Thаisheena M. Nicholson appeals the district court‘s judgment upholding the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security to dеny Nicholson‘s application for supplemental security income.
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
Before WOLLMAN, LOKEN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM.
Thaisheena M. Nicholson appeals the district court‘s1 judgment upholding the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Social Security to deny Nicholson‘s application for supplemental security income. Having jurisdiction under
The record supports the district court‘s conclusion that the administrative law judge (ALJ) did not grant Nicholson‘s request to reopen and reconsider the merits of her prior applicаtions for benefits, as the ALJ did in Jelinek v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 507, 508 (8th Cir. 1985). Absent a de facto administrative reopening, this court has no jurisdiction to review the denial of a request to reopen without a hearing. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107-08, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). Upon de novo review, this court finds the benefits decision is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See Teague v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 611, 614 (8th Cir. 2011). The ALJ‘s credibility findings are entitled to deference because those findings are supported by good reasons and substantial evidence. See Mabry v. Colvin, 815 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 2016). The ALJ was not required to give controlling weight to the opinions of treating physicians insofar as those opinions were conclusory, based on subjective complaints, or outside the doctors’ area of expertise. See Julin v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (8th Cir. 2016); Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 965-67 (8th Cir. 2010).
The judgment is affirmed.
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. David E. CLARK, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 16-3341
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.
Submitted: June 5, 2017 Filed: August 21, 2017
Before LOKEN, MURPHY, and MELLOY, Circuit Judges.
Carie Allen, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO (Laine Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.
D. Michael Green, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO (Tammy Dickinson, U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appelleе.
Defendant David Clark was convicted of bank robbery and sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. He appeals, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. We affirm.
I.
David Clark walked into the Plaza branch of Commerce Bank in Kansas City, Missouri on the afternoon of July 28, 2014 wearing a baseball hat, an orange vest, and sunglasses. Teller Justin Souza at once sensed that Clark was there to rob the bank. Clark walked right up to Souza‘s station and tried to give him a piece of paper. In a tone loud enough to be heard by others, Souza askеd Clark several times if he could help him. Clark demanded Souza open his cash drawer, and Souza told him the drawer was locked and hе did not have the key. Clark then ordered Souza to get the key. After Souza asked another worker for help, Clark told him, “No, don‘t do it.” Clark demanded specific types of bills when the cash drawer was opened. Souza then turned over $3,037 to Clark who left the bank. Souza reported the robbery to the police and later testified at trial that he had feared that Clark might have been reaching for a weapon. Souza said he had been concerned for his own safety as well as for the other people in the bank.
After Clark wаs charged with one count of bank robbery under
II.
We review the sufficiency of the evidence de novo and examine the record in the light most favorable to the government while resolving conflicts in its favоr and “accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict.” United States v. Koch, 625 F.3d 470, 478 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Scofield, 433 F.3d 580, 584-85 (8th Cir. 2006)). The same standard applies as in a jury case, and we “will reverse only ‘if no reasonable [factfinder] could have found [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.‘” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gray, 369 F.3d 1024, 1028 (8th Cir. 2004)).
In order to convict Clark of bank robbery, the government was required to prove that he had taken the funds by intimidation or force and violence.
In Smith, the defendant sought to withdraw $2,500 although he did not have an account at the bank. 973 F.2d at 603. After yelling, “[Y]ou can blame this on the president, you can blame this on whoever you want,” the defendant leaned only а foot away from the teller who feared that he might have a weapon in his fanny pack. Id. at 603-04. Several days later the defendant аpproached a different teller, again seeking to make a withdrawal. Id. at 604. When that teller refused, the defendant moved on to a second who recognized him from his previous visit but who was unable to see both of the defendant‘s hands. Id. When the defendant leaned over the second teller‘s counter and twice demanded $5,000, the teller complied. Id. The defendant was later convicted of two сounts of bank robbery, the evidence having established that he took money by intimidation on both occasions. Id. at 604-05. The intimidation element of bank robbery was also illustrated in United States v. Caldwell, 292 F.3d 595, 596 (8th Cir. 2002), where that defendant first slammed his hands on a bank counter and then jumped over it. After the adjacent tеller screamed, the defendant moved to another counter and emptied its cash drawer before leaving the bank without saying anything or showing any weapon. Id.
In the case now before our court, Clark approached Souza‘s teller station with a piece of paper and told the teller to open his cash drawer and give him its contents. The teller tried to seek assistance from a coworker, but Clark ordered him to stop. The teller and Clark were only an arm‘s length apart at this point without any physical barriеr between them. The district court found that Clark had intimidated Souza by approaching closely to a point from which he could have grabbed or hit the teller. Clark‘s manner also made Souza think he might have a gun. We agree with the district court that an ordinary person in the teller‘s position could have reasonably feared “a threat of bodily harm.” See Pickar, 616 F.3d at 825. We conclude that the evidence of intimidаtion was sufficient to support Clark‘s conviction.
III.
For these reasons we affirm.