United States v. Daniel GreenUnited States v. Daniel Green
Case Information
*1 BEFORE: GIBBONS and COOK, Circuit Judges; MURPHY, District Judge. [*]
COOK, Circuit Judge. Daniel Green pleaded guilty to producing and receiving child pornography. He now appeals the validity of his guilty plea and the reasonableness of his 960- month sentence. Finding no error, we AFFIRM.
In late 2009, Green’s seven- and ten-year-old step-granddaughters told their grandmother that Green had been molesting them for at least a year. A search of Green’s home confirmed that Green videotaped and photographed himself molesting the girls on multiple occasions. The search also revealed that Green downloaded numerous images and videos depicting the sexual exploitation of minors. A federal grand jury indicted Green on two counts of producing child pornography and one count of receiving it. Green pleaded guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement on the second day of trial.
The Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report. Although Green’s offense level of 43 dictated a sentencing guidelines range of life imprisonment, the statutory maximums associated with Green’s crimes limited his sentence to 960 months. The PSR thus recommended the maximum sentence, with the sentences on each count running consecutively. Green filed no objections to the PSR. After thoroughly examining the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 factors at sentencing, the district court accepted the PSR’s recommendation and sentenced Green to 960 months’ imprisonment. Green objected, arguing that the government’s earlier, rejected plea offer of 15 years illustrated that an 80-year sentence was excessive. The court responded that it would not have accepted such a deal given the seriousness of Green’s offenses.
Green raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district court failed to
comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(A), which requires the court to “verify
that the defendant and the defendant’s attorney have read and discussed the presentence report.”
The record refutes this claim. The court began the sentencing hearing “by asking [trial counsel]
whether Mr. Green has read the presentence report,” and counsel responded affirmatively,
explaining that “[she] visited him in jail, and [they] went over the presentence report line by
line.” Though Green faults the court for not asking him directly, we find no error in the court
accepting trial counsel’s detailed answer.
See United States v. Osborne
,
Second, Green contends that his guilty plea was involuntary because the court did not
specifically inform him that the sentences for each count could run consecutively. The court
explained at the plea colloquy that “[t]he statutory maximum penalty for Counts One and Two
. . . would be 30 years” and “[f]or Count Three, the statutory maximum is 20 years.” Green
argues that a “reasonable defendant, given this language, could have believed that the combined
maximum sentence for counts one and two was 30 years.” But the PSR—which Green reviewed
with his lawyer—eliminated any uncertainty by specifying that “[t]he sentences on each count
shall run consecutively.” And in any event, a district court need not “explicitly admonish a
defendant that a sentence may be imposed consecutively” to ensure that a defendant’s plea is
knowing and voluntary.
United States v. Ospina
,
Third, Green challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We review for
abuse of discretion, affording Green’s within-guidelines sentence a presumption of
reasonableness.
United States v. Rosenbaum
,
Notes
[*] The Honorable Stephen J. Murphy, III, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.