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United States v. Dennis Garland Andy
549 F.2d 1281
9th Cir.
1977
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*2 provides: part, Section pertinent TRASK, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: alleged to have committed “A not juvenile delinquency shall do find section 5036 so ambiguous *3 of the proceeded against court be requires that it the construction the majori- the Attorney unless Gener- United States give ty here it. In construing section certifies al, investigation, after to 5036, the majority refers to section 5032. court of the United district propriate provides 5032 Section that a juvenile shall the court or other States proceeded against in any court of the (1) of a appropriate court “unless the Attorney Gener- or jurisdiction refuses to assume al, investigation, after certifies to an appro- said over with re- jurisdiction priate district court of the United States” to such spect court that a state does not have jurisdiction (2) quency, or does not have available to jurisdiction or refuses assume over the adequate the programs and services for juvenile. This certification is required to juveniles.” needs give jurisdiction to the United States Dis- trict Court. While it is an action triggering construction of 5036 which would Section device the authorizes of the federal require 30-day the district - proceed, court to certification does the not an- to the time United States prior swer the of how detention pur- proceeded against could have poses of 5036 shall be nor measured. practical statutory neither sense. makes effectively two be har- The Detention is a fact determination monized, however, by holding that 30- Here, issue. separate the certification was (1) day period runs from date that until January (Clerk’s not made 26 Record certifies, exer- Attorney General or in the The 43). commenced on diligence, of reasonable cer- cise could have between these two is dates tified, to the conditions stated in Section the thirty day period well set forth 5032, (2) upon or date which the in section But certification could con- formally jurisdiction assumes Government have been ceivably days made ten or earlier juvenile, whichever event earlier over later, days ten and had it been made 10 occurs. earlier, days Washington might State of to have refused surrender its prisoner to an was in constant pretrial request by prosecutor informal state, custody, January 2, federal or to a writ or even corpus prose- habeas ad to trial See quendum. States, Carbo v. United 364 court federal 81 S.Ct. (1961). 5 L.Ed.2d 329 U.S. permit will be A remand Supreme Court declared in v. Ponzi more to determine whether Fessendon, U.S. S.Ct. days elapsed from the date that than (1922), 66 L.Ed. 607 that: govern- for the federal officer prosecuting chief rule preserves to the conditions could have certified our two ment “[t]he 5032, acting with dili- courts from actual systems reasonable conflict of Section appel- is that upon and the which the court which date first gence, subject-matter brought to trial. In this connec- takes the litigation lant control, tion, person more its whether this be we observe that than 30 must property, permitted state elapsed from date which the exhaust jurisdiction, remedy, relinquished to attain which it formally its control, before the other court upon which the shall at- purpose.” to take it for its tempt recognition vacated is of the judgment and the cause the other fur- me jurisdictions the district court for to be a per- REMANDED of deten- argument suasive system state should independent of an ARNDELL, Robert John system to that of the

not be tacked Plaintiff-Appellant, of section and that purpose Congress not intend such a result. did WARDEN, PRISON, NEVADA STATE majority permit would remand to Defendant-Appellee. determine district court to whether more 76-1403. elapsed the date than 30 officer for the federal prosecuting United States Court of ment “could have certified to the conditions Circuit. Ninth 5032, acting with reasonable dili- gence,” and the date of trial. *4 again out that the date of certifi- cation has no relevance to the Further,

time of detention. the certifica- procedure of section 5032 appears to

express concern

ment shall intrude into matters programs

unless the state meeting

and services for the needs of its juveniles.

own Section 5032 does not ad-

dress itself to or to the detention set forth

Finally, I note that it appears entirely

unclear from the record that more than 30

days of detention elapsed after the federal

government obtained custody and day

of trial. While in his brief directs argument principally to the combined detention, he does observe that was eventually decided that the Fed-

“[i]t government

eral must assume

and, on the Federal

government officially jurisdic- through a brief pre-arraignment

hearing Magistrate Lonny before R. Suko

(C. 41).” Tr. government brief for the likewise custody

states that it assumed

21. If this be true then I would hold that began

the trial the allowable time, irrespective of the tacking problem. affirm.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Dennis Garland Andy
Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date Published: Feb 22, 1977
Citation: 549 F.2d 1281
Docket Number: 76-1667
Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.
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