OPINION AND ORDER
Before POPE, Circuit Judge, SWEI-GERT and ZIRPOLI, District Judges.
On May 13, 1963, some 34 days prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank,
While the court was thus in the process of hearing testimony, on June 11, 1965, the Senate passed, with no opposing vote, its S.1698, a bill under whose provisions, if enacted, this case would have become moot, for, as stated in the report accompanying the bill, the bill “would free the banks involved in such suits from further proceedings under the antitrust laws.” Whether it was because of their knowledge of the pendency of this legislation or otherwise, counsel by stipulation postponed the final filing of briefs and proposed findings until shortly before the passage of this proposed legislation, as amended in the House on February 9, 1966. The enactment, designated Public Law 89-356, 80 Stat. 7, was signed by the President on February 21, 1966.
The court was thus confronted with a somewhat extraordinary situation in which the law applicable to the case was changed after the testimony had been received and the cause submitted for decision. The measure, as finally enacted, made specific reference to this and other *128 cases similarly situated in § 2(c) thereof which provides as follows: “Any court having pending before it on or after the date of enactment of this Act any litigation initiated under the antitrust laws by the Attorney General after June 16, 1963, with respect to the merger, consolidation, acquisition of assets, or assumption of liabilities of an insured bank consummated after June 16, 1963, shall apply the substantive rule of law set forth in section 18(c) (5) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, as amended by this Act.” 1 The so-called “substantive rule of law set forth in § 18(c) (5)” is stated in the Act as follows: “(5) The responsible agency shall not approve—
(A) any proposed merger transaction which would result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking in any part of the United States, or
(B) any other proposed merger transaction whose effect in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly, or which in any other manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
In every case, the responsible agency shall take into consideration the financial and managerial resources and future prospects of the existing and proposed institutions, and the convenience and needs of the community to be served.”
That language refers to the tests to be applied, in a case of this type, by the Comptroller of the Currency in passing upon an application for approval of a proposed bank merger. Not only did § 2(c), quoted above, specifically direct that this court, in respect to this case, “shall apply the substantive rule of law set forth in § 18(c) (5)” but § 18(c) (7) (B) provided as follows: “In any judicial proceeding attacking a merger transaction approved under paragraph (5) on the ground that the merger transaction alone and of itself constituted a violation of any antitrust laws other than section 2 of the Act of July 2, 1890 (section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. 2), the standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply under paragraph (5).”
After a special hearing conducted for that purpose evidence was received and the parties were granted time within which to file further briefs and memoranda expounding their views as to the action which the court should take in the light of the entire testimony and in view of the new enactment.
It is the Government’s view that the new statute made no substantial change in the law or standards to be applied in passing upon the issues here presented. The Government puts it thus: “It is, of course, the essential position of the Government * * * that the 1966 amendment to the Bank Merger Act (P.L. 89-356; 80 Stat. 7) has not resulted in substantial change in substantive antitrust law or in the standards used by the courts in determining the legality of bank mergers.”
The new enactment does pose some difficult questions which we shall note hereafter. But we find no difficulty in concluding that the new enact *129 ment made substantial changes in the substantive law and in the standards to be applied in this case. Not only the language of the enactment but its legislative history is very compelling on this point. As we have noted, both § 2(c) and § 18(c) (7) (B), quoted above, specifically direct the court in this situation to apply the new standards of this Act. (The latter refers to the'standards “directed to apply under paragraph 5” and § 2(c) and refers to these as “the substantive rule of law,” set forth in that section.) It would be a bit startling to assume that in making this enactment, over which the congressional committees struggled long and hard, the Congress had turned up with nothing of substance, or had accomplished no change in respect to the law applicable for testing the validity of bank mergers.
The legislative history of the Act most emphatically contradicts the position now taken by the Government. The Senate Committee report, which accompanied the introduction of the bill in the Senate, took note of what Congress had contemplated would be the result of the Bank Merger Act of 1960. The Committee stated: “At that time it was clearly expected that the decision of the responsible Federal banking authority, based on its own investigation and on reports on competitive factors from the other two banking agencies and from the Department of Justice, would be final and conclusive. The Attorney General’s report was expected to be advisory only.” The report states that the uncertainty created by the situation resulting from the Philadelphia and the Lexington bank cases (supra note 1) “is harmful to the banking industry and to its customers. * * * There was unanimous agreement by all the witnesses that the present situation was undesirable and should be changed.” The House Committee report states clearly the intent to make changes in the law as follows: “The intended legal effect of the bill is to modify the foregoing provision in three respects:
First, it is intended to make clear that no merger which would violate the antimonopoly section (sec. 2) of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act may be approved under any circumstances.
Second, the bill acknowledges that the general principle of the antitrust laws— that substantially anticompetitive mergers are prohibited — applies to banks, but permits an exception in cases where it is clearly shown that a given merger is so beneficial to the convenience and needs of the community to be served— recognizing that effects outside the section of the country involved may be relevant to the capacity of the institution to meet the convenience and needs of the community to be served — that it would be in the public interest to permit it.
Third, the bill provides that this rule of law is to be applied uniformly, in judicial proceedings as well as by the administrative agencies.”
The most complete exposition of the congressional view in the process of this enactment is to be found in the remarks of Senator Robertson at the time the bill, as amended to conform to the House Committee report, came back to the Senate. At that time Senator Robertson, who was Chairman of the Senate Committee which had charge of the bill and who originally introduced the bill in the Senate, was recommending that the Senate accept the House amendment. No member of Congress had remained in closer touch with the bill’s progress through both Houses than Senator Robertson. As he put it: “I have lived with this problem day and night for months. I am convinced that we have a good bill.” What he then had to say expounded at considerable length the ideas which had been expressed by various House members during consideration of the bill in the House. 2
*130 Senator Robertson said unequivocally that the purpose of the bill was to “reverse a decision of the Supreme Court.” He said (Cong.Rec. Feb. 9, 1966, p. 2538): “The bill will end the confusion and controversy which has surrounded the bank merger situation since the ill-advised and unfortunate decisions of the Supreme Court in the Philadelphia and Lexington eases and the district court decision in the New York case which followed those precedents. It will do this by establishing a uniform rule for the bank supervisory agencies and the courts to follow in bank merger cases: a rule which takes into account both the competitive factors on which the antitrust laws are based — for banks these were written into the Bank Merger Act of 1960 — and the convenience and needs of the public to be served by the proposed merged bank.” Referring to the pend-ency of the suit now before us, he said: “It would permit the continuance of proceedings against the three ‘post-Philadelphia’ cases — in Nashville, San Francisco, and St. Louis — where mergers were consummated after that decision, but in these three cases the courts would be directed to follow the new statutory standards laid down in the statute for all mergers to be considered in the future.” And in a prepared statement which he incorporated in the record as a part of his remarks he said of the bill: “It will strike the Philadelphia, Lexington, and New York decisions and opinions from the books.” 3
*131 Perhaps the most conclusive evidence of the fact that this Act alters the previous rules comes from a comparison of the language of this statute with what the Supreme Court said in the Philadelphia case, namely, that a bank merger such as that one “is not saved because, on some ultimate reckoning of social or economic debits and credits, it may be deemed beneficial.” Section 18(c) (5), quoted above, expressly requires a consideration of similar factors thus rejected in Philadelphia.
This statute makes a further alteration in the nature of the proceeding now before us. After providing for the time of commencement of an action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of a merger transaction, § 18(c) (7) (A) stipulates: “In any such action, the court shall review de novo the issues presented.” Returning now to the provisions of § 2(c), requiring this court to “apply the substantive rule of law set forth in § 18(c) (5)”, and to § 18(c) (7) (B), reciting that in any judicial proceeding attacking a merger transaction approved under paragraph 5, “the standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply under paragraph 5,” it seems clear that what we are now called upon to do is to review a decision and determination of the Comptroller of the Currency.
To what extent that review can be “de novo”, we shall have occasion to discuss hereafter. The immediate difficulty now presented is that the prior decision of the Comptroller of September 30, 1963, was not made under or in the light of the new Bank Merger Act of 1966.
It is true that the Comptroller then found that the proposed merger “will promote the public interest”, using the language of the 1960 Act, but his determination did not contain findings covering the precise issues required to be determined by him under the language of § 18(c) (5) quoted above. Under that section it would be incumbent upon the Comptroller to determine whether any anti-competitive effects of the proposed merger were “clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.” We apprehend that an appropriate finding would specify in what respect the transaction would meet the convenience and needs of the community to be served.
There is another respect in which the earlier finding of the Comptroller may be inadequate and out-dated. His decision of September 30, 1963, antedated the decisions of the Supreme Court in United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.,
The Act requires this court to proceed in this case in the same manner in which it would have to deal with some future proposed merger. Before we can perform the required function of reviewing the action of the Comptroller, the matter must be remanded for the consideration of the Comptroller under the provisions of the 1966 Act, a proposition we shall discuss hereafter.
Plainly enough the Act is designed to set up precise rules under which the validity of proposed bank mergers may be ascertained and determined. The first required step is the application to the Comptroller of the Currency 4 for written approval of the proposed merger. Upon hearing on such an application the Comptroller is directed to act upon the considerations set forth in § 18(c) (5) above referred to. Then, as indicated, if an action be brought attacking the merger transaction, it must be brought within a limited time and in any such action “the court shall review de novo the issues presented.” Thus the Act contemplates initial action by the Comptroller followed by a review at the instance of the Department of Justice.
When we face the task of complying with these requirements we are confronted with a difficulty arising out of the fact that the Act provides that this review shall be “de novo”.
It will be noted that under § 5 the Comptroller is charged with ascertaining two sets of facts. The first is whether the effect of the proposed merger transaction “in any section of the country may be substantially to lessen competition” and the second, whether, having found that there would be anti-competitive effects in the proposed transaction, those effects “are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served.”
No difficulty would be presented here so far as reviewing de novo the first of these determinations for this court has traditionally adjudged whether mergers have anti-competitive effects. But the problem of reviewing the second determination by the Comptroller, namely, whether the proposed transaction is outweighed in the public interest, and whether it meets the convenience and needs of the community, is plainly and unquestionably a legislative or administrative determination 5 of a type which *133 this court, as a constitutional court, is prohibited from deciding.
The jurisdiction of this court is limited to cases and controversies as that term is used in Article III of the Constitution. As stated in Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.,
This does not mean that the administrative order of an agency or commission may not be reviewed in a judicial proceeding in a constitutional court; but such a review is necessarily limited to the determination of questions of law and the ascertainment of whether findings of fact by the agency are supported by substantial evidence. Federal Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Co.,
Since it is plain that this court cannot be invested with power to make an original and independent determination as to whether anti-competitive effects are “outweighed in the public interest” or what are the “convenience and needs of the community to be served” we are confronted with the question whether this Act’s provision for a re\view de novo must be held null and void and therefore wholly disregarded.
We do not think so. There are certain general principles relating to construction of statutes which should aid us here. In United States v. American Trucking Ass’ns,
In the case before us the use of the words “de novo”, as we have noted, may have full significance in respect to this court’s review of the Comptroller’s determination of the existence or nonexistence of anti-competitivé effects by the merger. But the language of the Act would lead to absurd and futile results if it were construed as requiring this Court to substitute its judgment for the findings of the Comptroller dealing with the public interest and the convenience and needs of the community. This court cannot validly be invested with power to make such a decision which, as we have noted, is plainly legislative or administrative in character. If we look to the purpose beyond the statute and to the policy of the legislation as a whole we must conclude that Congress has framed an Act which contemplates, as an important part thereof, provisions for review of the Comptroller’s action.
Other courts have had occasion to deal with an identical problem arising from the use of the words “de novo” in state statutes providing for court reviews of administrative or legislative determinations. In those cases the courts have been confronted with difficulties comparable to those present here, some of them stemming from their constitutional provisions for separation of powers. Thus in Household Finance Corp. v. State,
A like decision was made by the Supreme Court of Indiana in State Board of Medical Registration and Examination v. Scherer,
The same problem confronted the Supreme Court of Texas in Jones v. Marsh,
It seems reasonable to say that there may be a special kind of review de novo involved here, namely, a review involving a greater exercise of our judgment in respect to the question of anti-competitive effects, and a review, more limited under the so-called substantial evidence rule, of the Comptroller’s determination of weight of public interest and of the character of the needs and convenience of the community.
Another general principle may therefore be applied here. Since the language of the Act could properly be construed to intend the special kind of
de novo
review just referred to, we can “apply the familiar canon which makes it our duty, of two possible constructions, to adopt the one which will save and not destroy. We cannot attribute to Congress an intent to defy the Constitution or ‘even to come so near to doing so as to raise a serious question of constitutional law.’ ” Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis,
It is plain to us that the congressional purpose here was to provide for an initial decision by the Comptroller and that the action brought by the Department of Justice should be deemed an action to review that decision. It is noteworthy that the section of the statute which uses the term “de novo” does not speak of a trial de novo but of a review de novo.
The legislative scheme here, in our view, resembles that which is more elaborately spelled out in those sections of the Interstate Commerce Act which were discussed in the recent case of Seaboard Air Line R. Co. v. United States,
The action of the Supreme Court in those cases dealing with the right of the Interstate Commerce Commission to approve a merger notwithstanding its anticompetitive effects, and particularly the language above quoted from the Seaboard Air Line case, would seem to negative another argument of the Government. This is that the language of § 18(c) (5) referring to the “convenience and needs of the community to be served” is but a reiteration of the “failing company doctrine” long recognized as “an integral part of settled antitrust law.” No such limiting suggestion was ever made in Seaboard Air Line and the other cases dealing with Jhe same statute. In our view it would be absurd to find that the new standards so carefully framed for the 1966 Bank Merger Act were no more than the inclusion of a wholly unnecessary reference to the “failing company doctrine”. There is not the slightest indication in the language of the Act, or in its legislative history, to support the Government’s effort thus to cancel or dissipate the declared purpose of the Act. During the debate on the bill, the question of the situation of the failing bank was mentioned, and in a colloquy between Congressman Weltner, who opposed the bill, and Congressman Multer, who supported it, it was made plain that the language referred to was not limited to the failing bank situation. 9
*137 The careful and precise description of this portion of the bill, made by Senator Robertson to the Senate as the latter body prepared to accept the House version, would clearly negative any suggestion that it was limited to the failing company situation. 10
A final answer to the Government’s “failing company” theory is found in the House Report’s indication as to the limited extent of the use of financial resources of the affected banks. That report states (U.S. Code, Cong, and Administrative News, 89th Cong. 2d Session, p. 337): “However, only the convenience and needs of the community to be served can be weighed against anticompetitive effects, with financial and managerial resources being considered only as they throw light on the capacity of the existing and proposed institutions to serve the community.”
One problem which we confront in this particular case is how we shall apply the rules which are prescribed in the Act. In the case of future mergers the method of procedure and the application of the statutory requirements is quite simple. First, the banks seeking to merge will make their application for approval to “the responsible agency” in a case of this kind, the Comptroller of the Currency. The agency will then hold the hearings and make the determination contemplated by § 18(c) (5) of the Act which, as we have indicated, calls for two determinations — whether the merger will have a tendency substantially to lessen competition and whether the anti-competitive effects, if found, are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the needs and convenience of the community to be served.
The Act then provides that any action brought under the antitrust laws arising out of this merger transaction shall be commenced within a short period following the Comptroller’s approval and in this judicial proceeding “the standards applied by the court shall be identical with those that the banking agencies are directed to apply under paragraph 5.” Also, in any such action, the court is required to review in the manner we have mentioned, the issues presented. The Act, making reference to this, and other cases initiated after June 16, 1963, with respect to a merger consummated after that date, requires us to apply the same substantive rule of law that we would apply in the case of any future merger.
Here, however, the merger is already accomplished; it was accomplished pursuant to a September 30,1963, approval by the Comptroller who purported to act under the provisions of the 1960 Bank Merger Act. That Act, as demonstrated by the decision of the Court in Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, was without force and effect, and the Comptroller’s decision of September 30, *138 1963, cannot, we think, be the equivalent of a determination by him under the 1966 Bank Merger Act or in accordance with § 18(c) (5) thereof. The question' is whether we may now require the Comptroller to proceed under the new Act and to make the determination called for by the last mentioned section preliminary to our further consideration of the same and a review thereof.
We think that the decision in United States v. Morgan,
We think that in this case this court cannot as a practical matter apply the substantive rule of law set forth in § 18 (c) (5) of the Act unless it has before it for review an order of the Comptroller made pursuant to the requirements of that section. Not only because we are here required to review an administrative order as a part of our consideration of this case, but also because the Comptroller has made himself a party to this proceeding and subject to our orders, we shall now remand the cause to the Comptroller with directions to proceed to make the determinations called for by the Bank Merger Act of 1966. This we think to be appropriate in view of the requirements of the Act notwithstanding the actual merger has been completed.
This remand is predicated upon the assumption that after a new order has been made by the Comptroller, we will be able to review the same. As we have indicated, our power to review any determination as to the anti-competitive effects will allow a greater exercise of our own judgment, than our power to review a determination as to whether the anti-competitive effects, if any, are clearly outweighed in the public interest and as to the effect of the transaction in meeting the needs and convenience of the community to be served. In making his determination the Comptroller should make specific findings as to the competitive situation as to which the merger may have operative effects and particularly whether the merger will have a probable tendency to lessen or do away with potential competition.
In passing upon the question of the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the needs and convenience of the community to be served, the Comptroller should specify particularly what he finds to be the convenience and needs of the community, what he considers will be the effect of the merger thereon, and how and by what means he weighs these effects as against the anti-competitive effects of the transaction. Furthermore, in order to avoid any possible necessity for further remand following our review of the Comptroller’s order, he is directed to make a finding as to whether, assuming that the merger has the effect upon *139 potential competition which the Government claims, that effect would be outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the interest and convenience of the community to be served. 12
In holding that our function now, under the 1966 Act, is to review an appropriate order of the Comptroller, we are disapproving other alternatives. One alternative would be to hold that we must disregard any suggestion for a review and simply decide the case on the evidence now before us, applying directly the standards set forth in § 18(c) (5). Such, we think would not be consonant with the clear purpose and intent of the Act. Plainly the whole intent was that there should be made available in determining the validity of bank mergers the expertise of persons familiar with banking and with the operating procedures of banks. Not only is this court constitutionally without power to evaluate such features of the “probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served,” but we lack the informed experience properly to apply such tests.
To deny the banks involved in these three “post-Philadelphia” actions the benefits of these banking-economic tests by specialized agencies would run counter to what the legislative history of the Act indicates was the attitude of Congress toward these three mergers. As the bill first came from the Senate it would have provided that this merger “shall be exempt from the antitrust laws.” In its final form the bill exempted only the pre-Philadelphia mergers. But the bill would, as Senator Robertson stated, “permit the continuance of proceedings against the three post-Philadelphia cases — in Nashville, San Francisco, and St. Louis — where mergers were consummated after that decision, but in these three cases the courts would be directed to follow the new statutory standards laid down in the statute for all mergers to be considered in the future.” Surely Congress was not swinging from a most favorable treatment of this merger to an opposite extreme of denying it the expertise contemplated for all mergers in the future.
Another holding, in the alternative, would be that since this court cannot validly entertain a question as to “the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to be served,” the requirement that we “shall apply the substantive rule of law set forth in § 18(c) (5)” must be held inoperative and disregarded, and therefore this action must proceed as if the Act had not been passed. Such an unnecessary and uncalled for disregard of the obvious purpose and intent of the Act is unthinkable.
We anticipate that the defendant banks will suggest that we should simplify this whole matter by finding now, once and for all, that the claimed adverse effect upon competition has not been established and that the merger will not have the effect either substantially to lessen competition, whether actual or potential, or to tend to create a monopoly or operate in restraint of trade. But, as indicated in Seaboard Air Line R. Co., supra, that is not the ultimate question to be determined in this litigation, and we shall not invite a repetition of the error corrected in that case.
It is therefore ordered that further proceedings herein shall be stayed pending the further consideration by the Comptroller, in the manner hereinabove indicated, of the questions required to be passed upon under § 18(c) (5). In reaching his determination the Comptroller will, of course, give the notices and provide the opportunity for hearing contemplated by the Act. We assume the parties will assist in shortening the proceedings by agreeing that the Comptroller may consider the evidence adduced at our last hearing, as well as that
*140
at his first hearing, particularly in view of the rule that administrative agencies have never been restricted by the rigid rules of evidence. Federal Trade Comm. v. Cement Institute,
Upon certification to this court of the proceedings of the Comptroller, this court shall proceed in such manner as may be called for by the Comptroller’s decision.
It is so ordered.
This opinion contains the court’s findings and conclusions.
Notes
. It was noted in tlie congressional debates that this section referred to three so-called “post Philadelphia cases — in Nashville, San Francisco and St. Louis — where mergers were consummated after that [Philadelphia] decision.” This is the San Francisco case there referred to. The Philadelphia case referred to is United States v. Philadelphia National Bank,
. Representative Ashley, one of the members principally in charge of the bill in the House, stated (Cong.Rec. Feb. 8, 1966, p. 2339): “The bill would require the court to use the new standards of the bill in all * * * ‘post Philadelphia’ cases now pending in court. * * * The courts have repeatedly held that un *130 der the antitrust laws the social or economic benefits of a given merger cannot even be considered.” The Congressman then quoted from the statement to that effect in the Philadelphia case: “It is a primary purpose of the bill to assure that the courts will never again dismiss as irrelevant the question of the needs of a community * * *. [T]he merger must be shown to be sufficiently beneficial in meeting the needs of the community to be served that, on balance, it may properly be regarded as in the public interest.” During the same discussion Rep. Stanton, a member of the committee in charge of the bill, (Cong. Rec. Feb. 8, 1966, p. 2343) stated: “[I]t was the expressed purpose and intent of Congress when it passed the Bank Merger Act in 1960 to make certain that control of bank mergers should be in the hands of the appropriate banking supervisory agencies, and that while the competitive effects of a proposed merger should be considered, they were not to be given a predominant position. These standards were repudiated by the Supreme Court in the Philadelphia National Bank and the Lexington Bank cases in which the Court decided that the Justice Department had the final say in bank mergers. Contrary to the intent of Congress, the bank regulatory authorities were relegated to advisory roles. * * *
These provisions * * * reinstate a measure of antitrust consideration which was lacking in the Senate bill, and they provide a banking standard that may allow economic assistance to a community even though a merger tends to lessen competition in that community. It is this statutory balance that was intended in 1960. * * *
The * * * bill * * * directs the courts to apply the banking standards as well as the competitive standards in any judicial proceeding attacking an approved merger transaction * * * * * * gives these standards equal weight as between economic and competitive circumstances and it assures this equilibrium throughout the entire review procedure.”
. In an effort to find some legislative history to bolster its position that this Act made no changes in the law, the Government has inserted in its brief some quotations from the remarks of individual Congressmen during floor debate. Taken out of context, as they are, they prove nothing. It is true that the wording of § 18(c) (5) emphasized and restated the requirement that the Comptroller, and the reviewing courts, take into consideration the antitrust laws. This was noted in debate, but it was also noted that this Act definitely and positively added a new standard. As stated in the House Report of supplemental views of Congressman Ottinger who helped draft the bill: “It also assures that banking services available to meet the convenience and needs of a
community arc
considered in all cases and will prevail where they clearly outweigh nonmonopolistic anti-competitive effects of a merger.” Counsel’s quotations from the debate ignore the rule stated in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,
. It is this officer who must act if the acquiring, assuming or resulting bank is to be a national bank. Where a state bank is to be the resulting one, the decision is to be made by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. In other cases, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation is to make the decision.
. It will be noticed that the standards of § 5 are to be applied in granting or refusing leave to merge in the future. The contemplated action “looks to the future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied thereafter to * * * some part of those subject to [the Comptroller’s] power,” as fully as the establishment of railroad rates in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.,
See Finfrock, “Trial de Novo — Panacea?” in 14 Baylor Law Review, 135, where the Texas cases are discussed: “This criterion in essence classifies as administrative and non-judicial decisional functions which courts are not particularly equipped to decide while leaving to the courts that category of decision making with which it has traditionally dealt and is equipped to handle under the adversary type of judicial procedure. Decisions that require the inquisitorial type of procedure, investigative in nature, and which must, to attain optimum utility, be based upon a mosaic of expert opinion, judgment, and decisions are and should be regarded as non-judicial and left primarily to the administrators. They are far more able to come to grips with such problems than a court or jury in the detached and sterile atmosphere of the courtroom.” (p. 160)
. A like problem was solved in a similar manner in De Mond v. Liquor Control Commission,
. In United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, the Court was confronted with a difficulty arising out of the language of § 7 of the Clayton Act. The Court recognized merit in the contention of the appellees that the merger there involved an assets acquisition and hence that § 7 had no application since the Federal Trade Commission had no jurisdiction over banks. The Court said (374 U.S. p.. 337, 83 S.Ct. p. 1727) : “Since the literal terms of § 7 thus do not dispose of our question, we must determine whether a congressional design to embrace bank mergers is revealed in the history of the statute.” The Court’s final conclusion was based upon what it found to be a “plain congressional purpose.”
. During the debate in the House Congressman Moorehead, one of the members of the committee most actively in charge of the bill, cited and quoted from the Seaboard Air Line case, and also from McLean Trucking Co. v. United States,
. After Congressman Multer had given an illustration of how this language would apply in a ease not involving a failing hank, the following colloquy occurred:
“Mr. Weltner. This is a case of a failing bank, which has long been recognized by the court. It has nothing to do with this legislation. I am sure the gentleman from Wisconsin will agree with me, that we do not have to pass any bill to permit the approving agency to merge a failing bank in order to save it from insolvency. I am certain that the gentlemen from New York, indeed, would say, as a well-educated lawyer, that the failing bank doctrine exists independently of any statutes which has been passed in the last 20 or 30 years. I yield to the gentleman for the purpose of responding to the correctness of that proposition.
Mr. Multer: The gentleman is correct as far as he goes, but I have gone beyond the failing bank theory. There are many instances where we are not concerned with the failing bank, where there is an absolute and complete diminution of competition, yet under all the circumstances and all of the factors the *137 court should approve that merger just as the regulatory agencies may approve the merger.” Cong.Rec. Feb. 8, 1966, p. 2346.
. He said: “* * * this bill, should convince the courts that the Congress does not intend that mergers in the banking field should be measured solely by the antitrust considerations which are applied in other industries.” (Cong.Rec. Feb. 9, 1966, p. 2541.) In short, something apart from the older antitrust considerations, (including the failing company rule) are imported here. He also said (p. 2542): “The courts will no longer be able to say — in the ease of a merger which does not reach to the point of creating a monopoly — that proof that a merger will have demonstrable benefits or will be benign is irrelevant. On the contrary, the question whe,ther there are or are not demonstrable benefits— whether the merger is benign or malignant — will be the heart of the issue.” Again he said (p. 2542): “The effect of the merger on the public interest and on the convenience and needs of the community to be served must be measured in specific and realistic terms in the light of the kinds of business involved, and the kinds of people being served. The banking agencies and the court? must be guided by the realities of the industrial, commercial, and financial worlds. They must look through theories and percentages and doctrines to the hard facts of life.”
. In that case the Secretary of Agriculture made an order reducing stockyards rates. After those rates had gone into effect the Supreme Court set aside the order of the Secretary because of procedural defects and the cause was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The Court stated that it would not attempt to forecast what further proceedings the Secretary might see fit to take. The district court which had entered a temporary restraining order enjoining the enforcement of the Secretary’s order had required the excess charges collected by the stockyards over and above the amount prescribed by the Secretary to be deposited with the court pending final determination of the case. The Secretary then reopened the original proceedings and pending these proceedings the district court granted the appellees’ motion to distribute the fund mentioned among them. This decision was based upon a ruling that the Secretary did not have authority to make an order prescribing rates and charges effective as of the date of his original order.
. Note the usefulness of findings based on assumptions made by the district court in United States v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, supra, at p. 335 of