United States v. Curtis Edmonds
700 F.3d 146
4th Cir.
2012
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UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Curtis Lakoy EDMONDS, a/k/a Rude Boy, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 10-4895

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Decided on Remand Nov. 19, 2012.

146-148

conclude that the MTA‘s argument is not well taken.

Moreover, there would be nothing to render illegal an agency‘s adoption of regulations that restrain the degree of discretion it exercises. See (“[E]ven if a statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decisionmaker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to withhold that authority“). If the agency, through rulemaking, decides to remove discretion from its determinations, then it appropriately relegates to itself a ministerial role. See (“A ministerial duty is one that admits of no discretion, so that the official in question has no authority to determine whether to perform the duty“) (citing ).

Here, in promulgating 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29, the Board parroted the language of the Trails Act but included, as an alternative to assuming full responsibility for any liability, the right of a state sponsor to indemnify the railroad for any potential liability. The need for assuming full financial responsibility by either means was, however, demanded by the Act. Thus, when the Board made the individualized decision in this case, it simply confined its role to verifying the trail sponsors’ undertakings and concluding that because the trail sponsors qualified their indemnifications of the railroad, they did not provide the railroad with the protection required by the Trails Act. We cannot conclude that this decision manifested an improper discharge of the agency‘s duties.

For the reasons given, we affirm the decision of the STB and deny the MTA‘s petition for review.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Michael W. Patrick, Law Office of Michael W. Patrick, Chapel Hill, North Carolina, for Appellant. Thomas G. Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Felice McConnell Corpening, Yvonne Victoria Watford-McKinney, Assistant United States Attorneys, Office of the United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Before NIEMEYER and KEENAN, Circuit Judges, and J. MICHELLE CHILDS, United States District Judge for the District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Published opinion on remand from the Supreme Court. Judge NIEMEYER wrote the opinion, in which Judge KEENAN and Judge CHILDS joined.

OPINION

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge:

A jury convicted Curtis Edmonds on one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute more than 50 grams of crack cocaine during the period from January 2007 to June 2008, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, and on three counts of distributing more than 5 grams of crack cocaine on each of three occasions during February 2008, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On August 3, 2010, the district court sentenced Edmonds to life imprisonment for the conspiracy conviction, concluding that it was mandated by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), and to a term of 360 months’ imprisonment for each of the distribution counts, with all sentences to be served concurrently. Edmonds filed a timely appeal.

In , we affirmed the judgment of the district court and held (1) that the evidence was sufficient to support Edmonds’ participation in the drug trafficking conspiracy, as alleged; (2) that, in sentencing Edmonds to 360 months’ imprisonment on each of the three distribution counts, the district court properly considered and applied the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (3) that Edmonds’ two prior state convictions for drug offenses qualified as predicate felony drug offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) and therefore his sentence on the conspiracy count was properly enhanced to a mandatory life sentence, as provided by § 841(b)(1)(A).

Some six weeks after we handed down our decision, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in , holding that the lower mandatory minimum sentences introduced into 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 applied to offenders who committed a § 841(a) offense before the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, August 3, 2010, so long as they were sentenced after the effective date. Prior to August 3, 2010, § 841(b)(1)(A) provided that a violation of § 841(a) involving 50 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base committed by a person with two or more prior convictions for felony drug offenses was subject to a mandatory term of life imprisonment. The Fair Sentencing Act mitigated that provision by increasing the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger the mandatory minimum from 50 grams to 280 grams. Pub. L. No. 111-220, § 2(a)(1), 124 Stat. 2372 (2010).

Because Edmonds was sentenced on August 3, 2010, the effective date of the Fair Sentencing Act, he was, as decided by , entitled to its benefits. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated our decision in this case and remanded it to us for further consideration in light of its decision in . See .

Having now considered further our earlier decision in this case, we conclude that does not implicate the matters that we had actually decided. Accordingly, we reissue our earlier opinion in this case insofar as we (1) stated the facts; (2) concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support Edmonds’ participation in the drug trafficking conspiracy, as alleged; (3) concluded that the district court, in sentencing Edmonds to 360 months’ imprisonment on each of the three distribution counts, properly considered and applied the sentencing factors in § 3553(a); and (4) concluded that Edmonds’ prior North Carolina convictions for felony drug offenses qualified as predicate offenses under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A). See . Thus, we affirm Edmonds’ convictions, as well as the district court‘s rulings made as part of its sentencing. But because the Fair Sentencing Act is applicable and has not been addressed, we vacate Edmonds’ sentence and remand this case to the district court for resentencing, which must include consideration of the provisions of the Fair Sentencing Act and which may include reconsideration of the court‘s earlier sentencing rulings.

It is so ordered.

NIEMEYER

Circuit Judge

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