Case Information
*1 Before KRAVITCH, ANDERSON and BARKETT Circuit Judges.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
In light оf the Supreme Court's recent decision in United
States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ----
(1996), 95-345 & 95-346, the court orders that the opinion filed
April 24, 1996,
1) Footnote one is deleted in its entirety and replaced with the following:
Because the civil forfeiture provision in this case did
not serve solely a remedial purpose, the forfeiture
constituted punishment for purposes of the Excessive Fines
Clause. Austin v. United States,
In determining whether a civil forfeiture constitutes
punishment for purposes of analysis under the Excessive Fines
Clause, we look to the statute as a whole. See id. at 622 n.
14,
Furthermore, as the Supreme Cоurt has recently observed: It is unnecessary in a case under the Excessive Fines Clause to inquire at a preliminary stаge whether the civil sanction imposed in that particular case is totally inconsistent with any remedial goal. Because the second stage of inquiry under the Excessive Fines Clause asks whether the particular sanction in questiоn is so large as to be "excessive," a preliminary stage inquiry that focused on the disproportionality of a particular sanction would be duplicative of the excessiveness analysis that would follow.
United States v. Ursery, --- U.S. ----, --- S.Ct. ----, --- L.Ed.2d ---- (1996), (citation omitted).
In interpreting 31 U.S.C. § 5317, we assume that
"forfeiture generally and statutory in rem forfeiture in
particular historically have been understood, at least in
part, as punishment."
If a report under section 5316 with respect to any monetary instrument is not filed (or if filed, contains a material omission or misstatement of fact), the instrument and any interest in property, including a deposit in a financial institution, traсeable to such instrument may be seized and forfeited to the United States government.
Because the value of thе funds forfeited under the
statute is completely unrelated to remedial goals, except by
mere coincidеnce, there is a strong presumption that the
forfeiture is, in part, punitive. This presumption is
overcome only wherе there is a direct correlation between the
value of the items seized and the damages caused by the
dеfendant, for instance, where the items seized are
contraband. See Austin, 509 U.S. at 619-21, 113 S.Ct. at
2811; United States v. One Assortment of 89 Fireаrms, 465
U.S. 354, 104 S.Ct. 1099, 79 L.Ed.2d 361 (1984). The harm
addressed by § 5317, however, is depriving the government of
the information it seeks, and the amount of the forfeiture in
*3
any particular case is only incidentally related to this harm.
See United States v. $69,292.00 in U.S. Currency, 62 F.3d
1161, 1167-68 (9th Cir.1995). The money Dean was transрorting
belonged to him, and it is not a crime to transport one's own
money out of the United States. Although § 5317 in part may
servе the remedial goal of defraying some of the costs the
government has spent in investigation, this is not sufficient
to make it purely remedial. Forfeiture under § 5317 is not
calculated to reimburse the government for the costs of
investigating and prosecuting Dean. Again, this is because
the amount forfeited is independent of any costs to the
government and is bаsed only on the contingent fact of how
much currency is being transported.
Congress's intent to punish through § 5317 is further
manifested by thе fact that forfeiture occurs only as the
result of failing to report the funds. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5316,
5317; see $69,292.00,
Finally, we reject the government's argument that this
case is controlled by One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United
States, 409 U.S. 232, 93 S.Ct. 489, 34 L.Ed.2d 438 (1972),
where the Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of goods
involved in customs violations as a "reasonable form of
liquidated damages." at 237,
2) Judge Anderson's previously-filed special concurrence is withdrawn, and he now joins the opinion of the court as modified.
