United States v. David McCraw United States of America v. James Mathis

presentation compul- such evidence a sory dog-and-pony just show because some may someday successfully

defendant re-

fute it. rulings

District court on evidence must

be affirmed unless constitute an

abuse of discretion. The admission of the

challenged proper exhibits was and well

within the court’s sound discretion.4 judgment of the district court

affirmed.

AFFIRMED. America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, McCRAW, Defendant-Appellant.

David America,

UNITED STATES

Plaintiff-Appellee, MATHIS, Defendant-Appellant.

James 89-5412,

Nos. 89-5420. Appeals,

United States Court

Fourth Circuit.

Argued May 1990.

Decided Nov. 1990.

As Amended Dec. 1990. government presented Though 4. The a certificate also same reasons as the IRS exhibits. it Virginia Department prose- from the of Taxation that eludes us how this exhibit is relevant to a evasion, pay the Bowers did not state income taxes from cution for federal tax error was interposed hearsay by appellants' object 1981 to 1988. The defense waived failure to on that objection, properly ground. which was denied for the Sanders,

Todd argued (Robert Francis C. Whitestone, Whitestone, Brent, Young & Merrill, brief), Fairfax, Va., on Gwendolyn Hickman, Church, Va., M. Falls argued, for defendants-appellants. Martin,

John Thomas Asst. Atty., U.S. argued Hudson, (Henry E. Atty., on brief), Alexandria, Va., for plaintiff-appel- lee. WILKINS,

Before HALL Circuit Judges, BULLOCK, United States Judge District for the Middle District of Carolina, sitting North by designation. BULLOCK, Judge: District questions before the court on this appeal are whether the district court erred in denying appellants McCraw’s and Math- suppress is’s allegedly motions to obtained as fruit of arrests. Be- cause we appel- conclude the arrest of lant McCraw was consistent with the re- quirements amendment, of the fourth we affirm the court’s district denial of his mo- However, suppress. tion to we conclude appellant the warrantless arrest of Mathis his hotel room was in violation of On December authorities were Therefore, the fourth amendment. we re- advised employee Stouffer that Mathis verse the order of the district court registered which had at the Agents hotel. were denied Mathis’s motion to evi- informed the hotel manager that Mathis staying dence obtained his hotel room and was re- Room 210. agents ar- proceedings mand for further rived at the hotel and consistent established surveil- opinion. lance in a viewing with this room within distance of They

Mathis’s room. were able to observe I. periphery Mathis’s room from the of the peephole they occupied. of the room 6, 1988, On or about December an infor- mant told detectives of the District By of Co- agents radio the agents told other Metropolitan lumbia Department Police involved in investigation that an individ- he, McCraw, that very David and large a ual had entered Shortly Mathis’s room. black to thereafter, male were be involved in drug-re- a that same individual was ob- meeting lated at the Stouffer’s Concourse served leaving the room with a suitcase. Arlington, Virginia. Later, Hotel later, the Moments stopped McCraw by was by detectives were advised the informant law guns enforcement officers with drawn gave money very David McCraw placed to a under attempted arrest as he to large prepayment black male as drugs for drive out of garage. the hotel On the back which would be delivered at a later date. seat of McCraw’s vehicle an officer ob- agents attempted Federal to corroborate served a suitcase matching description tips the informant’s through surveillance. of the by suitcase carried Mathis at check- evening 6, 1988, in, On the of December matching description agents saw David McCraw and the infor- by suitcase carried the individual seen leav- vicinity mant in the apart- McCraw’s Room 210. ownership McCraw denied ment, approximately one-quarter mile from of the suitcase. The opened suitcase was agents Stouffer Hotel. The observed and inside were packages numerous the informant and apart- McCraw leave the powder white which the officers believed to ment and vicinity drive to the of the hotel. be cocaine. Pursuant to verbal Miranda Apparently, McCraw was never seen enter- warnings McCraw made statements on the ing the scene, hotel. and later made additional statements pursuant to written warnings. Miranda agents

Federal very did a large observe black male exit the hotel on December Approximately one-half hour later five or day 1988. That manager same the hotel six went to Room 210 and knocked very confirmed that a large black man on the door without announcing them- the name of registered “James Mathis” had opened selves. Mathis the door about half- at the hotel on December 6 way and that this standing while inside his room. When individual had visited the hotel on several officers, Mathis attempted saw the he prior employees occasions. Hotel indicated close the door. weap- Several officers with usually that there was a dispari- noticeable ons way drawn forced their inside and ar- ty weight between the bags Mathis’s rested Mathis. Within two minutes Mathis between check-in and handcuffed, check-out. was given verbal Miranda warnings, and asked if he would consent to On December an undercover a search of his room. Mathis consented to officer met with the informant and David the search questions and then answered McCraw. McCraw told them both he from arresting officers his room. expecting “shipment,” the of- which During the search a suitcase was found interpreted ficer illegal drugs. mean At opened which contained incriminating meeting, the same McCraw sold the officer evidence. bag of a substance which the officer illegal understood to drugs. A Appellants subse- Mathis and in- McCraw were quent field test of the substance possession confirmed dicted for of cocaine with intent this fact. At evidentiary hearing, distribute. appellants moved to their state- reviewing probable court in cause to ments and the contents of both suitcases arrest. Henry States, v. United grounds that the evidence was ob- 98, 103, tained as the fruits of arrests. The (1959); Garcia, 848 F.2d at 59-60. motions were denied the district court

and subsequently McCraw and Mathis en- A tips combination of from an guilty pleas tered upon pre- conditioned informant and first-hand corroborative ob serving objections their to the denial of suspicious servation of activity provide will suppress. their This appeal motions to fol- probable cause for an arrest. See Ala lowed. White, _, bama v. (1990) 110 L.Ed.2d (anonymous informant and Terry stop);

II. Illinois v. Gates, 213, 2317, 462 U.S. 103 S.Ct. 76 McCraw public, contends that his (1983) L.Ed.2d (anonymous 527 informant warrantless arrest was made prob without probable search); cause to United able cause. The admissibility any of state Chavez, (4th States v. 902 F.2d 259 Cir. ments McCraw made at the scene and of 1990) (confidential probable informant and the evidence found the search of his search); cause to Porter, United v. States contingent upon vehicle is legality of (4th Cir.1984) 738 F.2d 622 (anonymous in appellate his arrest. An court must make stop); formant and Terry United States v. independent an determination on the issue (4th Shepherd, Cir.1983), 714 F.2d 316 cert. arrest; however, legality of an fac denied, 938, 1914, 466 U.S. 104 S.Ct. 80 findings tual will not be disturbed unless (1984) (confidential L.Ed.2d 462 informant they clearly are erroneous. See United probable arrest). cause to Once the Pelton, (4th States v. 835 F.2d 1067 Cir. agents informant told 1987), McCraw would denied, 1010, cert. 486 U.S. 108 S.Ct. engaging drug be 1741, transaction (1988); with a see also very large Carrillo, specific black male at a v. 902 hotel the United States F.2d 1405 (9th Cir.1990); agents Patrick, naturally would United States v. look for other (2d Cir.1990); 899 F.2d 169 during investigation United facts the course of the States Price, (7th Cir.1989). 888 F.2d 1206 An which would corroborate the information public officer can make a warrantless ar supplied by agents the informant. The had long probable rest as as the officer has observed their informant and McCraw in to; felony cause believe that a has been vicinity of the Stouffer Hotel on De Watson, committed. United States v. 423 6; they cember had verified that Mathis 411, 820, U.S. 96 46 L.Ed.2d 598 registered at the hotel on that same (1976). Probable cause exists if “at that date; they had information about the dis moment the facts and circumstances within parity weight bags; of Mathis’s an un knowledge and of which [the officers’] purchased drugs dercover officer had from reasonably trustworthy had information 14, McCraw on December at which time prudent were sufficient to warrant a man upcoming ship McCraw talked about believipg [suspect] had commit ment; 29, day on December committing or ted was an offense.” Beck arrest, agents Mathis had McCraw’s knew Ohio, U.S. 85 S.Ct. 379 registered at the Stouffer Hotel and that (1964). 13 142 L.Ed.2d Probable cause is another black male had entered his room upon “totality based circum empty-handed emerged carrying a suit Gates, 213, stances.” Illinois v. 462 U.S. case; attempted later McCraw moments 230-31, 2317, 2328-29, 103 S.Ct. 76 L.Ed.2d garage. drive out of the hotel (1983); Garcia, 527 United States v. 848 A of the information from 58, combination (4th Cir.), denied, F.2d 60 cert. 488 U.S. 957, 395, the informant and the first-hand corrobora- (1988). 109 S.Ct. suspi- Only facts and tive observation circumstances known at activity part pro- the time of the arrest considered cious of McCraw 228 probable vided cause for his arrest.1 York, 573, See 1371, 445 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 63 317; Shepherd, 714 F.2d at White, (1980). see also L.Ed.2d 639 _, 2412; Gates, U.S. 110 S.Ct. An arrest warrant always re 213, 2319; Chavez, 103 S.Ct. at 902 quired for an arrest inside the arrestee’s F.2d though 259. Even certain of the ob home, probable even when exists, cause served part activities on the of McCraw absent exigent Payton, circumstances. behavior, constituted innocent when those 573, 445 U.S. 100 S.Ct. 1371. The Payton activities completely so corroborated the requirement warrant also applies guest tips informant’s the innocent behavior rooms in commercial establishments. would provided have basis for Carrion, United States v. 1120, 809 F.2d Gates, cause. 213, Illinois v. See (5th Cir.1987); 1127-28 United States v. 13, 2317, 244 n. 13, 2335 n. 76 Baldacchino, 170, (1st 762 F.2d 175-76 Cir. (“innocent (1983) L.Ed.2d 527 behavior fre 1985); Newbern, United States v. 731 F.2d quently provide will the basis for a show 744, (11th Cir.1984); United States v. probable cause”). Jones, (7th F.2d Cir.1982), 486-87 denied, cert. Incident to an automobile occu An arrest warrant pant’s arrest, police may lawful search the required is not when the arrest is made in passenger compartment the of vehicle and public probable based on cause.2 United examine the any contents of containers Watson, 411, States v. 423 U.S. 96 S.Ct. found within the passenger compartment. 820, (1976). Belton, 454, New 460, York government The contends that Mathis’s arrest governed by is United States v. Consequently, the statements at the scene Santana, 38, 96 S.Ct. and the evidence seized incident to legal the (1976), L.Ed.2d 300 in which the United arrest of McCraw were admissible. The Supreme States Court characterized the properly district court denied McCraw’s doorway of an arrestee’s public home as a suppress. motion to area in the which arrestee a diminished has expectation privacy. Santana, of In the III. suspect, Santana, “Mom” had been identi- suppression Mathis’s motion fied as supplier drugs the another presents question of whether officers arrestee police minutes earlier. The then without an arrest warrant proba but with drove to Santana’s they As residence. may, ble cause exigent absent circum up, drove they standing saw Santana on stances, way force their into a hotel room the threshold of the doorway home, of her occupant who, and arrest the from inside holding paper bag a brown officers which room,

his partially opens the door to deter believed contained drugs. The officers identity mine the knocking officers on drove to within fifteen feet suspect of the the door. We hold person that a does not and exited shouting, their van “Police.” expectation surrender his privacy nor Santana retreated into the vestibule of her consent to the entry by officers’ doing, so home where she was arrested. The Su- and that his arrest his inside room under preme Court that doorway held was not such circumstances contrary to the an area suspect any expecta- where had fourth amendment and the United States tion of privacy that when knowing- she Supreme Court’s decision Payton ly exposed New public herself to the she lost the government argues 1. regardless The that and the drug search of his vehicle for the Mathis probable cause to arrest McCraw for the Mathis transaction were consistent with fourth drug probable transaction there cause to amendment. prior drug arrest him for the sale to an under- agent. government cover The contends that Following 2. arrest McCraw his state- McCraw cannot choose place the time and of his pursuant ments made to verbal Miranda warn- subsequent police arrest actually once the ob- ings, had cause arrest serve the felony. commission of a We need not Mathis. address issue this because the arrest of McCraw protection applicable they fourth amendment to and that way forced their inside to home. at at The her Id. 2409. make the By opening arrest.3 the door Court went on to hold that the were only halfway, voluntarily Mathis did not justified pursuing her into the vestibule expose public himself to the to the same of her home without a warrant because extent as the arrestee in Santana. He expectation had a realistic certainly did not consent to the officers’ in the delay would result destruction of entry into his room to arrest him. 42-43, 96 S.Ct. at evidence. Id. at 2409-10. A Supreme recent suggests Court case The identified the Court ease as police may not forcibly or coercive involving pursuit.” “hot one a true Santa ly gain private admittance to a residence to na, 42-43, 96 S.Ct. at 427 U.S. at 2409-10. effect an arrest simply by obtaining the quickly prevent The need to act presence arrestee’s at the door. In New justified destruction of evidence the war _, York v. entry. rantless Id. at 96 S.Ct. at 2410. 1640, (1990), police officers pursuit” concluded that “hot The Court guns with drawn knocked on the arrestee’s chase, though kind of not means some to apartment response. door but received no cry the extent of some “extended hue and suspect When the looked peep out of the ” public ‘in and about streets.’ Id. [the] door, hole of the one of the officers dis court). pursuit (quoting the district played badge. suspect opened then begins. as it end almost as soon Id. the door and allowed the officers to enter. suspect police, If the au sees the inside, Once suspect the officers asked the expectation thorities a realistic have questions a series of which resulted any delay will result in the destruction of guilt. admission of The officers then for evidence, they may enter without a war mally suspect, although they arrested the rant to effect an arrest. Id. probable had cause for the arrest before distinguishable The case is Santana entering apartment. the present from the case in that the arrestee accepted Court the present standing in the case was not finding suspect state court’s did doorway threshold of the at the time the entry said, not consent the to officers’ Instead, agents Mathis came to arrived. evident, light “It is also in of Payton, that response agents’ the door in to the knock- arresting in Moreover, Harris his home without an ing. relinquish Mathis did not arrest warrant violated the Fourth Amend completely expectation privacy. his At trial, ment.” 110 government S.Ct. at 1642.4 The witnesses did not even explained Payton Court further that contend that Mathis was on the threshold drew a line doorway, admitting instead that he at the entrance to the home which opened only halfway the door to determine the could not breach without a war it, rant, knocking, attempted exigent who was to close absent circumstances.5 Id. Brenner, Joseph arresting suspect previously 3. Detective one of the where the had been seen. officers, suspect as testified at trial follows: When the looked out the window an agent yelled, Open "FBI. the door.” The sus- open Q How far did defendant Mathis the pect opened the door and allowed the to door? apartment, enter the where he was arrested. appeals agreed district court of with the opened halfway. A He the door about suspect the court that the did not consent to entry illegal; and that officers’ his arrest was door, opened happened? Q After he the what physical sup- evidence seized at time was the way placed A We forced our in and him pressed. arrest, by opened under because the time he door, the he could see who we were. recognize 5. We the circuits have several of Appendix Joint at 113. doorway held that of an individual’s "[t]he public place 4. A similar situation was before the for Eleventh home or hotel room Edmondson, making purpose Circuit in United States v. 791 F.2d a warrantless arrest if (11th Cir.1986). doorway 1512 Officers with the individual has come to stand in the Stone, voluntarily.” cause to arrest but without search or arrest Duncan v. 869 F.2d _ U.S. _, denied, (8th Cir.), apartment 110 warrants knocked on the door 1102 cert. case, present In the the trial court found S.Ct. (1981); circumstances, exigent there were no Dunaway York, 200, 217, v. New agree. we Mathis did not know of 2248, 2259, (1979); S.Ct. pres- McCraw’s arrest or of the officers’ Illinois, Brown v. ence, and his room under constant destroy surveillance. He had no reason We affirm the district court’s denial of evidence, and if he came out of his room he McCraw’s motion suppress because the promptly apprehended could have been in evidence obtained from his vehicle followed hallway, public place. Any risk of arrest; a search legal incident to a his the destruction of evidence when Mathis subsequent precip- retreated further into his room was statements are also admissible. agents’ itated themselves when We reverse the district court’s denial of knocked on the door. Mathis’s motion to the evidence obtained in immediately his hotel room fol- requirement The warrant for lowing his in arrest violation of the fourth imposed protect an arrest in the home is amendment, and remand pro- for further home, anything incriminating law ceedings not opinion. inconsistent with this gain enforcement officers as a result of an illegal taking place arrest in the home PART, AFFIRMED IN REVERSED IN should be excluded to deter such conduct. PART, AND REMANDED. Harris, 110 S.Ct. at 1644. Mathis’s con temporaneous consent to the search of his incriminating WILKINS,

hotel room and the state Judge, concurring Circuit product ments made the room were the part and dissenting part: Assuming arrest his room. I concur in the result reached that the consent to search and hotel room majority respect with to its treatment of voluntary by statements were fifth amend defendant disagree McCraw but with its standards, proximity ment in time and regarding conclusion suppression of ev- place between the arrest and the search idence following obtained Mathis’ arrest. and statements and the absence of inter This evidence ultimately might prove to be vening require circumstances nevertheless inquiry by inadmissible after the district suppression protect evidence to this the court; however, gross deficiency the of the physical integrity of the home and to vindi concerning record the following events purpose cate the of the fourth amendment. Harris, prevent Mathis’ arrest should See 110 S.Ct. at 1643-44. also this court See Alabama, Taylor v. 457 U.S. 102 drawing from conclusions as to its admissi- 152, (1989); 890, S.Ct. Azzawy, 107 L.Ed.2d 110 see United See United States v. Al F.2d 784 893 Carrion, 1120, (5th States v. (9th Cir.) (coercive denied, 809 F.2d 1128 Cir. behavior), cert. 476 Whitten, 1000, 1987); United States v. 706 F.2d 1144, 2255, (1986); U.S. 106 S.Ct. 90 L.Ed.2d 700 Cir.1983), (9th denied, 1100, 1015 rt. 465 U.S. 1158, ce Morgan, United States v. 743 F.2d 1166 1593, (1984); 104 S.Ct. 80 L.Ed.2d 125 United (6th Cir.1984) (coercive behavior), denied, cert. Burns, 95, (10th Cir.), States v. denied, 624 F.2d 101 cert. 1061, 2126, 471 U.S. 105 S.Ct. 85 L.Ed.2d 490 954, 361, U.S. 101 S.Ct. 449 66 L.Ed.2d (1985); Johnson, 753, United States v. 626 F.2d case, (1980). present 219 In the Mathis did not (9th Cir.1980), 537, aff’d, 757 102 S.Ct. 457 doorway. assuming stand in the Even that he 2579, (1982) (deceptive practic 73 L.Ed.2d 202 doorway, presence did stand in the at the es); Houle, 1297, United States 603 F.2d 1300 and, therefore, by door was solicited (8th Cir.1979) (deliberate delay); accord Dun Furthermore, completely voluntary. was not Storie, 1102; can v. at 869 F.2d United States v. precede these cases by the most recent discussion Davis, 610, (8th 1986). 785 F.2d 615 Cir. The Court in Harris warrantless case, although officers’ conduct in this not in arrests in the arrestee’s home. The Harris court herently deceptive, question does call into their clearly pronouncement reiterated the from its good faith efforts to observe the warrant re holding Payton earlier in that a line is drawn at quirement private an arrest in a for residence. police the entrance to the home which the 1407, breach, George, See United States v. 883 F.2d 1414 exigent not absent circumstances. See Kunkler, Harris, (9th 1989); n. 14 Cir. United 110 States v. S.Ct. at 1643. 187, (9th Cir.1982). n. 679 F.2d 191 3 Many "doorway” cases have invalidated ar- objectionable police rests because of behavior.

231 bility proper develop- home, without a remand for outside the since would “know ment of the record. that a entry warrantless will lead to the suppression evidence found or state- majority by The is correct that reliance ments taken inside the home.” Id. at 1644. upon the district court United States v. Santana, 38, 2406, 427 U.S. 96 49 S.Ct. context, Viewed in language this from (1976), misplaced. L.Ed.2d 300 The Harris does not establish a per rule se exigent district court found no circum- mandating suppression of evidence ob- justifying entry stances into Mathis’ that, tained in the home under a traditional room, finding hotel a accept we must un- analysis, attenuation would be free from erroneous, clearly finding less and a essen- the taint illegal goal arrest. The Thus, application tial to an of Santana. deterrence that the exclusionary rule fos- the law required enforcement officers were ters would not by be furthered the suppres- prior to obtain a forcibly warrant enter- because, sion of such by defini- room, Mathis’ hotel and their failure to tion, such evidence must sufficiently do so rendered the arrest unlawful. See attenuated from the taint of the York, 573, 588-89, Payton v. New 445 U.S. activity to be admissible. (1980). 100 S.Ct. 63 L.Ed.2d 639 Likewise, surely Harris did not majority’s nullify doorway discussion of ar- view, discovery the inevitable is, doctrine. my unnecessary rests See to the Murray States, 533, opinion. United 487 U.S. 2529, (1988); S.Ct. 101 L.Ed.2d 472 Segura language by majority used States, 796, v. United 468 U.S. 104 S.Ct. discussing suppression of evidence ob 3380, (1984); Nix v. voluntary tained in the consent search of Williams, 431, 2501, voluntary the hotel room and the state L.Ed.2d 377 Harris does not man- ments made Mathis could be read to date the exclusion of evidence obtained per establish a rule of of all se exclusion following the “home” Payton a violation following evidence obtained the “home” that would be admissible under the inev- Payton violation. I Payton do not read because, discovery again, itable doctrine no U.S. _, or New York v. goal of exclusionary rule would be fur- (1990), compel suppression. thered such a nor I result do read Harris completely analysis erase the attenuation The record before court virtually this recognized by Illinois, Brown v. regarding void of facts transpired what (1975), Indeed, after arrest. the record is so progeny following Payton and its viola deficient that it does not reveal evi- what tion. dence was discovered or what statements notes,

In specifical- Court were majority opinion made. As the ly inquiry inculpa- limited its to given whether Mathis was handcuffed and Miranda tory warnings statement made the defendant at a following within two minutes However, police following station an arrest made in arrest. the record is silent con- Payton suppressed. cerning temporal proximity violation of should be of the ar- Finding request 110 S.Ct. at 1642. that the state- rest to the officers’ to search and admissible, ment was the Court held that to Mathis’ statements. The record even analysis required suggests an attenuation was not that some of the statements following Payton sought suppress violation when the de- which Mathis to were Similarly, fendant made a statement outside the made outside the hotel room. following home. Id. at 1643-44. The Court reasoned the events Mathis’ arrest are not underlying purpose sufficiently developed permit for the exclu- this court to sionary intervening rule was to deter from fail- to infer that circumstances ing comply require- to with the warrant were absent. The circumstances surround- purpose following ment. This would not fur- in the hotel room events by suppressing sufficiently developed thered for this court obtained are not to admissibility draw conclusions about the any of the evidence. Devaughn WILLIAMS, E. Plaintiff-Appellant, appear meager

It does on the record before us that officers obtained and exe- cuted a search for the warrant hotel room.

Nevertheless, the record does not disclose FIRST UNION NATIONAL BANK OF obtained, N.C., precisely when the warrant was Defendant-Appellee. magistrate what given facts the No. 90-2074. cause, support finding or when the warrant was executed. Conse- Appeals, United States Court quently, permit the record is insufficient to Fourth Circuit. the court to conduct an discovery inevitable analysis. Argued Oct. 1990. majority recognizes inadequacy Decided Dec. 1990. of the record created the breadth of Mathis’ motion to and the dearth concerning

of facts the record the events

following attempts Mathis’ arrest. It by limiting

solve the dilemma reversal to

evidence obtained the hotel room and

permitting proceedings further consistent However, opinion

with the on remand. proceed-

reason which necessitates further

ings to unravel that evidence which is ad- the rule

missible under announced Har- applies require equally

ris further in-

quiry by court the district into the facts essay

which are needed to an attenuation

analysis application and an of the inevitable

discovery doctrine. court found that district the arrest

of Mathis was lawful that his consent

to the search and his statements were vol- Thus,

untary. court had no occasion to admissibility

consider the of the evidence I

on other basis. would remand this fully develop

issue with instructions to admissibility

record and rule conducting

evidence after an attenuation

analysis, applying the rule of Harris to room,

statements made outside the hotel considering application of the inev- discovery

itable doctrine.

may be found inadmissible in the final

analysis, not but we should draw such a allowing on this record without

conclusion thorough inquiry the district court.

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. David McCraw United States of America v. James Mathis

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

Date Published: Dec 6, 1990

Citation: 920 F.2d 224

Docket Number: 89-5412, 89-5420

Court Abbreviation: 4th Cir.