United States v. Dante Williams

791 F.3d 809

8th Cir.

2015

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Docket

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dante M. WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 14-2600

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Feb. 9, 2015. Filed: June 25, 2015.

809 F.3d 809

description of her amended complaint or produce a third amended complaint. And now, on appeal, she only contends that her “second amended complaint was current counsel‘s ‘getting up to speed’ effort, and should not be viewed in light of first counsel‘s foibles.”¹⁷ Nowhere does she address her proposed amendments or their merits. Given that she never attempted to explain how she would amend her complaint to state a claim for relief, the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing her complaint with prejudice and in denying her post-judgment motion to amend.¹⁸

Conclusion

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

AFFIRMED

accorded impermissible weight to the fact that Williams was prosecuted in federal court. We affirm.

During a traffic stop on January 7, 2012, Williams left the vehicle and ran from police officers. Officers saw Williams drop a black handgun, which was later identified as a loaded Glock 9 millimeter pistol.

Williams pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). At sentencing, Williams asked the court to vary downward from the advisory guidelines sentencing range pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentence him to probation. He cited as mitigating factors his stable employment history, his provision of financial support for his family, his involvement with his community and church, the age of his prior felony convictions, and the fact that he lived and worked in a high-crime area.

The district court denied Williams‘s request for a sentence of probation, observing that Williams fled from police and that the gun he possessed was fully loaded. The court then sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment, at the bottom of the advisory guideline range, citing the factors listed in § 3553(a). After imposing the sentence, the court said:

[This case is a run-of-the-mill felon-in-possession case. For some reason, the Kansas City, Missouri Police Department has to have their felon-in-possession cases brought into federal court. This ought to have stayed in the State of Missouri, but, apparently, the U.S. Attorney‘s Office lets the police department decide to bring these cases up here, and if they‘re going to bring them

Anita L. Burns, Asst. Fed. Public Defender, Kansas City, MO (Laine Cardarella, Fed. Public Defender, on the brief), for appellant.

Christina Y. Tabor, Asst. U.S. Atty., Kansas City, MO (Tammy Dickinson, U.S. Atty., on the brief), for appellee.

Before LOKEN, SMITH, and COLLOTON, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Dante Williams pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon. The district court¹ sentenced him to thirty-seven months’ imprisonment. Williams appeals the sentence, arguing that it is substantively unreasonable because the district court gave undue weight to the nature and circumstances of his offense, ignored mitigating factors, and

up here, I‘m going to follow the Guidelines.

Now, you can send a message to whoever you want to, and this, it‘s not you, Mr. Williams, but that‘s why you‘re being sentenced, because the U.S. attorney has to have these cases up here. They can‘t leave them in the state court. That‘s why you‘re getting a sentence.

Williams argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable. We review the reasonableness of a sentence under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51, 128 S.Ct. 586, 169 L.Ed.2d 445 (2007). Williams contends that the district court placed undue weight on the circumstances of his offense and ignored mitigating factors. Williams also complains that the court improperly considered that Williams was prosecuted in federal court.

Williams‘s sentence was within the advisory range recommended by the Sentencing Commission, so we presume that it is substantively reasonable. United States v. Borron, 557 F.3d 866, 870 (8th Cir.2009); see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007). Williams advanced his mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing and in a sentencing memorandum, and we presume that the district court considered them. United States v. Timberlake, 679 F.3d 1008, 1012 (8th Cir.2012). The district court has “substantial latitude to determine how much weight to give the various factors under § 3553(a).” Id. (internal quotation omitted). It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to conclude that the nature and circumstances of the offense called for a term of thirty-seven months.

The district court‘s commentary about the prosecutorial discretion of the United States Attorney in gun cases does not establish an unreasonable sentence. Under our system of separated powers, the United States Attorney—not the district court—has authority to decide whether federal prosecution of recidivists who possess firearms is sufficiently important to the safety of the community to warrant the dedication of federal resources. The district court correctly observed that once the United States Attorney elects to prosecute a case in federal court, the court is required at sentencing to consider the federal sentencing guidelines, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4), along with the other statutory considerations mentioned by the court. Despite the district court‘s statement that it would “follow” the guidelines, the court elsewhere made clear that it properly treated the guidelines as “advisory,” S. Tr. 11, and there was no abuse of discretion in sentencing Williams at the bottom of the advisory range.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.

Notes

The Honorable Dean Whipple, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

Appellant‘s Br. 9.

The district court explained that it dismissed Ms. Gonzalez-Koeneke‘s complaint with prejudice and denied her motion for reconsideration because she failed in explain how she would amend her complaint. This explanation is an adequate basis for affirmance. We therefore have no occasion to address the propriety of the district court‘s standing order, which Ms. Gonzalez-Koeneke contends conflicts with Rule 15. We note that we recently explained that “[a] district court does not have the discretion to remove the liberal amendment standard by standing order or other mechanisms requiring plaintiffs to propose amendments before the court rules on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion on pain of forfeiture of the right to amend.” . Indeed, because the court‘s order could be understood as removing the liberal amendment standard and imposing a heightened burden on the plaintiff, whether this standing order is in conflict with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 is a significant question that we eventually may have to confront if the district court persists in requiring litigants to propose a possible amended complaint even before the court has ruled on the adequacy of the one already filed. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 83(b).

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