United States v. ComstockUnited States v. Comstock
In July 2006, Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (the Walsh Act), Pub.L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006), to combat sexual violence and the exploitation, molestation, and abuse of children in this country. Described by Senator Orrin Hatch as the “most comprehensive child crimes and protection bill in our Nation’s history,” 152 Cong. Rec. S 8012 (2006), the Act creates a National Sex Offender Registry with uniform registration standards, creates criminal penalties for individuals who fail to comply with the Act’s registration requirements, increases federal criminal penalties for violent and sexually violent crimes against children, provides grants to states to help states institutionalize sex offenders who have shown they are unable to control their behavior, creates a task force that will take action to make it more difficult for sexual predators to reach children on the Internet, and establishes a National Child Abuse registry. Much of the legislation is designed to close the gap between federal and state efforts to identify, track, and confine sexual predators.
Respondents’ motions to dismiss in these cases present the court with questions of constitutional authority and substantive due process, among others, with respect to only one provision of the Walsh Act, 1 that which permits the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons. Those questions are: whether the federal government has the constitutional authority to seek the indefinite commitment of a person to prevent criminal conduct that is almost exclusively proscribed by the States, without requiring a nexus between the commitment and an identifiable federal interest; and whether a statute requiring a factual finding of criminal conduct as a prerequisite to indefinite commitment may permit such commitment where that conduct is not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Having carefully considered the arguments by all parties, the court concludes, for the reasons that follow, that the civil commitment provision of the Walsh Act is not a necessary and proper exercise of Congressional authority and that the use of a clear and convincing burden of proof violates the substantive due process rights of those subject to commitment under the statute.
Procedural History
Regarding the first filed of these cases, Graydon Comstock pled guilty on 4 October 2000 to one count of “Receipt [by computer] of materials depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct” in violation of
*527 In each of these cases, the Federal Public Defender on behalf of the respondents has filed motions to dismiss the petitions for hearings. 3 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition pertaining to Com-stock on 15 February 2007 and a second motion to dismiss on 20 March 2007. The government filed a consolidated response to these motions on 5 April 2007, and respondents filed a reply on 13 April 2007. This court heard oral argument on .7 May 2007.
To civilly commit an individual as a “sexually dangerous person,” the BoP must provide “clear and convincing evidence” that the person “has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation
and
... is sexually dangerous to others” as defined by
Discussion
The Supreme Court has upheld against constitutional challenge at least one sexually violent predator act passed by a state legislature, see
Kansas v. Hendricks,
1) a commitment under§ 4248 is a criminal proceeding and thus violates the double jeopardy clause, the ex post facto clause, the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the 6th Amendment right to jury trial;
2) Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in enacting§ 4248 ;
3) application of the clear and convincing standard of proof in a§ 4248 hearing violates due process; and
4)§ 4248 violates substantive due process and equal protection under the 5th Amendment.
The court notes, as an initial matter, that respondents’ arguments concerning the purported lack of Congressional authority to enact
If Congress lacked the authority to enact the civil commitment scheme at issue, however, the commitment scheme could not be constitutionally applied. Even if Congress does theoretically have the au
*529
thority to provide for the civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons in federal custody,
I. Civil vs. Criminal Nature of
Respondents argue that the commitment scheme set up by
In
Kansas v. Hendricks,
the Supreme Court reviewed a challenge to the constitutionality of the Kansas Sexually. Violent Predator Act (KSVPA) and held, among other things, that the KSVPA’s commitment scheme did not establish criminal proceedings and that involuntary confinement pursuant to that statute was not punitive.
Several recent decisions addressing constitutional challenges to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SOR-NA), which is Title I of the Walsh Act,
Because analogous case law indicates that
II. The Federal Government’s Authority to Civilly Commit Sexually Dangerous Persons: The Necessary and Proper Clause
Statutes are presumed constitutional.
United States v. Morrison,
Congress did not explicitly identify the source of federal authority on which it relied in enacting the civil commitment provision of the Walsh Act. Respondents argue that
The parties’ respective arguments regarding the federal government’s authority to civilly commit sexually dangerous individuals in the manner prescribed
*531
by
Because the government has invoked the Necessary and Proper Clause, the court must examine carefully the enumerated and incidental powers upon which the government relies as a source of federal authority to enact
A. Analysis of Congressional Authority
Of the powers suggested by the government, the Commerce Clause is the only one that is actually enumerated in the Constitution.
1. The Power to Prosecute
One of the categories of individuals subject to commitment under
In
Greenwood,
the Supreme Court upheld Congress’s power to civilly commit an incompetent individual pursuant to
While Justice Frankfurter rejected the federalism challenge mounted in
Greenwood,
he explicitly defined the limited extent of federal power to deal with civil commitment of incompetent and dangerous individuals. He wrote that where the petitioner at issue came legally into the custody of the United States but was found unable to stand trial because of his mental condition,
“the power that put him into such custody
— the
power to prosecute for federal offenses
— is
not exhausted.
Its assertion in the form of the pending indictment persists.... [Such a] commitment, and therefore the legislation authorizing commitment in the context of this case, involve an assertion of authority, duly guarded, auxiliary to incontestable national power. As such it is plainly within congressional power under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, 8, cl. 18.”
Id.
at 375,
Accordingly, in
Greenwood,
the Supreme Court recognized that civil commitment of a mentally ill and dangerous individual who is subject to a pending indictment but who is found to be incompetent to stand trial is a legitimate exercise of Congressional power and that the statutory provision for such commitment was necessary and proper to the government’s power to prosecute. Thus, to the extent that there is an indictment pending against an individual like Catron, the power to prosecute is not exhausted, and the Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to authorize civil commitment where release would endanger the interests of the United
*533
States.
7
The civil commitment provision considered by the
Greenwood
Court, however, differs markedly from
Importantly,
Greenwood
did not address the source of Congressional authority to civilly commit a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire, such as respondents Com-stock, Matherly, Vigil and Revland,
8
persons as to whom the power to prosecute is, in fact, exhausted. With respect to such individuals, an attempted commitment under
The government makes some effort to bring the commitment of a prisoner whose sentence is about to expire within the ambit of Congress’s power to prosecute, offering
United States v. Plotts,
In
Plotts,
the defendant pled guilty to receiving child pornography over the Internet and to a count of criminal forfeiture, and he was ultimately required, as a condition of supervised release, to cooperate in the collection of his DNA during that period of supervised release. The defendant argued, in reliance on
United States v. Lopez
,
Unlike the DNA Act,
The court concludes that civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons whose prison sentences are about to expire is not a necessary and proper extension of Congress’s power to prosecute federal crimes. Another source of power must support the use of the necessary and proper authority in this context.
2. The Commerce Clause Power
Like prohibiting the possession of guns within a school zone,
Lopez
and
Morrison
suggest that
In addition,
Lopez
and
Morrison
invalidated laws for lack of adequate connection to the federal regulation of commerce. In
Lopez,
the Court struck down a criminal prohibition, and in
Morrison,
the Court struck down a federal civil remedy for criminal conduct. Both statutes were Congressional attempts to regulate noneconomic activity. And in both, the Supreme Court rejected the “pil[ing] of inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States,”
Lopez,
3. The Power to Prevent Criminal Conduct
The government argues that Congress’s power to commit sexually dangerous individuals derives from its power to prevent the commission of criminal conduct, which in turn, derives from its power to criminalize that conduct in the first place, which power derives from powers enumerated by the Constitution, such as the Commerce Clause. (Gov’t Br. at 7-9.) Citing
United States v. Perry,
In
Perry,
the Third Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a presumption contained in the Bail Reform Act permitting pretrial detention of an arrestee when “no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure ... the safety of the community” and where there is probable cause to believe that the accused has committed a major drug trafficking offense or a felony with a firearm. The court examined the source of federal power to detain arrestees without conviction (a type of civil commitment) for the safety of the community.
Perry,
What, then, is the source of congressional authority to provide for civil commitment for “the safety of the community”? As the legislative voice of a government of limited powers, Congress, unlike the legislatures of the states, cannot sanction for the general welfare.... Congress may concern itself with the “safety of the community” only to the extent that other grants of specific power so permit.
Id.
In its analysis, the
Perry
court drew from the Supreme Court’s
Greenwood
decision the principle that “the federal gov-
*537
eminent may resort to civil commitment when such commitment is necessary and proper to the exercise of
some specific federal authority.
Congress may not, however, authorize commitment simply to protect the general welfare of the community at large.”
Id.
at 110 (italics added).
11
The specific federal authority at issue in
Greenwood
was the “power to prosecute for federal offenses.”
Greenwood,
A reasonable construction of this provision is that it is aimed at preventing the specific harm to the community proscribed by the four designated statutes; three dealing with drugs and one dealing with the use of firearms in the commission of federal offenses. We, therefore, read the second presumption of section 3142(e) as addressing only danger to the community from the likelihood that the defendant will, if released, commit one of the proscribed federal offenses. Thus because Congress has the power to proscribe the activities in question, it has the auxiliary authority, under the necessary and proper clause, to resort to civil commitment to prevent their occurrence.
Id. at 110-11 (emphasis added).
The pre-trial detention scheme in
Perry
is distinguishable in several ways from the commitment scheme at issue in
Under
The government acknowledged at oral argument that
Perry’s
necessary and proper holding “was tethered to the crimes for which the individual was held that would be committed in the future if the person was released. Because Congress had the Commerce Clause authority to criminalize certain federal drug offenses and federal drug crimes, the
[Perry
court] found that Congress also possesses the necessary and proper authority
to prevent the future commission of those crimes.”
(Trans, at 34 (emphasis added).) Without elaborating upon the necessary leap of logic, the government argues that the fact that
The government concedes that
A closer look at various federal sex offenses illuminates the disconnect between the federal government’s limited authority to criminalize sexually violent conduct and
Since the Constitution does not delegate to Congress generally the right to enact criminal laws, every foray into the area *539 of criminal law is an intrusion into the states’ traditional dominion. However, when an activity is the source of a problem national in scope and substantially affects an area over which Congress has poioer, Congress is within its authority in determining that the balancing inherent in federalism weighs in favor of its regulating that activity....
A factor weighing heavily in favor of passing constitutional muster is a jurisdictional element in the criminal statute, that is, one which requires as an element of proof evidence that the activity is interstate in nature....
United States v. Ganaposki
Federal sex crimes have, incorporated within them, specific jurisdictional elements. See, e.g.,
If Congress is limited in criminalizing conduct and punishing that conduct when it occurs, Congress must be subject to those same limitations in any quest to prevent such criminal conduct from happening. The government is correct that incidental prevention of criminal conduct that violates state laws should not, in and of itself, invalidate a federal effort to prevent the commission of federal crimes. However, where there is absolutely no nexus between the findings required for commitment under
The court concludes that neither the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, nor any other authority suggested, provide Congress with the power to enact
B. Is
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Congress had the power to enact
1. Necessary
The Supreme Court has held on several occasions that the Necessary and Proper Clause does not demand that an act of Congress be “absolutely necessary” to the exercise of an enumerated power. See, e.g.,
Jinks v. Richland County, S.C.,
Even if
Perry
stands for the proposition that the federal government has the power or the authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to detain or commit individuals in an attempt to prevent the conduct that it has the power to criminalize, a proposition that respondents dispute,
The court recognizes that the broad interpretation accorded to the term “necessary” historically gives Congress wide latitude in crafting federal laws to help carry out its enumerated powers. The “necessary” test simply is not a strenuous one. Necessary and proper are not synonymous, however.
2. “Proper” Laws — a Limitation of the Federal Government’s License to Regulate
In
M’Culloch,
Justice Marshall emphasized that Congress could not “under the pretext of executing its powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government.”
With its careful enumeration of federal powers and explicit statement that all powers not granted to the federal government are reserved, the Constitution *541 cannot realistically be interpreted as granting the Federal Government an unlimited license to regulate. Moreover, the principle that “ ‘the Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers,’ ” while reserving a generalized police power to the States, is deeply ingrained in our constitutional history.
Morrison,
“[A] ‘proper’ executory law must respect the system of enumerated federal powers: executory laws may not regulate or prohibit activities that fall outside the subject areas specifically enumerated in the Constitution.”
The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause,
The Fourth Circuit has recognized that Congress may act pursuant to an enumerated or cognizable incidental power, yet still fail to craft a statute that is a proper means of effectuating its intent:
Under the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the [Tenth] amendment, we ask two questions to determine whether a statute violates it: First, whether the regulation it embodies is within Congress’ raw power as being within those enumerated in the constitution. Second, whether, even if so, the means of regulation employed yet impermissibly infringe upon state sovereignty. New York v. United States,505 U.S. 144 , 159, 188,112 S.Ct. 2408 ,120 L.Ed.2d 120 , ... (1992) (so concluding, in process of holding that while Congress had raw Commerce Clause power to regulate disposal of low level nuclear waste, means chosen, of effectively requiring states to regulate, impermissibly infringe on state sovereignty). See also ACORN v. Edwards,81 F.3d 1387 , 1393 (5th Cir.1996) (same).
United States v. Johnson,
The Tenth Amendment provides that the “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively....”
The mere fact that a federal law displaces state action does not, in and of itself, signify Congressional overreaching. The Supreme Court has explicitly “upheld as constitutional any number of federal statutes enacted under the commerce power that pre-empt particular exercises of state police power.”
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass’n, Inc.,
[Questions [as to whether particular sovereign powers have been granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government or have been retained by the States] can be viewed in either of two ways. In some cases, the Court has inquired whether an Act of Congress is authorized by one of the powers delegated to Congress in Article I of the Constitution. See, e.g., Perez v. United States,402 U.S. 146 ,91 S.Ct. 1357 ,28 L.Ed.2d 686 (1971); McCulloch v. Maryland,4 Wheat. 316 ,4 L.Ed. 579 (1819). In other cases the Court has sought to determine whether an Act of Congress invades the province of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment. See, e.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,469 U.S. 528 ,105 S.Ct. 1005 ,83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985); Lane County v. Oregon,7 Wall. 71 ,19 L.Ed. 101 (1869).... This has been the Court’s consistent understanding: “The States unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority ... to the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal Government.” .... (citation omitted). 16
A. Limited Federal Action Historically in the Area of Commitment
Among other important factors, Congress has, prior to the enactment of
Congress has on a number of occasions considered providing for the commitment, nationwide, of federal defendants acquitted on grounds of insanity.... The most recent occasion brought forth a well considered analysis by the House Judiciary Committee of the major concern leading to rejection:
The Committee recognizes that the Federal government is one of specifically enumerated powers. State governments, on the other hand, may act in any given area unless specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Commitment and treatment of the mentally ill has traditionally been left to the states pursuant to their parens patri-ae or general police power. The Federal government has no such authority. Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal Defendants, 108 U. Pa. L.Rev. 832 (1960).... [The report then considers in detail whether Congress has the constitutional authority to provide for a nationwide federal commitment procedure, but draws no firm conclusion.]
In view of these considerations, the Committee believes that a Federal procedure for the commitment of the dangerously mental [sic] disturbed would constitute an inappropriate interference with the balance of Federal and State powers. Moreover, such a procedure could constitute a precedent for further Federal involvement in the care of the mentally ill. Once the Federal Government takes on the task of caring for the dangerously mental [sic] ill that become involved in the Federal criminal system, Congress would most likely be asked to expand the Federal role even further. For example, legislation might be proposed allowing the Federal Government to take over State mental health institutions, or to accept the transfer of those incarcerated there, when the State is allegedly not doing a satisfactory job. The Committee thus believes that the care of the mentally ill is a task that uniquely belongs within the parens patriae powers of the States.
H.R.Rep. No. 1396, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 559, 561 (1980) (footnotes omitted).
United States v. Cohen,
Judge Scalia explained further that
[t]he issue, of course, is whether such congressional action would run afoul of the Tenth Amendment, because legislative authority in the general field of lunacy is reserved to the states. That issue was raised, but not resolved by the Supreme Court’s decision, in Greenwood v. United States,350 U.S. 366 ,76 S.Ct. 410 ,100 L.Ed. 412 (1956), which involved federal treatment of a defendant found not competent to stand trial on federal charges. The narrow basis on which the Court found such treatment permissible' — i.e., not barred by the Tenth Amendment — -was that until the federal charges had been disposed of, the individual was properly in the custody of the United States. Id. at 375,76 S.Ct. 410 ,.... If that is the only permissible basis for federal action in this field, then once the criminal custody is terminated, which may occur at the moment the defendant is acquitted, see Note, Federal Commitment of Defendants Found Not Guilty by Reason of Insani *545 ty-Proposed Legislation, 52 Iowa L.Rev. 930 (1967), the-constitutional underpinnings of federal treatment may also dissolve.
Id. at 137 n. 15. 17
Within months of the
Cohen
case, and despite the concerns expressed in the legislative history cited therein, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (IDRA),
Section 4246 covers those circumstances where state authorities will not institute civil commitment proceedings against a hospitalized defendant whose federal sentence is about to expire or against whom all criminal charges have been dropped for' reasons related to his mental condition and who is presently mentally ill. At such a point the responsibility for the care of insane persons is essentially a function of the states. The committee intends that this section he used only in those rare circumstances where a person has no permanent residence or there are no state authorities willing to accept him for commitment. If criminal charges are dropped for reasons other than the mental condition of the defendant, such as insufficient evidence, but the defendant was mentally ill, the Attorney General would release the defendant to state authorities.
S. Rep. 98-225, P.L. 98-473 (Aug. 4, 1983, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.Ñews 1984, pp. 3182, 3432) (emphasis added). Courts have construed
At oral argument, the government argued that whatever power or authority permitted Congress to enact
Like
Under
Moreover, under
In
United States v. S.A.,
in response to a challenge by a juvenile to commitment under
*548
Accordingly, the group of people eligible for commitment under
As the Ninth Circuit wrote in
United States v. Sahhar,
It is a truism that “[t]he passage of ... [§ ] 4246 was not intended to be an invasion of the general field of lunacy, which is reserved to the states.” United States v. Clark,617 F.2d 180 , 184 n. 5 (9th Cir.1990 [1980]). As we said in Sahhar I, the states have the principal responsibility for committing dangerous persons:
Unlike most states, the federal government has chosen not to establish a comprehensive system of civil commitment, reserving to local authorities the principal task of committing dangerous, mentally ill persons. Section lt,2UQ thus is narrowly tailored to apply only to a particular concern of the federal government: dangerous persons charged with federal crimes but found incompetent to stand trial.
[United States v. Sahhar,917 F.2d 1197 , 1203 (9th Cir.1990) (Sahhar I), cert. denied,499 U.S. 963 ,111 S.Ct. 1591 ,113 L.Ed.2d 655 (1991) ] (citations omitted).Section 4246 does not authorize wholesale, continuous federal detention of dangerous persons who have once been charged with a federal crime. The statutory scheme embodies a clear preference that a state assume responsibility.... It is ... clear that the statute’s authorization for indefinite federal commitment is a conditional one, contingent upon whether a state has declined to accept custody of the federal detainee. 19
In contrast, commitment under
In spite of the demonstrably broader language, the government argues that
The very narrow group of people to whom
B. Federal Custody as a Jurisdictional Limitation on Congressional Power
The government’s assertion that
The government explains that the text of
In support of its argument regarding the significance of federal custody, the government emphasizes respondents’ concession that decisions about how to control federal prisoners are within the undisputed authority of the federal government and notes that when certification is made under
First, as discussed previously, the federal government does not have the authority to prevent generalized danger to the community. See
Perry,
In sum, section
III. The Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof as a Violation of Due Process
A standard of proof functions to “instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”
In re Winship,
*552
Failure to apply the reasonable doubt standard to such an antecedent factual finding required for commitment under
The government argues that, in the context of a
State courts asked to determine the appropriate standard of proof to apply in various state sex offender commitment statutes have relied on
Winship
to conclude that the reasonable doubt standard is required. In a
post-Addington
decision, the Washington Supreme Court concluded that the reasonable doubt standard should be applied to sexual psychopathy commitment proceedings, regardless of whether
*553
the proceeding was labeled criminal or civil, explaining that “ ‘[t]he analogy to
Win-ship
is clear and persuasive, sufficient alone to warrant the [application of the reasonable doubt standard].’
Due Process Requires Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt for Commitment of Sex Offenders,
1975 Wash. U.L.Q. 1092, 1102 (1976).”
Washington v. Rinaldo,
The Coughlin court’s conclusion that the reasonable doubt standard be applied to findings that an individual is a sexually dangerous person under the Illinois statute was not based on a general conclusion that the statute was “criminal” in nature. Rather, despite the fact that the statute was presented as one permitting civil commitment of sexually violent individuals, the court concluded that the consequences of commitment, more substantial than those at issue in Winship, required the application of the reasonable doubt standard.
Here, the loss of liberty is as great, if not greater, than the loss in Winship. The violator of the criminal law be he an adult or juvenile is imprisoned, if at all, in almost all cases for a definite term. The person found to be sexually dangerous, in stark contrast, is committed for an indeterminate period and is unable to attain his freedom until he can prove that he is no longer sexually dangerous. Likewise with respect to stigma an involuntary commitment for sexual dangerousness presents an a fortiori case: Unlike the delinquency proceedings in Winship, these actions are not confidential, and an adjudication of sexual dangerousness is certainly more damning than a finding of juvenile delinquency.
Coughlin,
The government argues, however, that
Addington,
an involuntary civil commitment case, provides the more analogous context. In
Addington,
the Court weighed the individual’s interest in not being involuntarily confined erroneously against the state’s interest in committing the emotionally disturbed person for his own welfare and the protection of the community. That Court rejected the argument, made in reliance on
Winship,
that the reasonable doubt standard should apply to a civil commitment determination,
There may be factual issues to resolve in a commitment proceeding, but the factual aspects present only the beginning of the inquiry. Whether the individual is mentally ill and dangerous to either himself or others and is in need of confined therapy turns on the meaning of the facts which must be interpreted by expert psychiatrists and psychologists. Given the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely to be dangerous.... The subtleties and nuances of psychiatric diagnosis render certainties virtually beyond reach in most situations. The reasonable-doubt standard of criminal law functions in its realm because there the standard is addressed to specific, knowable facts. Psychiatric diagnosis, in contrast, is to a large extent based on medical “impressions” drawn from subjective analysis and filtered through the experience of the diagnostician.
Id.
at 429-30,
The substance of the
Addington
holding addresses only the difficulties that would
*555
be posed by the second prong of the
However, the preliminary finding required by the first prong of § 4248 — that someone is a “sexually dangerous person” — poses an explicit factual question answerable only with specific, potentially knowable facts, because it requires the court to find that “a person has engaged or attempted to engage in sexually violent conduct or child molestation!,]”
Civil commitment under the Texas statute at issue in
Addington
was not premised upon a finding of criminal conduct of any kind. Thus, the
Addington
Court’s observation regarding the Texas statute that “[ujnlike the delinquency proceeding in
Winship,
a civil commitment proceeding can in no sense be equated to a criminal prosecution,” is not particularly pertinent to a discussion of commitment under
This antecedent finding of fact takes on even greater importance when one considers the commitment scheme as a whole and the criteria for eligibility for commitment. Any person in the custody of the BoP, any person who has been committed pursuant to § 4241(d), and any person against whom charges have been dismissed solely for reasons pertaining to the mental condition of the person, is eligible for commitment under this statute, regardless of the nature of his criminal history or the charges against him. A criminal history of sexual violence or molestation is not required; for example, individuals convicted of and serving time for bank robbery, mail fraud, tax evasion, drug dealing, and sexual abuse of a child in the special maritime or territorial jurisdiction of the United States are all equally subject to certification and commitment under
As the Supreme Court explained in
Jones,
Just as the
Addington
concerns were diminished in
Jones,
those concerns are exacerbated in the
To the extent that the government relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kansas v. Hendricks,
in support of its assertion that
According to the government,
“unambiguously requires a finding of dangerousness either to one’s self or to others as a prerequisite to involuntary confinement. Commitment proceedings can be initiated only when a person ‘has been convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense’' and ‘suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual violence.’ ... The statute thus requires proof of more than a mere predisposition to violence; rather, it requires evidence of past sexually violent behavior.... As we have recognized, ‘[p]revious instances of past sexually violent behavior are an important indicator of future violent tendencies.’ ”
For the foregoing reasons,
Conclusion
Because the civil commitment scheme set forth at
Given the court’s conclusions in this Order, the court will not address the remaining substantive due process and equal protection arguments also raised by respondents. The court’s omission of this discussion should not be read to suggest any conclusions as to the merits of those arguments. For the foregoing reasons, respondents’ motions to dismiss are ALLOWED, and the government’s petitions are DISMISSED.
Given the very substantial constitutional issues of first impression in these cases and the gravity of the concerns raised by the government, the court hereby REC.OGNIZES the Notice filed by the government on 15 May 2007, and temporarily STAYS the effect of this Order pending receipt of, and the court’s decision regarding, the government’s forthcoming motion to stay the effective date of the release of the respondents from custody in each of the cases identified in the caption of this Order.
Notes
. The approximately 59 pages of new laws and amendments to existing laws that comprise the Walsh Act, Pub.L. No. 109-248, are codified in numerous scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.
. Respondent Shane Catron, found incompetent to stand trial for aggravated sexual abuse
*527
of a minor and abusive sexual conduct under
. While these cases have not been consolidated, substantially identical motions have been filed in each, and each motion raises questions as to the constitutionality of
. The commitment provision of the Walsh Act is codified in Chapter 313 of Title 18 of the United States Code alongside other federal civil commitment provisions.
. At oral argument, however, the government contended that civil commitment under
. Respondent Catron is one such individual,
.The limited holding of Greenwood may be characterized as one farther limited by narrow statutory language requiring a potential harm to the "interests of the United States” to justify federal commitment. While that statutory language has been changed to permit commitment if a person's release would "create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another person or serious damage to property .of another,” the court has not located' any case law actually addressing a challenge to Congress’s authority to enact such a civil commitment scheme designed to commit, among others, prisoners whose sentences are about to expire and with respect to whom the power to prosecute has arguably been exhausted simply to prevent generalized, nonspecific harm to the public.
. In fact, respondents Comstock’s and Math-erly’s sentences have already expired, and • both inmates remain in federal custody solely as the result of the statute challenged here.
. It would appear somewhat contradictory to support the constitutional authority to propagate a "civil” commitment scheme by reference to a power to prosecute "criminal” conduct. As the government itself has argued,
. In support of its argument that Congress has the power to provide for civil commitment of sexually dangerous persons, the government also cites
Plotts,
. The court recognizes that the
Perry/Greenwood
principle does call into question the source of Congressional power to enact the civil commitment provision of
While the Supreme Court has held the commitment of incompetents who pose a danger to the interests of the United States to be within the scope of Congressional authority based on the unexhausted power to prosecute, see
Greenwood,
that analysis would not apply to the general commitment of mentally ill and dangerous prisoners whose sentences are about to expire. This court has not located a Supreme Court case specifically addressing the constitutionality of that provision. The constitutionality of
. As Justice Marshall wrote in a dissent in
Salerno,
. For example, "[t]he Supreme Court has ... recognized that the Necessary and Proper Clause contained in Article I, § 8, ¶ 18 extends the reach of the Spending Clause to authorize federal criminal laws which ‘keep a watchful eye on expenditures and on the reliability of those who use public money.’ See
Sabri v. United States,
. That the government created by the Federal Constitution is one of enumerated powers, and cannot, by any of its agencies, exercise an authority not granted by that instrument, either in express words or by necessary implication; that ... a state of the Union may exercise all such governmental authority as is consistent with its own Constitution, and not in conflict with the Federal Constitution; that such a power in the state, generally referred to as its police power, is not granted by or derived from the Federal Constitution, but exists independently of it, by reason of its never having been surrendered by the state to the general government; that among the powers of the state, not surrendered, which power therefore remains with the state, is the power to so regulate the relative rights and duties of all within its jurisdiction as to guard the public morals, the public safety, and the public health, as well as to promote the public convenience and the common good; and that it is with the state to devise the means to be employed to such ends, taking care always that the means devised do not go beyond the necessities of the case, have some real or substantial relation to the objects to be accomplished, and are not inconsistent with its own Constitution or the Constitution of the United States.
House v. Mayes,
. The court notes that this discussion of the Tenth Amendment is not a consequence of any specific Tenth Amendment claim put forth by respondents. Indeed, respondents have not made such a claim and thus, no issue of standing to make such a claim is before this court. Rather, the court examines the Tenth Amendment because it necessarily limits operation of the necessary and proper powers of the government and because, as a constitutional provision, it is pertinent to the characterization of any act of Congress as necessary or proper.
. In
Patton,
the Tenth Circuit referred to powers traditionally reserved to the states when considering a challenge to a federal statute criminalizing possession of body armor, which it ultimately affirmed based on its interpretation of the
pre-Lopez
precedent of
Scarborough v. United States,
We do not mean to suggest that subjects of traditional state concern are immune from congressional regulation when they fall within Congress’s Article I powers. Our constitutional federalism is based on a one-way enumeration: the question is whether a particular authority has been vested in Congress, not whether it falls within the reserved powers of the states, which are defined only negatively. But evidence regarding traditional divisions of power between the states and the federal government can help to show how the Constitution’s enumerations have been interpreted over time.
Patton,
. Judge Scalia's
comment
suggests
the
constitutional relevance of legitimate federal custody to Congressional exercise of power over individuals in the federal prison system. While the
Greenwood
Court relied on the fact that the "petitioner came legally into the custody of the United States,"
Greenwood,
. The comparison of
. While
. For example, despite the fact that a prisoner may not ultimately be committed pursuant to
. If the director of the facility in which a person is hospitalized or placed pursuant to this chapter certifies to tire Attorney General that a person, against whom all charges have been dismissed for reasons not related to the mental condition of the person, is a sexually dangerous person, the Attorney General shall release the person to the appropriate official of the State in which the person is domiciled or was tried for the purpose of institution of State proceedings for civil commitment. If neither such State will assume such responsibility, the Attorney General shall release the person upon receipt of notice from the State that it will not assume such responsibility, but not later than 10 days after certification by the director of the facility.
18 U.S.C. 4248(g) (emphasis added). See also
. As in
Winship,
the fact that criminal consequences do not attach to the finding of criminal conduct does not lessen the seriousness and importance of the consequences of civil commitment. See
Winship,
.
Hollis v. Smith,
any person convicted of assault in the second degree for an assault upon another with intent to commit the felony of rape in the first degree, rape in the second degree, sodomy in the first degree, sodomy in the second degree or carnal abuse may be punished by imprisonment for an indeterminate term, the minimum of which shall be one day and the maximum of which shall be the duration of his natural life.
Hollis,
Likewise, while the government is correct that a federal district court in New Jersey recently approved that state’s application of the clear and convincing evidence standard to commitments made pursuant to the New Jersey sex offender commitment statute, New Jersey Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. § 30.4-27.24
et seq.,
see
Rivera v. Rogers,
No. 05-3385,
. It is worthy of note that the statutes governing delinquency proceedings in New York at issue in
Winship
currently provide that "[a]ny determination at the conclusion of a fact-finding hearing that a respondent did an act or acts must be based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt,”
. In its brief, the government asserts that nine states of 18 with sexually violent predator commitment statutes have legislatively or judicially adopted the clear and convincing standard for state commitment schemes. At least four of the state statutes cited by the government, however, apply only to individuals convicted of or charged with sexually violent behavior (Florida, Missouri, New Jersey, and Virginia), See Florida (F.S.A. § 394.912(10(a)))("sexually violent predator” is a person who “has been convicted of a sexually violent offense”); Missouri (Mo. Stat. § 632.480 defining "sexually violent predator” as person who "has pled guilty or been found guilty or been found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect ... of a sexually violent offense” or has been committed as criminal sexual psychopath before August 1980); New Jersey (N.J.S.A. § 30:4-27, 26 (defining "sexually violent predator” as, inter alia, a "person who has been convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for commission of a sexually violent offense, or has been charged with a sexually violent offense but found to be incompetent to stand trial”)); Va.Code § 37.2-900 ("Sexually violent predator” means any person who "has been convicted of a sexually violent offense or has been charged with a sexually violent offense and is unrestorably incompetent to stand trial”). Nebraska (not cited by the government) also has a Sex Offender Commitment Act that uses a clear and convincing standard, but that statute also defines a "dangerous sex offender” eligible for commitment as one who "(a) ... suffers from a mental illness which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence, who has been convicted of one or more sex offenses, and who is substantially unable to control his or her criminal behavior or (b) a person with a personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in repeat acts of sexual violence, who has been convicted of two or more sex offenses, and who is substantially unable to control his or her criminal behavior.”
Moreover, ten additional states have legislatively or judicially adopted the reasonable doubt standard and also render individuals eligible for commitment only if they have been charged with or convicted of a sexual offense. (Arizona, California, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin). See
While some of the states above allow commitment based on charges of sexually violent offenses where the individuals charged are found not guilty by reason of insanity or incompetent to stand trial, those states require that the person be found sexually dangerous beyond a reasonable doubt, as is the case in Kansas.
. With respect to flexibility, even the Adding-ton Court, which held the clear and convincing burden to be the minimum required by due process in the commitment context, recognized that a heightened "clear, unequivocal and convincing” standard was appropriate in cases involving severe consequences similar to loss of liberty and factual issues susceptible of objective proof;
In Woodby v. INS,385 U.S. 276 ,87 S.Ct. 483 ,17 L.Ed.2d 362 ... (1966), dealing with deportation, and Schneiderman v. United States,320 U.S. 118 , 125, 159,63 S.Ct. 1333 ,87 L.Ed. 1796 ..., dealing with denaturalization, the Court held that "clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence was the appropriate ■ standard of proof. The term "unequivocal,” taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt, a burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal cases. The issues in Schneider-man and Woodby were basically factual and therefore susceptible of objective proof and the consequences to the individual were unusually drastic — loss of citizenship and expulsion from the United States.
. The Supreme Court explained that its holding in
Jones
was in accord "with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment.”
Jones,
. "[I]t is estimated that rape and sexual assault offenders account for ... about 1% of those serving time in Federal prisons.” Sex Offenders and Offenses, at 16-17 (Bureau of Justice Statistics rev. 2/6/1997).