By сonsent of the parties litigant, a magistrate adjudicated this dispute, which is predicated on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is the contention of the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff that the magistrate’s dеtermination exceeded the issues surrendered to her by stipulation of the parties. That being so, the Sheriff seeks to have the magistrate’s judgment pared to only those issues that wеre contained in the stipulation. Finding merit in the Sheriffs position, we recast the judgment by reversing in part.
I.
In its petition, the government alleges that the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriffs Office and its Sheriff, Charlеs C. Foti, Jr., violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f) and 6(b). Specifically, the government asserts that the Sheriff engaged in discriminatory policies and practices that prevented women from attaining deputy sheriff positions on the male inmate residential tiers of the Orleans Parish confinement facilities.
The magistrate first considered the issue of liability and then, if necessary, the issue of relief. As to liability, the parties submitted a stipulation whereby the Sheriff agreed not to contest the government’s assertion that the Sheriffs department’s hiring and promotiоnal opportunities, as they pertained to male residential tiers, were not gender neutral. The stipulation stated in pertinent part:
The United States contends that Defendant’s policy and practice of not assigning female deputy sheriffs to posts located on its male inmate residential tiers denied females assignment, hiring, and promotional оpportunities and terms and conditions of employment equal to those accorded to male deputies and that this is a pattern and practice violative of Titlе VII, except to the extent that such policy and practice was justified as a BFOQ [bona fide occupational qualification] as defined in this Stipulation. Defendant denies this contention. However, for purposes of this suit only Defendant does not contest this contention.
With the liability issue at rest, the magistrate moved toward rendering relief, which camе in the form of an injunction.
II.
We note at this juncture the appellant’s suggestion that the magistrate erred as a matter of law in issuing an injunction without first affording a hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. We disagree. Rule 65(a)(1) provides that “[n]o preliminary injunction shall be issued without notice to the adverse party.” This circuit has stated that the purpose оf the rule “is always to prevent irreparable injury so as to preserve the court’s ability to render a meaningful decision on the merits.”
Meis v. Sanitas Service Corp.,
III.
Next, the appellant maintains thаt the court abused its discretion by issuing an injunction that exceeded the scope of the stipulation. In formulating relief in employment discrimination eases, the court has broad discretion to fashion remedies as the equities of a particular case compel.
LeBlanc v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
At issue are paragraphs two, four and five of the injunction. Paragraph two enjoins the Sheriff from “[flailing or refusing to hire females in the position of Deputy Sheriff, other than according to the same criterion applied in the hiring of males, at all facilities of the Orleans Parish Prison complex unless a bona fide occupational qualification ... exists.” Paragraph four enjoins the Sheriff from “[flailing or refusing to promote female deрuties into rank or supervisory positions at the Orleans Parish Prison jail facilities other than on an equal basis with male deputies unless a bona fide occupational qualification exists..., ” Paragraph five enjoins the Sheriff from “[flailing or refusing to adopt and implement a program to inform women of equal employment opportunities available аt the Orleans Parish Prison facilities and to attract qualified women to become Deputy Sheriffs in numbers reflecting their interest and availability in the relevant labor market.”
The Sheriff argues that the provisions of the stipulation apply only to facts surrounding the assignment of female deputy sheriffs to posts located on male inmate residential tiers. In contrast, thе three quoted paragraphs of the injunction go far afield from the stipulation and seek to regulate the Sheriffs hiring and promotional conduct in areas other than just the male inmate tiers of the Orleans Parish jail system.
The plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that the injunction was properly worded and that the magistrate did not exceed the scoрe of the stipulation. We disagree. As we stated previously, courts have broad discretion to fashion equitable remedies in Title VII cases.
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
IV.
This case has as its center point the policy employed by the Orleans Parish Sheriff in assigning deputy sheriffs to duties on all male populated tiers of the Orleans Parish jail. There is no proof, however, by stipulation or otherwise, that either side considered any other issue. The sheriff admitted to endorsing and enforcing a policy concerning deputy sheriff supervision on the male inmate residential tiers. No more was admitted. To regulate conduct not at issue is beyond the scope of the magistrate’s authority. A succinct summary of thе powers and limitations of the trial court was expressed in
NLRB v. Express Pub. Co.,
A Federal court has broad power to restrain acts which are of the same type or class as unlawful acts which the court has found to have been committed or whose commission in the future, unless enjoined, may fairly be anticipated from the defendant’s conduct in the past. But the merе fact that a court has found that a defendant has committed an act in violation of a statute does not justify an injunction broadly to obey the statute and thus subject the defendant to contempt proceedings if he shall at any time in the future commit some new violation unlike and unrelated to that with which he was originally charged. This Court will strike from an injunction deсree restraints upon the commission of unlawful acts which are thus disassociated from those which a defendant has committed.
In this case, paragraphs two, four and five apply to employment and assignment practices within the entire Orleans Parish prison system. Yet, the prefatory language of the injunction itself recites a dependence оn the stipulation: “In consideration of the Stipulation entered into by the plaintiff, United States of America, and the Parish of Orleans Criminal Sheriff in his official capacity, and the Parish оf Orleans Criminal Sheriffs Office herein collectively referred to as defen *241 dant and executed by the Court on September 8, 1992, the Court ORDERS as follows with respect to affirmative injunctive relief.” 1
This Circuit has previously ruled that a trial court’s discretion when fashioning in-junctive relief is limited to targeting the specific acts of discrimination.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Cosmair, Inc.,
For the foregoing reasons, we VACATE paragraphs twо, four, and five of the injunction of 29 December 1992 and AFFIRM the remainder.
Notes
. Paragraphs one and three of the injunction are not imbued with the same excessiveness as found in paragraphs two, four and five and are not opposed by the appellant in this appeal. The appellant’s restraint is well taken. Both paragraph one and paragraph three are limited in scope to correcting the absence of female deputy sheriffs on male only residential tiers.