87 F. 453 | 2d Cir. | 1898
Lead Opinion
(after stating the facts as above). The immediate question in this ease is, shall the total drawback, less the 1 per cent, retained by the government, be divided between the oil and the oil cake in proportion to their weight or their value? Inasmuch as .the duty is imposed by weight, the petitioner contends that the drawback shall be divided by weight. The decision depends upon the construction which shall be given to a general statute which has a very large class of articles within its scope, and therefore is an important statute both to the manufacturer and to the government When an imported material, upon which duties have been paid, is manufactured into two separate products, tin* statute is silent as to the proportion in which the drawback shall be divided among the respective products. A court, therefore, is permitted to adopt the construction of the statute or the method of division which shall seem to it the most reasonable and just, and therefore the one most in accordance with the probable intention of the legislation. It will be seen, by a glance at the list of articles heretofore given which are affected by the statute in regard to drawback, that, from many imported articles upon which duties are paid by weight., two or more products of different values are manufactured, and that the principal product, and the one of chief value, is often light in weight, while the secondary or byproduct is bulky, but cheap. This is noticeable in the products from the cas Lor bean, from sugar, and from tin plate. From a
“In the construct ion of a doubtful and ambiguous law, the contemporaneous construction of those who were called upon to act under the law, and were appointed to carry its provisions into effect, is entitled to very great respect.”
The uniform construction of the treasury department seems to us reasonable, and equitable to the importer and the government.
The government makes the point that the petitioner is not entitled to any drawback, because oil cake is not a manufactured article, but is waste. The supreme court, in Campbell v. U. S., supra, which was an action to recover drawback upon linseed-oil cake, proceeded in their opinion upon the undisputed theory that it was a manufactured article; and it has been recognized as such by the treasury department from 1861, whenever it was not withdrawn by legislation from the statute in regard to the drawback. The article is a different thing from the tobacco scraps or tobacco clippings, which in Seeberger v. Castro, 153 U. S. 32, 14 Sup. Ct. 766, were held not to be a manufactured article; not being fit for
(April 20, 1898.)
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting). I am unable to concur in the judgment in this cause.
Imported materials, viz. "linseed,” were used in the production here of two manufactured articles, viz. linseed oil and oil cake. The plaintiff, upon exporting the oil cake produced from a given number of pounds of the imported linseed, was entitled to a drawback, under the provisions of section 22 of the act of congress of August 27,1894, which provides as follows:
“Where imported materials, on which duties have been paid, are used in the manufacture of articles manufactured or produced in the United States, there shall be allowed on the exportation of such articles a drawback equal in amount to the duties paid on the materials used. Jess one per centum of such duties.”
Upon the linseed used in the oil cake the plaintiff had paid a duty of 20 per cent, for every 56 pounds, amounting to $4,521.09. According to the judgment of the court, the plaintiff is entitled to a drawback of only about 6 per cent, for every 56 pounds, amounting to $1,498.46, upon the theory that it is to be allowed, not upon the number of pounds of the linseed used in the oil cake, but pursuant to a mathematical formula adopted by the treasury department. The statute gives no sanction for such a mode of computing the drawback. The only inquiry which it permits is as to the quantity of the imported material in the exported article and the duty originally paid thereon. The mathematical formula which has been applied cannot possibly lead to a result which satisfies the statute.
It is true that between 1861 and 1870, while a similar statute was in force, it was the usage,of the officers of the treasury department to compute the drawback according to this formula, but the case is not one for the application of the rule that where a statute is ambiguous the practical interpretation given by the executive officers charged with its administration is entitled to great weight. The statute is not ambiguous, but is as plain a.s language can make it.
In iny opinion the judgment of the court below was correct, and should be affirmed.