Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge SILBERMAN.
Appellant David Pless challenges his conviction for bank fraud on grounds that the court constructively amended the indictment in its jury instructions, the court’s instruction on his defense of good faith belief was inadequate, and the court improperly admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) evidence of the defendant’s failure to pay corporate and personal federal taxes. We affirm.
I.
Pless owned and managed Allied Atlantic, a sign manufacturing businеss. The corporation had bank accounts at both First American Bank of Maryland and the National Bank of Washington. The latter bank also had made a loan to the corporation of $110,000. Almost immediately after oрening the two accounts and receiving the loan, Pless began experiencing difficulties that were aggravated by the acquisition of a second company, for which he was unable to secure an expectеd second loan from National. He began to overdraw, the company accounts in both banks and, in order to hide the overdrafts, he cross-deposited checks in the two banks. This is a classic check kite. The chеek Mter depends on the time lag between the point his account is credited at the depositing bank and the point at wMch the check “clears” the account upon which it is drawn. In the interim — during the float, as it is called — the check Mter appears to have, and may use, more funds than he actually has.
When National first noticed Pless was overdrawn, a bank officer agreed to convert the overdrawn amount, $135;000, into a new loan. Howеver, not only did Pless fail to repay tMs “loan” within the 81 days agreed upon, but the overdrafts continued. While National frequently contacted Pless over the following six to nine months about repaying the $135,000, it did not put holds on Ms deposits or stop payment on Ms checks. Between June 1989 and March 1990, Pless transferred approximately $47 million from First American to National and approximately $48 million from National to First American. He spent almost four hours a day driving tо multiple bank branches to make deposits in order to maintain positive account balances. First American eventually realized that the account might be in trouble, and after talking to Pless, refused to honor any more checks, while still accepting deposits. TMs caused funds to gravitate to First American, wMch ultimately lost no money, while the National account ended up overdrawn by more than one million dollars.
*1219 Pless was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1) (1994), which penalizes anyone who “knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice — (1) to defraud a financial institution....” Under the heading “Counts One Through Three,” the indictment described in twelve paragraphs the scheme to defraud First American and National and the series of transactions involving the two banks. In paragraph thirteen, the indictment charged three executions of the scheme through deposits of First American checks at National. The indictment did not charge as an execution any withdrawals from or deposits to First American, which gives rise to the major dispute in this case. The government did produce evidence at trial, without objection, that aрpellant intended to defraud both banks. But appellant asserted that since the unit of prosecution for the crime is the execution of the scheme, rather than the scheme itself, and only the deposits at Nationаl were set forth, in the execution portion of the indictment, the government could not submit the issue of intent to defraud First American to the jury. On the same “one bank” theory, he claimed that his defense — that he had a good faith belief that his overdrafts at National would be treated as a loan — if accepted, would be a complete defense to the charge.
The government, in order to rebut that defense, introduced evidence ovеr objection that appellant had failed during the perpetration of the scheme to pay corporate, employee withholding, and personal federal taxes. The court, also over a defense objection, instructed the jury — and submitted a special verdict form to the same effect — that it could find appellant guilty if he had intended to defraud either or both banks. 1 The court rejected appellant’s request that the jury be instructed that if it found he held a good faith belief that National had consented to his actions, it “must” acquit, because that would not be a complete defense to the charges. The jury found the defendant had intended to defraud both banks and convicted him on all three counts.
II.
Appellant’s primary argument before us is that the indictment was constructively amended when the court instructed the jury that it could find Pless guilty if he intended to defraud either or bоth banks. Relying on a substantial body of precedent that holds the prosecution to a very strict reading of an indictment,
see, e.g., Stirone v. United States,
We very much doubt the validity of either of appellant’s background assumptions. A cheek kite is like a game of musical chairs; the last bank to discover the fraudulent scheme will likely be stuck with the loss. But since the identity of the unlucky bаnk cannot be known during the kite, a withdrawal from one account seems as much an act of execution of the scheme as a deposit in another account. Nor is it apparent to us that venue in the district court could not have included acts of execution in Maryland. See 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994) (a multi-juris-diction offense may be “prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed”). In any event, the government only alleged аs acts of execution the three deposits at National. It somewhat ruefully acknowledges that it conceded below that venue for acts of execution in Maryland was not possible.
*1220
Be that as it may, we think apрellant’s logic, while creative, is fallacious. That the government chose to charge as the
execution
of the scheme only the three deposits in National does not reduce the boundaries of the
scheme,
which the statute requires the government to prove. To be sure, as appellant insists, xmder this statutory crime — unlike a conspiracy charge — the unit of prosecution is not the scheme but the execution.
See, e.g., United States v. Poliak,
For similar reasons we do not think it was error for the district judgе to refuse appellant’s request to instruct the jury that it “must” acquit if it found appellant had a good faith belief that National consented to his actions. The judge instead told the jury that it should “consider” the defendant’s asserted gоod faith belief in deciding whether he intended to defraud either bank. Under the foregoing analysis, the judge correctly determined that even if appellant did believe that National had consented to his transactions, he would still be guilty if he intended to defraud First American. (Appellant does not even suggest that First American knew of and consented to the check-kiting scheme.) 2
Appellant also challenges the admission of evidence that during the periоd of the cheek kite he failed to pay corporate, employee withholding, and personal taxes. The evidence is said to have violated Rule 404(b)’s prohibition against “other crimes” evidence that is admitted only to show a criminal defendant’s bad character or his propensity to commit the charged crime. Alternatively, the evidence is alleged to have been too prejudicial under Rule 403. The government explаined below, and reasserts here, that the evidence is appropriate under' 404(b) because it was submitted to show defendant’s “intent” and “plan,” in order to rebut the notion that appellant believed National consеnted to his transactions with that bank. Although the issue is close, we think the government’s argument that it is more likely that the defendant intended to defraud both (or either) banks if at the same time he was failing to pay other corporate liаbilities, is plausible. And the prosecutor’s carefully constrained use of the evidence, in conjunction with the judge’s limiting instruction, renders any potential for prejudice minor. Given the deferential standard of review of a district judge’s determinations under Rules 404(b) and 403— abuse of discretion — we do not believe the decision to admit the evidence is reversible.
See, e.g., Jankins v. TDC Management
*1221
Corp., Inc.,
H? * * * * *
The district court’s judgment is therefore
Affirmed.
Notes
. The special verdict form was in addition to a “regular” verdict form that asked the jury to decide whether the defendant was guilty or not guilty on the three counts of еxecuting the scheme to defraud.
. We also think meritless appellant's contention that his conviction must be reversed because the witness who testified to First American's FDIC-insured status, which is required for federal jurisdiction, did so without pеrsonal knowledge. Appellant did not object below, so "extraordinary circumstances” are necessary for reversal,
United States v. Nnanyererugo,