Case Information
*1 Before W OOD S CUDDER S T . E VE Circuit Judges
. P ER C URIAM . Cory Williams, federal inmate, sought com passionate 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). bypassing government’s agreed decide case without oral argument briefs record adequately present facts legal arguments, oral would significantly aid F ED . R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 20 2404 defense that Williams his remedies with of Prisons and concluding that he had shown cir cumstances his release. agree court’s bottom line, but we take opportunity explain why, even one thought Williams had made case merits, he failed exhaust.
Williams has been seeking from ever since he began serving an year sentence in for three counts robbery, see U.S.C. §§ 1951(a), 2113(a), (d), and one count brandishing firearm, see 924(c). Less year after his sentencing, moved U.S.C. vacate sentence, contending his guilty plea was invol untary judge had participated plea negotia tions. affirmed because, although judge violated Federal Rule Criminal Procedure error adversely affect due process rights. Williams F.3d
Williams renewed efforts April He prison’s warden lease, arguing role plea negotiations an “extraordinary compelling” relief. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). warden responded, so June moved same ap pointed counsel Williams. Counsel filed mo tion, advanced entirely different ground: pandemic exposure virus stemming role usher prison’s chapel justified government opposed mo merits, but also argued had *3 ‐ met the statute’s exhaustion because request the warden raise the now pursued motion.
The court denied the motion. It skipped over the point and the counseled motion on the merits. court noted admitted suffer from any significant medical conditions might ‐ crease risk complications from COVID ‐ 19. pres ‐ ence of the virus alleged of increased exposure the virus of role usher, the court thought, were extraordinary cir cumstances
By taking this approach, left open the question whether requests warden re lease based on errors sufficed support on COVID question whether particular issues must be exhausted is a recurring one, so think im portant clarify our position it. A may grant mate’s request only “after de fendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights appeal failure Prisons bring motion de fendant’s behalf” “the lapse days” receipt such request by warden without response—whichever earlier. 3582(c)(1)(A). Unless defense jurisdictional, however, free deny such any supported record. government raised exhaustion—a nonjurisdictional defense—in court, arguing raised prison’s warden. It asserts defense appeal. recently ruled de fense “is mandatory, claim processing rule therefore *4 No. must be enforced when properly invoked.” Sanford, WL *3 Jan. 25, 2021) (emphasis original). facts relevant to are not in dispute, they show that failed properly to remedies the Bureau. problem is that counseled sought compassionate release based on the risks but he asked Bureau to seek release on Instead, he Bureau to seek compas sionate release on conduct. We have yet had occasion whether, order ex haust, an inmate required present same or similar release request Bureau motion now issue squarely before us, we confirm this rule—any contrary ap proach would undermine purpose exhaustion. designed allow Bu reau bring “a motion defendant’s behalf,” moves own behalf. 3582(c)(1)(A). And cannot determine whether should bring inmate does explain request justifying Bureau’s regulations imple menting earlier version statute (which per mit inmates their own) reinforce necessity this information, instructing inmates quest 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) “shall minimum contain … [t]he extraordinary circumstances inmate believes warrant consideration.” C.F.R. 571.61(a)(1). have found appellate decision addressing issue, but recognize some courts reached *5 20 2404 5 conclusion contrary to ours. These courts § 3582(c)(1)(A) does explicitly require “issue exhaustion.” See, e.g., United States v. Brown , F. Supp. 3d 691, 696–98 (S.D. Iowa 2020); v. Torres , F. Supp. 3d 651, 654–57 (S.D.N.Y. They rely Sims v. Apfel U.S. (2000), Social Security case, which cautioned courts refrain imposing issue exhaustion requirements, par ‐ ticularly where there no adversarial administrative pro ‐ ceeding, at 108–110, true Bureau’s compas ‐ sionate procedures. these decisions do persuade us several reasons.
First, they overlook purpose § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaus requirement—to provide Bureau with infor mation necessary defendant’s behalf. Second, some fail Bureau’s regulation requir ing inmate detail circumstances com passionate C.F.R. § 571.61(a)(1). See Brown F. Supp. 696–98. Third, though dispositive, they involve situation unrelated presented frivolous. See id ; Torres F. Supp.
In our view, 3582(c)(1)(A)’s requirement more closely resembles Prison Litigation Reform Act, see 1997e(a), Social Security regulations addressed Sims . That Act quires “proper exhaustion” available administrative reme dies order afford prisons opportunity address sues they are brought federal Woodford Ngo U.S. (2006); 1997e(a). Consistent statutory scheme, inmate cannot satisfactorily un der PLRA by filing grievance one then *6 suing court unrelated See ; Schillinger v. Kiley F.3d 995–96 (7th Cir. Thus, because Wil liams district court his presence his infection, his counsel could properly file mo basis.
In effort salvage case, Williams responds court should have considered only argument initial, pro se was limited judge issue, rather presented counseled, motion. appointing counsel (a decision Williams did oppose), abuse its discretion. At point, was entitled limit its consideration arguments coun sel presented. See United States v. Patterson F.3d (7th Cir. 2009) (courts have discretion disregard pro se filings represented litigants); Wil liams F.3d 2007) (represented litigants no right file pro se motions). In any event, have already determined pro se lacks merit participation plea negotia tions violate due process rights. F.3d Even pro se was exhausted court, meritless. therefore AFFIRM judgment rejecting application