Dеfendant John Norbert Contreras pled guilty to bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). He now appeals the resulting sentence of 151 months imprisonment. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and affirm.
I.
In May 1998, a New Mexico state court sentenced Defendant to eleven years imрrisonment for a robbery Defendant committed in November 1997. In December 1998, Defendant subsequently pled guilty in federal district court to an August 1997 bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The district court sentenced Defendant as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 to 151 months imprisonment. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a concurrent sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(b) and instead imposed the instant sentence consecutive to his state robbery sentence pursuant to § 5G1.3(c). The court concluded that § 5G1.3(b) did not apply because the court based its determination that Defendant was a career offender on two specific prior violent felony convictions, rathér than on the recent state robbery conviction.
On appeal, Defendant argues the district court erred by ordering his federal sentence to run consecutively to his state sentence because U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b) requires a concurrent sentence. Defendant does not challenge the district court’s particular application of § 5G1.3(c) in imposing his consecutive sentence, but only the court’s decision to apply that sectiоn rather than § 5G1.3(b). We review the district court’s interpretation and application of the sentencing guidelines de novo.
United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela,
II.
In general, a distriсt court has broad discretion to sentence a defendant to a consecutive or concurrent sentence.
See
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3584(a), (b);
United States v. McCarty,
*1153
The parties agree that subsection (a) does not apply. Rather, Defendant аrgues that subsection (b) mandates the imposition of a concurrent sentence because the district court fully took into account his state robbery conviction when determining his career offender status under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1.
2
We disagree. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b)’s central aim is to ensure no defendant is punished twice for the same crime.
United States v. Caraballo,
Section 5G1.3(b) does not apply in this casе because the district court did not fully take into account Defendant’s May 1998 state robbery conviction in determining the offense level оf the instant offense. The district court determined that Defendant was a career offender pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1. Section 4B1.1 requires a defendаnt to have “at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offеnse” to be considered a career offender. Defendant has a total of eleven prior violent felony convictions
in addition to
the May 1998 violent felony conviction. The district court expressly relied on two such convictions when it determined Defendant was a career offender pursuant to § 4B1.1. Those two convictions occurred in August 1982 and September 1990. Consequently, § 5G1.3(b) does not apply because the district court did not “fully take[] into account” the May 1998 state robbery conviction in determining the offense level for the instant offense.
See Johnson,
Therefore, U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c), not § 5G1.3(b), applies to Defendant’s case. Subsection (c) grants the district court discretion to impose either a concurrent or consecutive sentence, or a combination thereof. The district court chose to impose a consecutive sentence. Defendant does not challengе, and we do not address, the district court’s particular application of § 5G1.3(c) in imposing his consecutive sentence.
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, Imposition of a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment, provides in full,
(a) If the instant offense was committed while the defendant was serving a term of imprisonment (including work release, furlough, or escape status) or after sentencing for, but before cоmmencing service of, such term of imprisonment, the sentence for the in-slant offense shall be imposed to run consecutively to Lhe undisсharged term of imprisonment.
(b) If subsection (a) does not apply, and the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant offense, the sentence for the instant offensе shall be imposed to run concur *1153 rently to the undischarged term of imprisonment.
(c) (Policy Statement) In any other case, the sentence for the instant offense may be imposеd to run concurrently, partially concurrently, or consecutively to the prior undischarged term of imprisonment to achieve a rеasonable punishment for the instant offense.
. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1 provides,
A Defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction, (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.