United States v. Cody RethfordUnited States v. Cody Rethford
Before LOKEN, WOLLMAN, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
LOKEN, Circuit Judge.
Cody Rethford pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of
The Guidelines define “crime of violence” to mean “any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year,” that either “(1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another”
In 2018, our Court, sitting en banc and applying the categorical approach, overruled a prior panel decision and held that a conviction of second-degree robbery under
Rethford argues that Swopes was wrongly decided and the Supreme Court‘s recent decision in United States v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), requires our panel to reconsider this precedent. In Taylor, the Court held that attempted Hobbs Act robbery is not a crime of violence under the force clause because the offense does not require a “communicated threat of force.” Id. at 2024. Rethford argues that the analysis in Taylor mandates reconsideration of Swopes because a person can be convicted of Missouri second-degree robbery on the basis of an implicit threat, which is not a “communicated threat of force.”
We recently addressed this same argument and found it unpersuasive. See United States v. Gordon, 69 F.4th 932 (8th Cir. 2023). We held that ”Taylor‘s reasoning about the inchoate offense of attempted robbery under the Hobbs Act does not extend to the completed offense of second-degree robbery in Missouri” because “an implicit threat is still a form of communication, and Taylor recognized that threats can be communicated verbally or nonverbally.” Id. at 933-34. Accordingly, a “prior [Missouri] conviction for second-degree robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under
On appeal, Rethford further argues that Missouri second-degree robbery is not a crime of violence under the enumerated offenses clause because it encompasses a broader range of conduct than does the generic definition of robbery. See Martin, 15 F.4th at 883-84 (explaining the analysis we apply in determining whether a state statute has the same elements as the generic federal definition of an enumerated offense). Because Missouri second-degree robbery is a crime of violence under the force clause, we need not address this issue. Nor need we address the government‘s alternative argument that it is clear from the record the district court would have imposed the same sentence independent of the Guidelines and therefore any error in calculating Rethford‘s advisory guidelines range was harmless.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.