UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. LATRICE COLVIN
Criminal No. 3:19cr179 (JBA)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
April 2, 2020
Defendant Latrice Colvin moves for compassionate release under
I. Background
Defendant was convicted by guilty plea of one count of mail fraud in violation of
Defendant suffers from Type II Diabetes. (Medical Records [Doc. # 35].) When not incarcerated, Defendant sees “medical professionals at Bridgeport Hospital who have treated her for her diabetes and high blood pressure, have seen her through a difficult pregnancy, and have performed surgery on her back,” and thus “know her and can properly care fоr her.” (Emerg. Mot. at 7.)
Although “COVID-19 is a new disease[,] . . . based on currently available information and clinical expertise,” the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention list “[p]eople with diabetes” among the groups of
On March 27, 2020, Defendant “filed an administrative relief request with the Warden [of] FDC Philаdelphia seeking compassionate release on the same grounds as” argued in her motion for compassionate release. (Emerg. Mot. at 1 n.1) She has not yet received any response to that request.
II. Discussion
Defendant moves for release under
the court . . . upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant‘s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant‘s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions that does not exсeed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.
Thus there are two questions before the Court: first, whether Defendant should be excused from her administrative exhаustion requirement, and second, whether Defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons for a sentence reduction.
A. Exhaustion Requirement
Section
“Even where exhaustion is seemingly mandated by statute . . . , the requirement is not absolute.” Washington v. Barr, 925 F.3d 109, 118 (2d Cir. 2019). There are generally three bases for waiver of an exhaustion requirement. See United States v. Perez, No. 17cr513-3(AT), ECF No. 98 at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020) (discussing exceptions to statutory exhaustion in context of motion for compassionate release during COVID-19 pandemic).
“First, exhaustion may be unnecessary where it would be futile, either because agency decisionmakers are biased or because the agency has already determined the issue.” Washington, 925 F.3d at 118. “[U]ndue delay, if it in fact results in cаtastrophic health consequences, could make exhaustion futile.” Id. at 120. Second, “exhaustion may be unnecessary where the administrative process would be incapable of granting adequate relief,” including situations where “the relief the agency might provide could, because of undue delay, become inadequate.” Id. at 119-20. Third, “exhaustion may be unnecessary where
The Court concludes that all three exceptions to thе exhaustion requirement apply to Defendant‘s request. First, if Defendant contracts COVID-19 before her appeals are exhausted, that undue delay might cause her to endure precisely the “catastrophic health consequences” she now seeks to avoid. See CDC Guidance. Second, given the brief duration of Defendant‘s remaining term of imprisonment, the exhaustion requirement likely renders BOP incapable of granting adequate relief, as her sentence will likely already have expired by the time her appeals are exhausted and would certainly already have expired by the time the thirty-day waiting period ends. Third, Defendant would be subjected to undue prejudice—the heightenеd risk of severe illness—while attempting to exhaust her appeals.
Thus, in light of the urgency of Defendant‘s request, the likelihood that she cannot exhaust her administrative appeals during her remaining eleven days of imprisonment, and the potential for serious health consequences, the Court waives the exhaustion requirement of Section
B. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
Section
- (1)(A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; . . .
- (2) The defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in
18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) ; and - (3) The reduction is consistent with this policy statement.
Appliсation Note 1 to that Guidelines provision enumerates certain circumstances constituting “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that justify a sentence reduction, including certain medical conditions, advanced age, certain family circumstances, or some “other” reason “[a]s determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons.” The Note specifies that “a serious physical or medical condition . . . that substantially diminishes the ability of the defеndant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not expected to recover” constitutes “extraordinary and compelling reasons” which justify compassionаte release.
Defendant argues that there are extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying her release because she “is at significant risk of contracting and developing severe complications from an еxposure to COVID-19 due to her diabetes and high blood pressure.” (Emerg. Mot. at 1.) Thus, Defendant argues, release is warranted to avoid confinement in a “densely populated
The Government argues that Defendant has failed to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling reasons for her release because she “has not described any рarticular vulnerability to COVID-19 or explained any deficiency in the BOP‘s response to this public health situation.” (Gov‘t Opp. at 3.) The Government clarified its position during the Court‘s teleconference with the parties, explaining that beсause Defendant‘s diabetes appears to be under control, the risk she faces while incarcerated is insufficient to justify her release. But contrary to the Government‘s suggestion, Defendant did describe a “particular vulnerаbility to COVID-19,” (id.), when she explained that she “is particularly vulnerable to COVID-19 due to her diabetes and high blood pressure,” putting her “at greater risk of complications,” (Emerg. Mot. at 3). The CDC Guidance confirms Defendant‘s position, stating plainly that “[р]ersons with diabetes” face a “higher risk for severe illness” if they contract COVID-19. Moreover, the Bureau of Prisons itself has acknowledged that home confinement may be appropriate for certain “at-risk inmates” in order “to protect the health and safety of . . . people in our custody.” (Ex. 1 (BOP Memo) to Emerg. Mot. [Doc. # 30-1] at 1.) Like Defendant, the BOP intends to rely upon “CDC guidance” to “make an assessment of the inmate‘s risk factors for severe COVID-19 illness.” (Id. at 2.)
Thus the Court сoncludes that Defendant has demonstrated extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying her immediate release under Section
In light of the expectation that the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to grow and spread over the next several weeks, the Court cоncludes that the risks faced by Defendant will be minimized by her immediate release to home, where she will quarantine herself. Continued exposure to the large population of FDC Philadelphia over the coming weeks would impose upon Defendant additional, unnecessary health risks which can be minimized by her early release.
Separately, the Court concludes that Defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, and the factors set forth in
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant‘s Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/
Janet Bond Arterton, U.S.D.J.
Dated at New Haven, Connecticut this 2nd day of April 2020.