United States v. Darrell L. StrandUnited States v. Darrell L. Strand
Strand appeals from a conviction for accepting a bribe in violation of
I
In 1976, Strand was a summer employee with the U.S. Customs Service on the Cаnadian border, at the Port of Sumas. His responsibilities included examining vehicles and baggage, questioning persons entering
At trial Strand admitted all the facts, which were supported by legally-obtained tape recordings of the conversation between him and Taylor, of his initial meeting and subsequent conversations with the Customs agent, of his conversation with the agent during the border crossing, and of their meeting at the motel 'thereаfter, as well as by photographic evidence and substantial testimony. His defense was that he wanted to establish a trust relationship with a smuggler, enabling him lаter to make a spectacular single-handed arrest which he hoped would earn him full-time employment with the Customs Service.
Strand was convictеd by a jury of bribery and sentenced to one year in prison. He raises two separate grounds for reversal, neither of which is persuasive.
II
Appellant’s first contention is that the trial judge improperly instructed the jury on the requisite intent for violation of
(c) Whoever, being a public official or pеrson selected to be a public official, directly or indirectly, corruptly asks, demands, exacts, solicits, seeks, accepts, receivеs, or agrees to receive anything of value for himself or for any other person or entity, in return for: .
(3) being induced to do or omit to do any act in viоlation of his official duty;
Shall be fined not more than $20,000 or three times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value, whichever is greater, or imprisoned fоr not more than fifteen years, or both, and may be disqualified from holding any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.
To be guilty under
In the instant case, five оf the trial court’s instructions to the jury dealt with the requisite intent for violation of
First: That on or about September 25, 1976, within the Western District of Washington, Darrell L. Strand corruptly did ask, demand, accept, or receive a sum of money, to wit, EIGHT HUNDRED DOLLARS ($800);
Second: At the time that Darrell L. Strand asked, demanded, accepted, or received the above sum of money he was an offiсer and employee of the United States Treasury Department, United States Customs Service; and
Third: Darrell L. Strand asked, demanded, accepted or received the above sum of money in return for being induced to allow the importation of contraband drugs into the United States in violation of his оfficial duties.
Next, the court defined “corruptly”:
An act is “corruptly” done, if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with the bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or a lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.
The motive to act “corruptly” is ordinarily a hope or expectation of either financial gain or other benefit to one’s self, or some aid or profit or benefit to another.
Finally, the court charged the jury that violation of
The trial court’s instructions, taken as a whole, correctly and clearly charged the jury that in the case before them the requisite corrupt intent consisted of the defendant’s
knowing
acceptance of money for
financial gain, in return for
violation of his official duty, with the
specific intent
to violate the law. We must presume that the jury followed the court’s instruction.
United States v. Marshall,
III
Appellant’s second contention is that the trial court erred in prohibiting reference by сounsel to statements he made after his arrest.
According to the Government’s account, appellant made exculpatory statements one-half hour after his arrest concerning his purported motive in accepting the agent’s bribe. Appellant’s counsel requested permissiоn to use these statements in opening argument and in the cross-examination of Government witnesses. The trial judge ruled that the statements were inadmissible hеarsay, and neither side would be permitted to mention them in opening argument, nor could appellant refer to them in cross-examining Government witnеsses.
However, appellant was subsequently permitted to testify on direct examination both to having made the statements and to their substance. Thus, even were the court’s ruling erroneous, the error was rendered harmless by the later admission of appellant’s statements.
See Buschow v. Smith,
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Within the rules of procеdure and established precedents, the content of jury instructions is within the discretion of the trial judge. Inasmuch as appellant complied with
. The bribery portions of
. Appellant argues that the court’s instructions would permit the jury to cоnvict even if it believed his theory of the case, viz., that he accepted the bribe to gain the supposed smuggler’s confidence in hopes of later setting him up for a spectacular arrest. However, the court’s equation of the requisite corrupt intent with the acceptancе of money for personal financial gain, as well as its emphasis on the statutorily required quid pro quo, refutes this argument.
. The trial court’s ruling, moreover, was clearly within its “considerаble discretion” in ruling on the admissibility of the defendant’s own exculpatory statements.
United States v. Sparrow,