51 U.S. 609 | SCOTUS | 1851
THE UNITED STATES, APPELLANTS,
v.
JEAN BAPTISTE D'AUTERIVE AND OTHERS, HEIRS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LATE JEAN ANTOINE BERNARD D'AUTERIVE.
Supreme Court of United States.
*615 It was argued by Mr. Crittenden (Attorney-General), for the United States, and Mr. Janin, for the appellees.
*620 Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellees, as heirs of Jean Antoine Bernard D'Auterive, claimed in the court below an extensive tract of land in the county of Attakapas, the quantity of which land is not given, though certain boundaries thereof are set forth in the instrument upon which these appellees prefer their claim. This instrument purports to be a grant from Charles Philippe Aubry, Knight of the Royal and Military Order of St. Louis, Commandant of the King in Louisiana, and Dionysius Nicholas Foucault, filling the functions of director in that Province, to Messrs. D'Auterive and Masse, and bearing date at New Orleans on the 2d day of March, 1765.
The proceedings for the establishment of this claim in the court below were instituted under the authority of an act of Congress of May 26th, 1824, entitled "An Act to enable claimants to land within the State of Missouri and Territory of Arkansas, to institute proceedings to try the validity of their claims"; which law was in part reënacted on the 17th of June, 1844, and extended in its operation to the State of Louisiana. (Vide 5 Stat. at Large, 676.) The purposes and the effect of the *621 law of 1824, with reference both to the claims and the proceedings embraced within its provisions, have been heretofore examined by this court. They were especially considered at the last term, in the case of the United States v. Reynes, 9 Howard, 127, and the following conclusions were then distinctly enunciated as implied necessarily in a just interpretation of that statute. Thus (pp. 146, 147), in speaking of the statute of 1824, revived by the act of 1844, this court explicitly declare, that, "with respect to that interpretation of these acts of Congress which would expound them as conferring on applicants new rights not previously existing, we would remark, that such an interpretation accords neither with the language nor the obvious spirit of these laws; for if we look to the language of the act of 1824, we find that the grants, surveys, &c., which are authorized to be brought before the courts, are those only which had been legally made, granted, or issued, and which were also protected by treaty. The legal integrity of these claims (involving necessarily the competency of the authority which conferred them) was a qualification inseparably associated by the law with that of their being protected by treaty. And as to the spirit and intention of the law, had it designed to create new rights, or to enlarge others previously existing, the natural and obvious means of so doing would have been a direct declaration to that effect: certainly not a provision placing these alleged rights in an adversary position to the government, to be vindicated by mere dint of evidence not to be resisted. The provision of the second section of the act of 1824, declaring that petitions presented under that act shall be conducted according to the rules of a court of equity; should be understood rather as excluding the technicalities of proceedings in courts, than as varying in any degree the rights of parties litigant; as designed to prevent delays in adjudicating upon titles, as is farther shown in another part of the same sentence, where it is declared, that these petitions shall be tried without continuance, unless for cause shown. The limitation, too, maintained as to the character of claims, and that imposed upon the courts in adjudicating upon them, is farther evinced in that part of the same section which says, that the court shall hear and determine all questions relative to the title of the claimants, the extent, locality, and boundaries of the claim, and by final decree shall settle and determine the question of the validity of the title according to the law of nations, the stipulations of any treaty, and proceedings under the same, the several acts of Congress, and the laws and ordinances of the government from which it is alleged to have been derived."
*622 By the meaning and directions of the statute of 1824, as thus expounded, the claim before us must be judged; and the next step in our investigation leads us to consider it as controlled by the law of nations, and the force of treaty stipulations construed in conformity with that law.
The land which is the subject of this controversy was, according to the terms of the instrument adduced by the appellees in the court below as the foundation of their title, granted to their ancestor on the 2d day of March, in the year 1765.
On the 3d day of November, 1762, by a treaty, or, as it is termed in the language of the king, by "a special act" done at Fontainebleau, Louis the Fifteenth ceded to the king of Spain the entire Province of Louisiana, including the island and city of New Orleans. The character and extent of this act of cession, as evinced by the instructions from the French king, dated at Versailles, April 21st, 1764, should be noted in this place, as they are decisive of the relative positions of the parties to that act, and of the extent of their powers posterior thereto, over the territories or persons comprised within its provisions. Nothing surely can be more comprehensive or absolute than the transfer announced by the king of France, or the declaration of his relinquishment of all power or rights in the subject transferred. The language of the French king to D'Abadie, Director-General and Commandant of Louisiana, is as follows: "Having ceded to my very dear and best beloved cousin, the king of Spain, and to his successors, in full property, purely and simply and without exceptions, the whole country known by the name of Louisiana"; he proceeds to command his Director-General, that, on the receipt of his instructions, "whether they come to your hands by the officers of his Catholic Majesty, or directly by such French vessels as may be charged with the same, you are to deliver up to the governor or officer appointed for that purpose by the king of Spain, the said country and colony of Louisiana, and the posts thereon depending, likewise the city and island of New Orleans, in such state and condition as they shall be found to be in on the day of the said cession; being willing in all time to come that they shall belong to his Catholic Majesty, to be governed and administered by his governors and officers, and be possessed by him in full property, and without exceptions."
The cases of the United States v. Reynes, and of Davis v. The Police Jury of Concordia, decided at the last term of this court, devolved upon it the necessity for a particular examination of the rules and principles applicable to the construction of treaties; and in the adjudication of the cases above mentioned, the following rules are either explicitly affirmed or *623 necessarily implied: That compacts between governments or nations, like those between individuals, should be interpreted according to the natural, fair, and received acceptation of the terms in which they are expressed. That the obligation of such compacts, unless suspended by some condition or stipulation therein contained, commences with their execution, by the authorized agents of the contracting parties; and that their subsequent ratification by the principals themselves has relation to the period of signature. That any act or proceeding, therefore, between the signing and the ratification of a treaty, by either of the contracting parties, in contravention of the stipulations of the compact, would be a fraud upon the other party, and could have no validity consistently with a recognition of the compact itself. As a regular corollary from these principles, and as deducible from the law of reason and the law of nations, it was ruled in the cases just mentioned, that a nation which has ceded away her sovereignty and dominion over a territory could with respect to that territory rightfully exert no power by which the dominion and sovereignty so ceded would be impaired or diminished. Vide 9 Howard, 148, 149, and 289, 290, 291.
In the cases just cited, and particularly in that of the United States v. Reynes, it became proper to examine the rights of a ceding and retiring government as a government de facto over the territory ceded. This examination was induced by the circumstance, that the claimant against the United States rested his pretensions in a great degree upon the position, that after the treaty of St. Ildefonso, and anterior to an actual delivery to the French authorities, the government of Spain as a government de facto retained the rights of sovereignty and dominion over the Territory of Louisiana, and, as incident thereto, the power of granting away the public domain. But this court distinguished between the proceedings of an adversary government, acting in the character and capacity of an independent perfect sovereignty, unaffected by any stipulation, and acts done in fraud or in violation of express concessions or compacts. It said that the former, as the acts of a government de facto, might be respected and sanctioned by a succeeding power; the latter could impose no obligation to respect them, because they would have been performed in bad faith, and in violation of acknowledged rights existing in others. Admitting the absolute verity of the document under which the appellees deduce their title, and about which no serious question appears to have been raised, can the validity of this title be sustained consistently with the rules and principles propounded above, and in the cases to which reference has been made? The grant *624 from Aubry and Foucault, the commandant and the director of the Province of Louisiana, to the ancestor of the appellees, bears date on the 2d of March, 1765, between two and three years posterior in time to the cession of the Province by France to Spain, and rather more than ten months after the order from the French monarch for the actual delivery of the territory to the Spanish authorities. Under these circumstances, then, the act of the French officers must be regarded as wholly unauthorized and inoperative to vest any title in the ancestor of the appellees, those acts being inconsistent with the existing relations between the kingdoms of France and Spain. It is true that Spain, during the continuance of her sovereignty and possession in Louisiana, might have adopted and confirmed this grant, but no such recognition thereof by Spain is shown or pretended; so far from there being proof of such recognition, it appears that a large portion of the lands comprised within this grant was bestowed by the Spanish government upon other grantees. Neither is there in the record proof or allegation, that, during the short reign of the French republic under the treaty of retrocession, the claim of D'Auterive was sanctioned, or even brought to the notice of that republic.
It follows, then, from the view of this case here taken, that the claim of the appellees cannot be sustained upon any general and controlling principle of the law of nations, nor upon any stipulation between the powers holding the Territory of Louisiana prior to its transfer to the United States. The fate of this claim must depend exclusively upon the authority and the acts of the government of this country, and we will now consider how far it is affected by those acts and that authority. It has been heretofore repeatedly ruled by this court, that the control and recognition of claims like that now before us were subjects belonging peculiarly to the political power of the government; and that, in the adjudication of those claims, the courts of the United States expound and enforce the ordinances of the political power. Guided by these rules, and looking to the acts of the legislature, we find it declared by the act of Congress of March 26, 1804, § 14 (2 Stat. at Large, 287), "that all grants for lands within the territories ceded by the French republic to the United States by the treaty of the 30th of April, 1803, the title whereof was, at the date of the treaty of St. Ildefonso, in the crown or government of Spain, and every act and proceeding subsequent thereto, of whatsoever nature, towards the obtaining any grant, title, or claim to such lands, and under whatsoever authority transacted or pretended, be, and the same are hereby declared to be, and from the beginning to have been, null, void, and of no effect in law or in *625 equity." Within the comprehensive language of this provision the case before us necessarily falls; as the inefficiency of the French concession, after the treaty of Fontainebleau, to convey any title, left the title in the government of Spain, where it remained up to, and at the date of, the treaty of St. Ildefonso. The reservation in the proviso to the section just quoted, in favor of actual settlers under the laws, customs, and usages of Spain, cannot include the case under consideration, as this is not an instance of a title asserted upon any such laws or usages, or founded on mere settlement; but one professing to be founded upon the grant made by the French commandant, independently of the authority of Spain, and exceeding in extent the quantity of land awarded to settlers by the proviso above mentioned. But it has been contended in the argument filed on behalf of the appellees, that, if any defect could have been alleged against their title by reason of the absence of power in either the French or Spanish governments to make the grant, such defect has been cured by the legislation of Congress; and in support of this provision we have been referred to the act of March 2, 1805 (2 Stat. at Large, 324). The first and fourth sections of that act have not been fully quoted in the argument of the appellees, and it may be that an omission to examine them throughout has produced the strange misapprehension of those provisions which seems to have existed with those who rely upon their operation. Thus from the first section of the act of 1805 the following portion is quoted: "Any person or persons, or the legal representatives of any person or persons, who, on the 1st of October in the year 1800, were resident within the territories ceded by the French republic to the United States, by the treaty of the 30th of April, 1803, and who had, prior to the said 1st day of October, 1800, obtained from the French and Spanish governments, respectively, during the time either of said governments had the actual possession of said territories, any duly registered warrant or order of survey," &c.; but this quotation omits the following terms, which essentially control every part of the section that precedes them; viz. "for lands lying within the said territories to which the Indian title had been extinguished, and which were on that day actually inhabited and cultivated by such person or persons, of for his or their use."
The first requisite prescribed by this section of the law as necessary to give validity to titles resting upon the actual territorial occupation of the French or Spanish authorities is, that the grantees or their representatives should, on the 1st day of October, 1800, be residents within the territories ceded by the French republic to the United States. The next condition imposed *626 by this statute is, that the Indian title to such lands should have been extinguished. And thirdly, that the lands thus granted should have been, on the 1st day of October, 1800, actually inhabited and cultivated by the grantees, or for their use. Without inquiring into the fulfilment of the second of these conditions, or into the necessity for its fulfilment, it will be seen that the first and the third, made essential by the statute, have been entirely unperformed. Thus it is stated in the petition of the appellees, that as early as 1784 the family of D'Auterive removed from the State of Louisiana. It is nowhere proved, or even alleged, that at any subsequent period they returned to this land, much less that in 1800, or at any other time posterior to 1784, they resided upon the same, or by themselves or by their agents, or through any instrumentality of theirs, cultivated this land. On the contrary, either of these inferences is irresistibly excluded by the statement in the petition, that, after the removal of the family of D'Auterive, much of this land was, by the Spanish government, during its possession of the country, granted to other persons. The alleged infancy of the children of D'Auterive in the year 1784, even if there had been a saving for the benefit of infants against the requisites of the statute, could scarcely authorize a presumption in their favor, after a lapse of more than half a century, viz. from 1784 to 1837, during which period this claim has been permitted to sleep.
The fourth section of the act of Congress, also quoted in the argument for the appellees, if applicable in any sense to their pretensions, certainly adds nothing to their intrinsic force. This section is a simple requisition, that persons claiming lands within the Territory of Louisiana, by virtue of any legal French or Spanish grant made prior to the 1st day of October, 1800, may, and persons claiming lands in the said territories by virtue of any grant or incomplete title bearing date subsequently to the 1st day of October, 1800, shall, before the 1st day of March, 1806, deliver to the register of the land-office or recorder of land-titles within whose district the land may be, a notice in writing, stating the nature and extent of his claims, together with a plat of the tract or tracts so claimed; and shall, also, on or before that day, deliver to the register or recorder, for the purpose of being recorded, every grant, order or survey, deed of conveyance, or other written evidence of his claim. This section then proceeds to declare, as a penalty for noncompliance with its directions, that all the rights of the claimant derived from the first two sections of the act (embracing all grants founded upon mere territorial occupation by France or Spain), shall become void, and for ever after be barred; and that no incomplete *627 grant, warrant, order of survey, deed of conveyance, or other written evidence, which shall not be so recorded, shall ever be considered or admitted as evidence in any court of the United States, against any grant derived from the United States. But for the act of Congress of the 6th of February, 1835, entitled "An Act for the final adjustment of claims to lands in the State of Louisiana," the fourth section of the act of 1805 would have operated as a complete bar to the claim of the appellees from the 1st day of March, 1806. The act of 1835 removes that bar so far as to permit, within the space of two years from its date, the prosecution of claims similar to that of the appellees, but this act accomplishes nothing beyond this permission. It imparts no merit or strength to any claim which such claim did not previously possess. Upon a view of this case, then, we think that the decision of the District Court should be reversed, and the petition of the appellees dismissed, and that decree is accordingly hereby reversed.
Order.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the District Court of the United States for the District of Louisiana, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, it is the opinion of this court, that the title of the petitioners is null and void. Whereupon, it is now here ordered, adjudged, and decreed by this court, that the decree of the said District Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby, reversed, and that this cause be, and the same is hereby, remanded to the said District Court, with directions to dismiss the petition of the claimants in this cause.