on the rights of a class of individuals, then that statute will be sustained.
Moreover, there is every reason to disapprove such a claim of immunity. The power of Congress has grown in proportion to our national needs, and today is so broad that many—if not most—laws could be justified under several of the powers granted by the Constitution.36
If that overlap could immunize legislation from the requirements of due process and equal protection, an important part of the Fifth Amendment would, for all practical purposes, cease to exist.
Under the traditional and proper analysis, we look to the power that the Constitution confers on Congress; we do so only to determine (1) whether Congress could pass the law that is before us, and, if so, (2) for the furtherance of what purposes.37 But when we apply the equal protection test, the interests of the Government in achieving the permissible purposes in question must be weighed against the impact on those whose interests are affected.38
B. The Requirements of Equal Protection
The equal protection requirements of the Constitution cannot be expressed in a single standard, nor even in two. It is quite true that only when legislation burdens fundamental interests or creates suspect classifications do we require that the Government support that law
That section 6 of Public Law 85-752 has an adverse impact on those whom it excludes from eligibility for a sentence under the terms of the Youth Corrections Act is obvious. The Young Adult Offender statute provides that eligibility for such a sentence is contingent on a finding that the individual will “benefit” from the program.42 The benefits provided by statute include a guarantee of “treatment,” which may include being sent to “training schools, hospitals, farms, forestry and other camps.”43 Those benefits include, as well, segregation from older and more hardened offenders whose presence would pose both
a threat to the youth‘s rehabilitation and treatment and a grave source of physical danger.44 Finally, and far from least important, those benefits include the possibility of having the original conviction set aside and re-entering the world with a clean record45—a benefit recognized by the Supreme Court as important enough to warrant, without more, habeas corpus relief when a conviction is found erroneous.46
Neither can it be doubted that the classification established by section 6 is problematic. It is not based on the nature of the particular offense committed, but on the jurisdictional scope of the law defining that offense. Further, the group it purports to exclude from eligibility for Youth Corrections Act sentencing is drawn exclusively from the District of Columbia, the residents of which, this court has pointed out, are entirely deprived of a voice in the Congress that enacts all local legislation.47
Given these effects of section 6, several decisional sources provide guidance in determining the nature of the justi-
Even when the nature of the legislative classification and the interests infringed are less striking, however, the Supreme Court has determined that merely conceivable justifications will not be found adequate. In Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 90 S.Ct. 532, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970), for example, the Court struck down a law limiting eligibility for local appointive office to freeholders. Without finding either that the law imposed a suspect classification or that it burdened fundamental rights, the Court refused to accept as a justification for the law anything less than a showing that a citizen “must . . . own real property if he is to participate responsibly,” or that lack of ownership would establish “a lack of attachment to the community and its educational values.”50 This is a far more stringent requirement that a showing that property ownership has some rational relationship to community attachment and responsible participation.
Turner provides a convenient point of reference for an examination of section 6. Certainly, the interests at stake in
Turner—eligibility to hold appointive office—are no more important to an individual than the interests at stake in McDonald‘s situation—the opportunity to receive rehabilitative treatment, expungement of the criminal conviction, and segregation from the more hardened elements of society who inhabit the adult prisons. Similarly, a classification that discriminates against individuals in the voteless District of Columbia on the basis of the jurisdictional scope of a statute must be viewed with at least as much suspicion as a “freeholder” requirement in a State.
How far beyond Turner, and similar opinions of the Supreme Court,51 we would have to go to take adequate account of the interests and classifications established by section 6, I need not determine. Both the terms and the legislative history of section 6, of the Young Adult Offender statute, and of the Youth Corrections Act, demonstrate that Congress lacked the quantum of justification that Turner demanded for the imposition of the Georgia “freeholder” requirement.
C. The Legislative Scheme and Purposes
The Young Adult Offender statute52 does not establish an independent correctional program. It merely extends the Youth Corrections Act to a limited number of individuals. Accordingly we must examine the scope and purpose of that Act, which was enacted in 195053 because, as the Senate report stated:
By herding youth with maturity, the novice with the sophisticate, the impressionable with the hardened, and by subjecting youth offenders to the
evil influences of criminal techniques, without the inhibitions that come from normal contacts and counteracting prophylaxis, many of our penal institutions actively spread the infection of crime and foster, rather than check, it.54
Drawing its approach from the successful Borstal plan in England,55 the Youth Correction Act provided new sentencing alternatives to the trial judge for committing the “youth offender,” defined as a “person under the age of twenty-two years at the time of conviction.”56 The essential elements of that alternative program included indeterminate commitment at age-segregated facilities for the purpose of treatment, a supervised period of conditional release of at least one year, and a final year of unsupervised release.57 Upon completion of this program in less than the maximum period authorized by law, the youth offender was to have his conviction automatically set aside and receive a certificate to that effect.58
As originally enacted, the Youth Corrections Act extended to “the continental United States other than the District of Columbia and Alaska.”59 The relevant committee reports,60 which do not discuss this limitation, set forth only
one criterion for limiting the Act—age. Indeed, the discussion of the age limitation seemed implicitly to reject the geographical limitation:
Most of the causes which contribute to antisocial conduct of youth offenders in the period between adolescence and maturity disappear when the youth reaches full maturity. The problem is to provide a successful method and means for treatment of young men between the ages of 16 and 22 who stand convicted in our federal courts and are not fit subjects for supervised probation—a method and means that will effect rehabilitation and restore normality, rather than develop recidivists.61
Some post hoc explanation for the geographical limitation did come in 1952, when Congress extended the Youth Corrections Act to the District of Columbia, subject to the District‘s financial ability to contract for those services.62 The House report stated:
As stated by [Chief] Judge Laws [of the District Court for the District of Columbia] the former objections to include the District of Columbia under the provisions of the Youth Corrections Act may be summarized as follows: (1) a serious budgetary prob-
lem would arise; (2) the method of sentencing convicted persons in the District of Columbia is different from that used in other district courts; (3) the District of Columbia has a separate Parole Board.63 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News p. 1380.
After pointing out that the 1952 amendment adequately solved objections (2) and (3), the report concluded that the remaining objection (1) was “budgetary.”64 Congress, of course, solved that by adopting the amendment and appropriating funds. Alaska and Hawaii were brought within the Act as they became states65 and, in 1967, the financial limitation on application of the Act to the District of Columbia was removed without further explanation.66
Originally enacted in 1958,67 the Young Adult Offender statute conditionally extended the operation of the Youth Corrections Act to individuals who have reached their twenty-second birthdays but not their twenty-sixth birthdays. Like the Youth Corrections Act, it excepted from coverage Alaska and the District of Columbia.68 Like the Youth Corrections Act, it was amended to include Alaska and Hawaii as they became states.69 Unlike the Youth Corrections Act, however, the Young Adult Offender
statute has not been amended to cover D.C.Code offenses.
The separate processes of enactment and amendment of these two statutes resulted in this anomalous scheme: any individual under the age of twenty-six who is convicted of violating a congressionally created crime is eligible for Youth Corrections Act sentencing unless that conviction came after his twenty-second birthday and was based on a law “applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia.”
Yet when Congress set up the Youth Corrections system, and when it amended the provisions establishing eligibility for that program, Congress did not consider whether there were any relevant differences between national and local offenses, or between the kinds of individuals who had violated those laws. In fact, although Congress did not discuss its reasons for limiting the Young Adult Offender statute, it did explicitly state that its sole reason in 1952 for not having earlier extended the Youth Corrections Act to the District of Columbia was the program‘s financial cost. Even if cost could justify a less ambitious program, it could not justify arbitrarily excluding one group on the basis of a
Thus, there is no justification for section 6‘s exclusionary language in the statutes and legislative history. Nor has the United States Attorney offered any of his own. He suggests, however, and a majority of the panel agrees, that the Young Adult Offender statute can be approved as an experiment in corrections. Noting that in United States v. Thompson, this court condemned experimentation that directly burdened the interests of District of Columbia residents, the majority attempts to stand this ruling on its head. They assert that Congress in section 6 chose to experiment by providing all individuals except local District of Columbia offenders with the “benefit” of Youth Corrections Act sentences. This is a play on words, for the discrimination runs against the local offender in either case.
Although legislative experiments are not always to be condemned, despite the obvious fact that they impose inequalities because of their limited coverage, there must be limits to the degree of inequality introduced and the arbitrariness with which individuals are included or excluded from the statute‘s coverage. In view of the discrimination imposed here, and the importance of the alternative treatment provided by Youth Corrections Act sentencing, section 6 draws too crude an exclusionary line to warrant judicial approval.
Although the United States Attorney has provided no other arguments in support of the statute, the majority has focused on the most obvious. It states that Congress might have reasonably
found that individuals become less fit for Youth Corrections Act treatment as they age. While I find no difficulty with that general proposition, I cannot conceive of reasons that would suggest that this phenomenon is uniquely a characteristic of those who violate the District of Columbia‘s laws. Nor has any evidence of such a phenomenon been brought to our attention. But, by extending Youth Corrections Act treatment to all violators until the age of twenty-two, and to violators of the national law until the age of twenty-six, Congress has clearly legislated out of existence any explanation other than that local law violators are unique in the speed with which they become incorrigible.72
To the extent that this phenomenon might be true in a particular case, or even for a particular law, Congress has taken full account of the possibility in the Young Adult Offender statute itself, by requiring the sentencing judge to take account of the offender‘s “delinquency or criminal experience, his social background, capabilities, mental and physical health, and such other factors as may be considered pertinent.”73 If, after considering all of these, the judge “finds that there [are] reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant will benefit from the treatment provided under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, sentence may be imposed” under that law.74
To exclude individuals who would otherwise qualify for Youth Corrections Act treatment simply because they violated local rather than national law has no more basis in either facts, common
Thus, the majority is approving section 6 on the ground that it needs no rational basis. Where randomness is a virtue, this is entirely proper—as, for example, in cases of jury selection and Selective Service eligibility.76 But this is not such a case. This program has clearly defined objectives, and eligibility criteria must rationally correspond to those goals.
Even if arbitrary exclusion were proper where Youth Corrections Act sentencing is concerned, I would not permit exclusion of District of Columbia offenders unless some rationale appeared. Even when arbitrariness is permissible, Congressional motivation must be free of unconstitutional taint.77 And the impact of a particular law may in some cases be so clear and predictable that it requires inferences concerning legislative motivation. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed. 2d 110 (1960).
Every enactment disadvantaging District of Columbia residents occurs against a unique, albeit unavoidable, background. First, the population of the District is almost three-quarters Black,78 and racial minorities compose approximately ninety-five percent of those arrested for major violations in the District.79 Congress must be aware of these facts, if not their impact on legislation. Second, Congress is not accountable to the population of the District of Columbia. Where electoral accountability is absent, normal presumptions of legislative regularity have a weaker claim. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 144, 58 S. Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938).
These are the facts of life in the District of Columbia. While they do not compel an inference that any particular discrimination is the product of an impermissible motive, they plainly signal such a pervasive potential for unconstitutional discrimination that some rational basis must be made to appear.
Whether Congress intended it or not, the painful truth is that section 6 imposes such a discrimination against District of Columbia offenders. And, if that is not enough, this is the same group of offenders about which we have said:
Many of these juveniles have grown to an embittered adolescence amidst the frustration of the ghetto. They need, desperately, some reason to hope they are not the losers that society has labelled them. This also the Juvenile Court too often may not be able to provide.80
Fortunately, we need not impute any evil motive to Congress, for in the history of this patchwork legislation81 it clearly appears that the infirmities of section 6 may be laid on inadvertence. Conceivably, section 6 might have stood judicial scrutiny when enacted. But when Congress extended the Youth Corrections Act to local offenders,82 it rendered the distinction between local and national offenders meaningless. Thus, the appropriate remedy in this case is to strike down section 6 and abolish the distinction entirely for Youth Corrections Act sentences.
I thus conclude that neither section 6 nor section 7 bars McDonald from consideration for a Youth Corrections Act sentence.
