UNITED STATES оf America, Appellant, v. David Victor GUTIERREZ, Appellee. UNITED STATES of America, Appellant, v. Patrick McMICKLE, Appellee.
Nos. 89-1950, 89-2222.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Nov. 16, 1989. Decided July 12, 1990.
Vacated on Grant of Petition for Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc in No. 89-1950 Sept. 26, 1990.
908 F.2d 349
The district court‘s judgment is affirmed.
Richard L. Murphy, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for U.S.
Mark Meyer, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellee Gutierrez.
Leslie E. Stokke, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, for appellee McMickle.
Before WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and WEBB,* District Judge.
WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.
The government appeals the sentences imposed upon David Victor Gutierrez and Patrick McMicklе. The district court departed downward from the range provided by the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) because of defendants’ assistance to the government, notwithstanding the fact that the government did not move for departure. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
I.
Gutierrez and McMickle pleaded guilty to drug charges. After Gutierrez entered his plea, federal agents debriefed him on a single occasion, during which he identified his supplier and his customers. He also testified at another defendant‘s trial on drug charges before the same district court.
* The HONORABLE RODNEY S. WEBB, United States District Judge for the District of North Dakota.
At the time of Gutierrez’ and McMickle‘s sentencing Guidelines
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offеnse, the court may depart from the guidelines.1
Both Gutierrez and McMickle asked the court to depart from the Guidelines in recognition of their cooperation despite the government‘s refusal to move for departure. The court sentenced Gutierrez to fifty-one months’ imprisonment, departing downward from the Guidelines by six months. The court sentenced McMickle to concurrent sentences of ninеty-six months’ and sixty months’ imprisonment, a downward departure of twelve months from the applicable Guideline range.
II.
We have upheld refusals to depart downward under
Other circuits have similarly found that district courts may not make
In thе present case, the district court reasoned that because
Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as minimum sentence so as to reflect а defendant‘s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. Such sentence shall be imposed in accordance with the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 of title 28, United States Code.
We recently held that a motion by the government is a prerequisite to a district court‘s power to impose a sentence below the statutory minimum under
Congress possesses the authority to limit judicial sentencing discretion. United States v. Grant, 886 F.2d 1513, 1514 (8th Cir.1989) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 647, 650, 102 L.Ed.2d 714 (1989)). “Congress has plenary authority in all areas in which it has substantive legislativе jurisdiction so long as exercise of that authority does not offend some other constitutional restriction.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 132, 96 S.Ct. 612, 688, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) (citation omitted).
The Commission shall assure that the guidelines reflect the general appropriateness of imposing a lower sentence than would otherwise be imposed, including a sentence that is lower than that established by statute as a minimum sentence, to take into account а defendant‘s substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.
Congress did not limit the conditions under which the exception may be available in
Beyond thе validity of the government motion requirement, we recognize sound policy reasons for placing the discretion to initiate departure with the government. As the Fifth Circuit stated in White, the government motion requirement is predicated on the reasonable assumption that the government is in the best position to supply the court with an accurate report of the extent and effectiveness of the defendant‘s assistance and that it would be the rarest of cases in which the government would be unwilling to recognize that assistance. 869 F.2d at 829. The government may also reward a defendant for substantial assistance in the charging or plea bargaining process instead of moving for departure at sentencing. See Sutherland, 890 F.2d 1043; Justice, 877 F.2d at 669; Taylor, 868 F.2d at 126-27.
In addition, the government‘s interest in rewarding defendants for their assistance to government investigations plаces some control on the prosecution‘s discretion. “The reasonable use of substantial assistance motions for those who cooperate will make others more likely to do so in the future.” Huerta, 878 F.2d at 93. Prosecutorial “promises to make [
Therefore, without a clear statement from the Commission to the contrary, we treat the policy statement of
The sentences imposed upon Gutierrez and McMickle are vacated and the cases are remanded to the district court for resentencing.
HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting.
This is the first panel in our Circuit to hold that a district court errs in departing downward where convicted defendants have rendered substantial assistance to the government pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines. But see United States v. Coleman, 895 F.2d 501, 501 (8th Cir.1990) (holding that under
I. THE DEFENDANTS PROVIDED SUBSTANTIAL ASSISTANCE
Before discussing the legal question, I recognize that the record amply supports the district court‘s finding that both defendants provided substantial assistance to the prosecutor‘s office. I also note that the prosecutor‘s office provided no information to the probation office with respect to the assistance offered by the defendants to it. All information on this score was developed by the district court at the sentencing hearing, a hearing which is a model of clarity and thoroughness. Finally, I must take notice оf the fact that the government‘s stated reason for failure to move for a reduction was that neither defendant had done enough. It made no statement as to why this was so or what more was required.
The district court found that Gutierrez had provided substantial assistance by identifying both his suppliers and customers and by testifying against Larry James Shreeves at Shreeves’ trial. The district court was particularly well positioned to note the importance of his trial testimony in assisting the government in its effort to convict Shreeves because it presided at the Shreeves’ trial.
The district court found that McMickle had provided substantial assistance by acceding to the government‘s post-arrest request to return to his supplier wearing a wire to record his dealings with the supplier. This action enabled authorities to seize another 30 pounds of marijuana. The court further found that McMickle cooperated with the government in a debriefing session and expressed a willingness to testify at the trial of others.
In both cases, the government failed to reveal what, if any, standards its office used in deciding not to move for a downward departure.2 I would add that to my knowledge not a single United States At-
II. THE GUIDELINES DO NOT REQUIRE THE RESULT REACHED BY THE MAJORITY
The Guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing provided:
§ 5K1.1. Substantial Assistance to Authorities (Policy Statement)
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has made a good faith effort to provide substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
The Fifth Circuit has stated that as a policy statement,
The Commission was silent with respect to whether the policy statements were more than suggestions. I do not believe they were. For example in section 1B1.7 the Commission stated that “the commentary may suggest circumstances which, in the view of Commission, may warrant departure from the guidelines. Such commentary is to be treated as the legal equivalent, of a policy statement.” (Emphasis аdded). In the commentary to
areas were dealing more harshly with black defendants than with whites. Can it really be believed that United States Attorneys and their assistants in those same areas, who now largely have control of sentencing through their control of the charges, will bе less governed by their prejudices, particularly since their decisionmaking will not be out in the open? Id. at 1366 n. 43.
tion of the intent of those who wrote them.” Thus, by making commentary and policy statements equivalent, the Commission has defined policy statements merely as guidance, not as binding authority.
The Commission also stated in Ch. 1, Part A, Introduction 4(b) that the Guidelines refer to three kinds of departure. The first kind of departure is the “interpolation” or “splitting the distance” between two related guideline sections. The second is when specific guidance is provided by analogy, as in the commentary to section 2G1.1.
A third kind of departure will remain unguided. It may rest upon grounds referred to in Chapter 5, Part H, or on grounds not mentioned in the guidelines. While Chapter 5, Part H lists factors that the Commission believes may constitute grounds for departure, those suggested grounds are not exhaustive. USSG Ch. 1, Part A, Introduction 4(b) (emphasis added). The Commission has suggested that a ground for departure is the government‘s recognition in the form of a motion of the defendant‘s assistance. The Guidelines do not preclude a court using its own conclusion of assistance as a ground.
Perhaps most persuasive is the Commission language in section 1B1.4. There, the Commission states that in determining whether departure is warranted, a court “may consider, without limitation, any information concerning the background, character, and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise prohibited by law” (emphasis added). In the commentary to that section, the Commission states “information that does not enter into the determination of the applicable Guidelines sentencing range may be considered in determining whether and to what extent to depart from the Guidelines.” Therefore, the Guidelines permit district courts, in their discretion, to consider assistance to authorities in deciding whether to depart from the sentencing
III. DUE PROCESS AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS
If
Justice expressed three primary concerns with requiring a government motion. First, it removes the consideration which has been traditionally in the discretion of the court and places it in the hands of the prosecutor. United States v. Justice, 877 F.2d 664, 667 (8th Cir.1989). This transfer of discretionary authority does nothing to ensure consistency of sentencing. Moreover, it is “questionable whether our constitutional system of due process tolerates a situation where the key sentencing responsibility is exercised not by a judge but by the prosecuting attorney.” See Roberts, 726 F.Supp. at 1367.
By the time a criminal defendant has reached the sentencing stage, all three players—the government, the defendant and the court—are bound together by the constitution and laws in a process designеd to result in a sentence which reflects the interests of the government and the people but which is balanced by the rights of the defendant. By freeing the hands of the prosecutor while leaving the defendant and the court bound,
The role of judges in sentencing has been a part of the due procеss core of criminal litigation because, by the very nature of their positions in the system, judges are expected to be and generally are fair, without partiality to one side or the other. Prosecutors obviously are not, as human beings, different from judges; however, their positions predispose them not to be even-handed while occupying those positions, but to favor the prosecution side оf criminal litigation. Yet, under the new sentencing scheme, prosecutors are not only performing their customary responsibilities of filing the charges and presenting the government‘s side in the course of criminal trials; their power over sentencing, as discussed above, often effectively constitutes them also as the authority which determines punishment. This change has in substantial measure eliminated the safety vаlve in terms of fairness and due process of an impartial judge exercising whatever sentencing discretion any particular criminal statute allows. Roberts, 726 F.Supp. at 1367.
The problem becomes even more compelling when the second concern expressed by Justice—the nonreviewability of the prosecutor‘s decision—is considered. Justice, 877 F.2d at 667. A district court‘s decision was reviewable under pre-Guidelines standards, see Woosley v. United States, 478 F.2d 139, 147 (8th Cir.1973), but today‘s decision places a prosecutor‘s decision as to sentence beyond reach of the Constitution. Id.; see also Roberts, 726 F.Supp. at 1374-75.
It is the government‘s invariable position that, regardless of the circumstances, no one—neither the defendant nor a court—may challenge the prosecutorial decision not to initiate the process, or may even attempt to ascertain on what basis that decisiоn was made, and that this is so although the decision will have enormous consequences for the defendant, running into many years of incarceration time. It is difficult to conceive of a parallel situation in the law where substantial liberty interests and consequences provided for by statute are beyond the power of inquiry by anyone. Id. at 1375. Even if the majority‘s decision leaves Grant‘s bad faith exception intact, review is seriously curtailed. Under prior standards, abuse of discretion was abuse of discretion, regardless of whether the judge‘s error was in good faith.
IV. CONCLUSION
In summary, I would hold that
To do otherwise is to further limit the already limited discretion of the district court, a discretion which must be exercised in the public view and subject both to constitutional limitations and to review on appeal.
On Motion For Rehearing Sept. 26, 1990.
Appellee‘s petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc has been considered by the court and is granted. The opinion and judgment of this court filed on July 12, 1990, are vаcated. The case is set for oral argument before the court en banc at 2:00 P.M. on Wednesday, October 10, 1990, in the U.S. Court and Customhouse in St. Louis, Missouri.
Notes
While judicial sentences and hence judicial disparities are pronounced on the public record, and are accordingly plain for all to see, disparities brought about by prosecutorial practices and conduct are generated by decisions made off the record in the prosecutorial offices.
United States v. Roberts, 726 F.Supp. 1359, 1366 (D.D.C.1989). The Roberts court also noted the ramifications of unrestrained prosecutorial discretion.For that reasоn, even the most indefensible kinds of discrimination can determine such sentences. To put it more concretely, some of the impetus for guideline sentencing was generated by the concern that judges in some
