254 F. 869 | W.D. La. | 1919
The defendant in count 1 of the indictment stands charged with violation of that part of the postal appropriation act of March 3, 1917 (39 Stat. 1069, c. 162 [Comp. St. 1918, § 8739a]), known as the “Reed Amendment,” which is as follows:
“Whoever shall order, purchase, or cause intoxicating liquors to be transported in interstate commerce, except for scientific, sacramental, medicinal, and mechanical purposes, into any state or territory, the laws of which state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors*870 for beverage purposes, shall be punished as aforesaid: Provided, that nothing herein, shall authorize the shipment of liquor into any state contrary to the laws of such state”
—in that he did, in the parish of Caddo,
“unlawfully, knowingly and willfully, and with intent to transport the intoxicating liquors hereinafter described, from the said parish of Oaddo, state of liouisiana, to Texarkana, in the state of Texas, the said state then and there being a state wherein the manüfacture of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes was prohibited by law, order, purchase, and cause to be transported in interstate commerce, a certain shipment of intoxicating liquor, to wit, ten cases of whisky; that is to say, did order, purchase, and cause the said intoxicating liquor to be transported in interstate commerce, from the city of Monroe, Louisiana, and into the parish of Oaddo, Louisiana, and with said state of Texas as the destination of said transportation, by transporting the same in an automobile from the said city of Monroe, Louisiana, to the parish of Oaddo, and which said intoxicating liquor was not then and there being transported for sacramental, scientific, medicinal, or mechanical purposes, contrary to the form of the statute,” etc.
In count 2 of the indictment the same offense at the same time and place is charged, the only difference being that in this count the intended destination of the liquors transported was the county of Bowie, which county was a county wherein, under the local option law of Texas, the sale of intoxicating liquors was prohibited.
The second count is based on the assumption -that, even though the state of Texas has not legally adopted state-wide prohibition, the Reed amendment is applicable to an interstate shipment of intoxicating liquors into a “dry” county of that state.
The defendant has moved to quash the indictment. It is contended that the Reed amendment is applicable only to those states where both the sale and the manufacture of intoxicating liquors is prohibited throughout the state, and that under a recent decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (Ex parte Myer, 207 S. W. 100, not yet officially reported), that section of the state-wide prohibition law of Texas prohibiting the sale of intoxicating liquors has been declared unconstitutional. The section prohibiting the manufacture of such liquors was not at issue and so was not passed on.
It is further argued, however, that under the recent Texas statute, not only is the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors prohibited, but likewise their importation from another state, and that if the Legislature of Texas, as held by the Court of Criminal Appeals of that
“any place or point in any state or territory of tlie United States, at wMcli it is, by tlie law in force in the state or territory at that time, unlawful to advertise or solicit orders for said liquors,”
Congress was careful to make this inhibition applicable, not only to advertisements mailed to any point in a state in which state-wide prohibition prevails, but also to such advertisements mailed to any point in the state at which point the sale of such liquors is prohibited. If in the Reed amendment, immediately following, it had been intended to make it likewise applicable to “dry” sections of a “wet” state, it would, as in the preceding section, have been so specifically provided. In the case of McAdams v. Wells Fargo Express Co. (D. C.) 249 Fed. 175, cited by counsel as holding the contrary, the sole issue presented appears to have been whether the act was applicable to liquors shipped for personal use and not for sale. No contention was made, as in the case at bar, that the Reed amendment did not apply to intoxicating liquors shipped into prohibition territory of a
“into any state or territory, the laws of which state or territory prohibit the manufacture or sale therein of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes.”
The case of United States v. Chavez, 228 U. S. 525, 33 Sup. Ct. 595, 57 L. Ed. 950, is relied on by counsel for the government in support of the contention that it was not necessary that the liquors transported with Texas as their destination should have actually crossed the border and been taken into that state. In the Chavez Case the defendant was indicted under a statute, the first section of which provides that, whenever the President shall find that in any American country domestia violence exists which would be promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States, and shall make proclamation thereof, it shall be unlawful to export, except under certain limitations, any arms or munitions of war from' any place in the United States to such country. The second section provides that “any shipment of material hereby declared unlawful shall be punishable,” etc. The defendant, charged with violation of the statute, while carrying Winchester cartridges from the city of El Paso to Mexico, was arrested before he crossed the border. The court held that, while the term “export” technically means the shipment from .this country and the entry into another, yet in common speech the shipment of goods from this to a foreign country, without regard to their landing-in such country, is often spoken of as an export, and that Congress used the word in this sense. This the court thought was made clear by the second section of the act, which it held does not purport to punish the act of exporting, but in express terms “only punishes any shipment.” The contrary construction of the act would have made it wholly inoperative in such cases, as, after a party intending to violate the law actually crossed into Mexico with the forbidden munitions of war, he would be beyond the jurisdiction of the •court.. Such, however, .fortunately is not the case with prosecutions under the Reed amendment. Had the defendant, Collins, completed (his journey into Texas with the prohibited liquors, he might still have been prosecuted in a United States court in that state.
Webster defines “into” as meaning:
“To the inside of; -within; expressing entrance, or a passage from the outside of a thing to its interior parts; following verbs expressing motion, as ‘come into the house,’ ‘go into the church,’ etc.”
As the indictment does not charge that the intoxicating liquors were transported from Louisiana into the state of Texas, but only that they were transported from Monroe, La., to Shreveport, with intent to continue the transportation on into the state of Texas, the facts alleged do not constitute an offense under the statute, and the demurrer is sustained.