United States v. Criss E. DuncanUnited States v. Criss E. Duncan
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- Before:
- Ripple
After a jury trial, Criss Duncan was convicted of the following offenses: armed bank robbery, in violation of
I
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
We shall set forth only those facts germane to Mr. Duncan’s present challenge to his sentence. On May 27, 2003, he and his co-defendant Ralph Berkey, each armed with an assault-type rifle, robbed the National City Bank located in Leesburg, Indiana. At Mr. Duncan’s trial, Berkey testified that the firearms that they had used during the robbery had been modified to be fully automatic. R.126 at 25, 41-42. In addition, Larry Joe Ellis testified that, prior to the robbery, he had worked for Berkey to make several firearms fully automatic. Id. at 22-24. According to Ellis, after the robbery, Mr. Duncan and Berkey left Mr. Duncan’s Mazda truck on Ellis’ property, and Berkey told him to “[wjipe the fingerprints off the guns. Take care of them for me.” Id. at 22. Ellis found two fully automatic firearms in the truck, and he converted them back to semi-automatic.
B. District Court Proceedings
Over Mr. Duncan’s objection, the district court found that the testimony of Berkey and Ellis established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the firearms used in the National City Bank robbery qualified as machine guns. Under the law prevailing at the time of sentencing, this finding required the district court to sentence Mr. Duncan to at least thirty years in prison on the firearms count.
See
The guidelines sentencing range for Mr. Duncan’s remaining convictions was 97 to 121 months. The final guidelines range was 457 to 481 months. The district court imposed a sentence of 457 months’ imprisonment, stating:
In my thirty plus years as a federal judge, because of the mandatory thirty years for using a machinegun, this is without a doubt the longest sentence this Court has given for a bank robbery. A sentence at the low end of the range still places him in federal custody for almost forty years, and seems more than adequate.
R.133 at 14.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Mr. Duncan contends that his sentence violates his Sixth Amendment rights
The plain error standard allows an appellate court to “correct an error that the defendant failed to raise below only when there was (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights.”
United States v. Henningsen,
402 F.3d 748, 751 (7th Cir.2005) (citing
United States v. Olano,
507 U.S. 725, 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993));
see also
B. Sentence
1.
With respect to Mr. Duncan’s contention that Booker and Blakely require the vaeation of his sentence because it is based on a mandatory minimum sentence, the Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002), controls. In Harris, the Court stated that McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), in which it upheld a state statute that mandated minimum sentences based upon judicial fact-finding, could co-exist with the logical implications of the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), that “ ‘[ojther than a fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum ... must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” Harris, 536 U.S. at 550, 566-67, 122 S.Ct. 2406 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348).
Contrary to Mr. Duncan’s submission, nothing in Booker or Blakely suggests that the Court reconsidered, much less overruled, its holding in Harris. See United States v. Lee, 399 F.3d 864, 866 (7th Cir.2005) (noting that Booker does not give sentencing courts any discretion to disregard a statutory mandatory minimum). 3 Put simply, Booker and Blakely do not affect the imposition of statutory minimum sentences.
Moreover, even if the logic and spirit of those decisions could be interpreted to have eroded the Court’s previous rationale for permitting mandatory
2.
Mr. Duncan’s sentence nevertheless requires our intervention. The district court imposed his sentence prior to Booker and, understandably, believed itself bound by the federal sentencing guidelines. Our cases hold that, in light of Booker, such a misapprehension can amount to plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Castillo, 406 F.3d 806, 823 (7th Cir.2005) (concluding that mandatory application of the guidelines itself, absent any Sixth Amendment. violation, constitutes error (citing United States v. White, 406 F.3d 827, 835 (7th Cir.2005))); Paladino, 401 F.3d at 480; see also Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 767 (rendering the guidelines effectively advisory, and not mandatory).
If Mr. Duncan were to be resentenced, the district court still would have no discretion to sentence him on the firearm offense to less than the statutory thirty-year minimum. However, this sentence runs consecutively to the sentence imposed because of Mr. Duncan’s other offenses.
See
[i]n my thirty plus years as a federal judge, because of the mandatory thirty years for using a machinegun, this is without a doubt the longest sentence this Court has given for a bank robbery. A sentence at the low end of the range still places him in federal custody for almost forty years, and seems more than adequate.
R.133 at 14. This statement suggests that the district court, even though still bound by the statutory minimum, may well have imposed a lighter total sentence if it had not believed that it was bound by the sentencing guidelines to impose the sentence that it did impose. We cannot know this, however. To enable us to complete our plain error analysis, a limited remand to the district court, in accordance with the procedure outlined in this court’s decision in Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483-84, is appropriate.
Accordingly, while retaining jurisdiction, we remand this case to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It Is So OjrdeRed.
Notes
. “Machine gun” is defined under
. Title 18 section 924(c)(1) provides in.part:
(A) Except to the extent that a greater minimum sentence is otherwise provided by this subsection or by any other provision of law, any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ... uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possess a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence ...—
(i)be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years;
(ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and
(iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
(B) If the firearm possessed by a person convicted of a violation of this subsection—
(i) is a short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun, or semiautomatic assault weapon, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years; or
(ii) is a machinegun or a destructive device, or is equipped with a firearm silencer or firearm muffler, the person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 30 years.
. The other courts of appeals to have addressed this issue have concluded that Booker does not apply to statutory mandatory minimum sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Bermudez, 407 F.3d 536, 545 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Cardenas, 405 F.3d 1046, 1048 (9th Cir.2005); United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 972 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Moore, 401 F.3d 1220, 1222 n. 1 (10th Cir.2005); United States v. Rojas-Coria, 401 F.3d 871, 874 n. 4 (8th Cir.2005); United States v. Groce, 398 F.3d 679, 682 n. 2 (4th Cir.2005); United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1333 n. 10 (11th Cir.2005); United States v. Sanchez, 123 Fed.Appx. 510, 511 n. 2 (3d Cir.2005) (unpublished); United States v. Sharpley, 399 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Joiner, 123 Fed.Appx. 681, 682 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished).