*4 GILMAN, Before DAUGHTREY and COLLIER, Circuit Judges; District Judge.*
OPINION
GILMAN, Judge. Circuit This case $60,000 involves the theft of from a bank’s automated teller machine (ATM) by Marshall, Christopher a Pinker- ton Security Company courier. Marshall on convicted two of counts bank larce- ny and possessing stolen in viola- 2113(b) § tion of 2113(c), § 18 U.S.C. and one count of engaging an unlawful mon- etary $10,000 exceeding transaction in vio- § lation of 18 U.S.C. three of counts * Collier, nessee, The Honorable Curtis L. United sitting by designation. Judge District for the Eastern District of Ten- ATM, handle in a adjusting specific in violation of 18 U.S.C. laundering manner, vault 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), filing inserting a combination one count of
§ currency key into the vault door dial to allow the on a federal statement false of 31 U.S.C. The moment it was report violation door to release. transaction 5324(a)(2). sen- opened, security Dayton § He was service in § imprisonment signal notifying to 36 months an electronic tenced alerted concurrently, with count, to be served the vault had been ac- each the service after supervision 3-year period cessed. below, we the reasons set release. For ATM Myers serviced the Marshall and 18 U.S.C. three VACATE Avenue location of Cuyahoga at the Falls 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) con- money-laundering Society Bank ATM on December and, gov- with the consent victions their various performing 1993. After ernment, we also VACATE Marshall’s $90,000 duties, money” they left of “extra 2113(c) These counts conviction. U.S.C. vault, practice that allows the REMANDED to the the indictment are banking normal ATM to be serviced after entry judgment of a court for district trial that this hours. Marshall testified at remaining AFFIRM the We acquittal. unusually large was an amount of extra three convictions. money to leave the vault. This extra *5 into bricks money prepackaged had been I. BACKGROUND 1,000 Each contained at the bank. brick background A. Factual bills, in individually packaged and was Bank) Three of bricks (now shrinkwrap plastic. the Key Society Bank known as bills, $20,000 each in contained $20 to maintain with Pinkerton contract $10,000 contained each three of the bricks Mar- supply Society’s ATMs. the cash he in Marshall testified that bills. shall, Myers, $10 partner with his Jim along money in the vault with- placed the extra performed couriers who were Pinkerton plastic packaging. disturbing out the throughout the Akron ATM maintenance servicing complete, was the vault Once the they in ser- Together area Ohio. Canton activated, closed, the alarm was was and twelve locations viced between ten the outside door was locked. day. each 1994, later, January days on servicing each ATM Three procedures The for Day- in elaborate, security ATM service the central system as was the were rather signal at 6:30 At ton recorded an electronic ATM vault. each accessing the Society vault at serviced, indicating that the pair p.m., the of couri- being machine ac- Cuyahoga Falls ATM had been allowing Bank’s key, would have a master ers that the vault signal showed cessed. The portion into the restricted-access entry seconds, was open door remained for 28 building. the outside door the ATM Once closed, good 6 sec- reopened in a and then punch couriers had to opened, was the security the ATM system. Although later. security code to disarm the alarm onds in- respond to to and supposed call a service is required were then to The couriers openings unauthorized vestigate in security Dayton ATM service central vault, Tina action was taken. no such identify themselves and advise order person the first to use Adolphson ATM. presence their at the Once service of January opened after it was couriers ATM building, ATM inside the trial, that Adolphson At testified done 1994. the ATM vault. This was opened ATM noticed that the restricted-access unique to each she using a combination lock ajar door was conducting when she was brokerage firm. Marshall had never been transaction, her but that she did not see to Weston’s office before this visit on Janu- anyone around the machine either before ary Upon 1994. his arrival at Weston’s or after. office, Marshall told that Weston he want- ed to invest specula- “short term Myers
Marshall and did return to aggressive tive trading.” implied He service Cuyahoga again Falls ATM until he following day, wished to January belonged 1994. invest Miller, Upon approaching ATM, Myers no- Robin girlfriend. Mar- ticed that the restricted-access door to the $40,000 shall told Weston that he had building ajar, had been left slightly but he car, cash the trunk located of his saw no other person inside. After check- which Weston’s first reaction was “what vault, ing he realized the three $40,000 the hell is Robin doing with $20,000 missing. Myers bricks were testi- cash?” told Marshall Weston that he fied at trial that there signs were no cash, accept could not and directed Mar- entry forced on the ATM restricted-access shall to obtain a cashier’s check. Marshall Rather, door or the vault. the vault alarm proceeded then directly to a Bank One had been deactivated. He testified also branch, Davis, teller, where he told Jean only physical evidence at $40,000 that he exchange wanted to in cash plastic scene consisted of the shrinkwrap for a payable certified check Dis- Olde that had been removed from purloined $40,000 count. Davis testified that the money. only intact fingerprints that all in bills. $20 were found on the plastic discarded be- longed law, to Marshall. Under currency-transaction federal reports completed must be for all bank years incident,
Almost four prior to this $10,000. transactions involving more than had filed for bankruptcy. *6 103.22(b)(1) (“Each See 31 C.F.R. finan- subsequent years, reported his annual in- cial institution other than a casino file shall $11,697 come ranged $23,855. from to He report a withdrawal, of each deposit, ex- rarely had more than two thousand dollars change currency of payment or other and, in or 15, 1993, the bank as of December transfer, $2,025.83 by, through, he or to such had accumulated financial in credit card institution which Immediately debt. involves a larceny, after the transaction in $10,000”). currency more improved of than finances Because 3, dramatically. 1994, On January involved, Mar- of the amount Davis over called deposited $1,200 shall cash an account into supervisor, her Aldridge. Diane Aldridge at Savings the Ohio Bank. bought Marshall told Marshall she would have speak to a cashier’s check that same from First day with identification, to obtain Weston ap- $2,025.83, Bank National which he used parently to completion facilitate the to pay off his credit-card in full balance report. transaction Marshall then stepped days four later. January 4, On Mar- out of teller line to use his cellular shall made a cash deposit $5,000 of into his phone. He showed a Aldridge Florida account, credit union bringing his balance driver’s address, license with a Florida $5,021.05. to though even he also had an Ohio driver’s
The following day, Although license. Aldridge traveled Marshall believed this transaction, Akron to to be an Cleveland to call on unusual complet- she step-brother, John Weston. report ed the using Weston the information that an Discount, account executive Olde a provided. Marshall had trial, in The purchases question. Al- or to the wine testimony at Marshall’s
In her frequently had in fact sold wine told her that merchant Marshall had said that dridge past. Marshall in the currency, to the owner of this was not “[h]e the mon- merely dropping that he was January about the Weston first learned customer, John Wes- for this other ey off August 1994 ATM ton, money.” After and it was not he also discovered that Marshall was when this, spoke with told her she Marshall he would be suspect. impli- Worried that cash, Weston, Mar- gave accepted crime, secretly cated Weston met $40,000 payable check shall a cashier’s inquired with Miller and as to the source currency The transaction Olde Discount. $40,000. Weston then met with an as the owner of the report, listing Weston agent days FBI a few later to discuss the cash, filed as an official bank was then brokerage subsequent- account. Marshall record. expla- an ly visited Weston demanded for the with FBI. Dur- meeting nation office returned to Weston’s Marshall ensued, check, ing discussion that Marshall remarking that “one of with the indicated that he wanted the account to by awed the fact that girls at the bank was “disappear.” response, Weston told money so much before she had never seen that “if police you him or what have At Marshall’s di- her life $20s.” account, I come and take a look rection, joint account opened Weston if can make the account look as there with Miller rights survivorship, with gone.” are nothing there and all the assets joint listed first and Marshall second. as Miller’s annual income account listed Marshall then instructed Weston $7,000. $50,000 and Marshall’s as Weston joint from the account transfer the purchase account to stocks. then used the into an account Miller’s name individual creation, the account’s Subsequent question continued to Mar- only. Weston Miller, in phone by calls made Weston to funds, shall about the source transactions, potential order to discuss finally admitting that Marshall, would be directed Miller According explana- to Marshall’s was his. approve disapprove would of Wes- who $40,000 tion, over he had accumulated the suggestions. ton’s and had taken out long period time cards with cash advances on credit large $7,000 from the bro- Marshall withdrew *7 maxing them out so the intention 17, 1994, which January account on kerage He not use the cards. his then-wife could a Rolex watch a few purchase he used off the paid that he had later claimed subsequently later. Weston weeks When balances, keeping the while credit card watch, falsely told admired the Marshall away. money of the hidden bulk gift a from him that the Rolex had been a three- purchased Miller. Marshall also background B. Procedural $2,124 on carat diamond tennis bracelet investigation, 11,1994, years After several and wine worth at least February on December $1,700 finally indicted July July 23 and of that same Marshall on charged bank lar- 1998. He was with and the wine were year. The bracelet card, causing ceny, money laundering, credit purchased with Marshall’s currency-transaction a false using funds bank file paid by of which was balance trial, filed Prior to his Marshall report. from the bro- that Marshall later withdrew limine, evi- seeking to exclude motion account. Both the Rolex salesman kerage after the “wealth and assets pri- dence of his merchant knew Marshall and the wine larceny alleged place January took trial. When court reconvened the next 1994.” Marshall claimed that day, such evi- Marshall’s counsel informed the court dence was irrelevant and unduly prejudi- present Marshall was not and that he cial. The district court could not be located. denied Marshall’s His counsel then waived presence, motion. and the court began jury to discuss the instructions with Marshall testified his own defense lawyers. Nothing in the record indi- trial, began which in March of 1999. He cates if when reappeared, al- claimed to approximately have earned though government maintains that he $54,125 income, in unreported mainly dur- shortly arrived after 9:00 a.m. ing said, money, 1992-93. This he 1, 1999, April On returned a been stored his closet due to his distrust against verdict Marshall on all seven ability of a bank’s to keep the cash from counts. He was later sentenced to 36 his ex-wife. Marshall claimed that these count, months of incarceration on each funds were the source of the initial deposit be concurrently, served by followed brokerage into the prof- account. He also years of supervised release. Marshall fered several support expla- exhibits to timely filed a of appeal days notice three nation as to money the source of the challenges later. He his convictions on (1) issue. The exhibits included: a recent First, multiple grounds. he argues that Cruisin’ magazine Times in which Mar- the district court erred in admitting evi- shall advertised his fixing up business of dence of the improvement dramatic in his (2) old cars and selling parts, auto hand- financial status after the was sto- printed receipts from 1997-98 indicating len. He then asserts that the court was work that Marshall had done on several mistaken when it excluded evidence of his cars and the he had received from alternative sources of income after 1996. (3) jobs, those evidence regarding the mar- Marshall next claims that the district court (4) vehicles, ket for similarly restored evi- erred proceeded when it charge dence that Marshall had sold restored despite conference his absence from the antique vehicle to Stephens Suzanne courtroom at the Finally, time. he chal- (5) a bank account statement from lenges sufficiency sup- the evidence 1998 that allegedly propensity reflected his porting his larceny, convictions for fil- (6) money, save payroll stubs ing a currency-transaction false report, job Marshall held at the time of his and for the three money-laundering con- trial. Each government’s objections relating victions to the purchases of the to these exhibits was sustained watch, bracelet, and wine. district court on ground they were too remote time from the to be II. ANALYSIS any did, relevance. The district court however, allow put Marshall to on evidence A. The district court did not abuse its *8 regarding earnings his and financial status discretion when it admitted evi- prior to 1995. dence of Marshall’s “sudden wealth”
At the conclusion of Marshall’s testimo- ny 31,1999, on Wednesday, March as Mar- In support charge of the that Mar stand, shall was stepping off the witness shall perpetrator was the larceny, the district court instructed the parties government the proffered evidence of and jury the present to be a.m. 9:00 the Marshall’s sudden unexplained wealth in next morning for the days continuation of the the following the crime. Marshall
533
distinguish Amerine
Marshall seeks to
$2,000
card imme-
on his credit
over
owed
2, 1994,
present
and had
that in the
case there
January
by claiming
diately prior
income to be between
to sup-
his annual
insufficient “other evidence”
was
reported
$23,855
past
the
several
$11,697
and
admission of the sudden-wealth
port the
Nevertheless,
days
a few
Amerine,
within
years.
the
disagree.
evidence. We
his cred-
larceny,
paid
he
off
following the
only
evidence besides
government’s
other
over
deposited
in full and
it-card balance
in
increase
fi-
unexplained
the defendant’s
$46,000
two financial institu-
in cash with
his
opportunity
nancial resources was
firm. Marshall
brokerage
tions and
currency
his use of
commit the crime and
of his
district court’s denial
challenges the
as that which
in the same denomination
this
seeking to exclude
in limine
motion
government
in
Similarly,
stolen.
was
wealth,
unexplained
of his sudden
evidence
evidence of
present
produced
case
unduly
and
that it was irrelevant
claiming
opportunity to steal
Marshall’s
prejudicial.
$40,000
the fact that he started
States, Amerine,
using
two thousand
brokerage
v.
account
$20
In United
(6th Cir.1969), this court addressed
bills.
admissibility of sudden-
the relevance
against
circumstantial
evidence
a deliv-
involving
in a case
wealth evidence
Marshall,
fact,
than
greater
was even
stealing
charged
ery-truck driver
in Amerine. For
that which was available
$36,000
to deliv-
supposed
that he was
over
only
was evidence that the
example, there
job.
gov-
Although
of his
part
er as
shrinkwrap
were those
fingerprints on
guilt,
it
proof
no direct
ernment had
Marshall,
testimony of
as well as the
op-
evidence of the defendant’s
presented
detailing
er-
various witnesses
gov-
the crime. The
portunity to commit
statements,
behavior,
ratic
inconsistent
evidence of
ernment
then introduced
the FBI investi-
his nervousness about
prior to the
modest means
defendant’s
that
therefore conclude
gation. We
with his
larceny, as contrasted
date of the
not abuse its discretion
district court did
$2,000
down
of old debts and
payment
in limine or
denying Marshall’s motion
form of
payment on a new car
$20
wealth.
admitting evidence of
sudden
(the
as the
same denomination
bills
Inc.,
Express,
Trepel Roadway
See
stolen)
money disap-
immediately after the
Cir.1999)
(holding
F.3d
This court held
peared.
Id. at 1131-32.
only if the
evidentiary rulings are reversed
case,
this
total facts of
that “under the
discretion).
court abuses its
district
much other evidence
where there was
relevant and ad-
testimony
this
guilt,
also included
Marshall’s brief
Furthermore,
at 1132.
missible.” Id.
challenge
to the
instructions
summary
proper
it
also declared that was
court
from the
jury to infer
permitted
this evidence that
jury to infer from
ex
evidence that Marshall’s
sudden-wealth
by
defendant]
employed
[the
“the funds
after the
immediately
penditures
from the
buy
a car came
pay debts and
money. The
funded
the stolen
were
Id;
$36,000.”
see also United
missing
instructions,
accu
(6th district court’s
O’Neal,
Amerine.
holding rately reflected the
Cir.1974)
evidence
(holding sudden-wealth
Amerine,
also
that the district court should have held an C. The district court’s decision to con- evidentiary hearing to decide whether the charge conference, pos- duct defendant’s absence voluntary, so that
sibly portion closing argu- “the issue might have been foreclosed ments, in Marshall’s absence does further litigation Id. avoided.” at 862-63. not constitute reversible error If made, however, no finding such as in challenges Finney, look to decision we the record as a whole district court to accept his lawyer’s waiver to determine whether or not a defendant *10 trial.”) right present every stage be at his voluntarily waived his and knowingly (internal omitted). id. at trial. See citation present his to be timely did not Because Marshall record, reviewing After the we trial, may we object to his absence that, the in Fin conclude like defendant on this al based reverse his conviction court ney, Marshall’s absence from the process rights due violation of his leged voluntary knowing and room constituted court’s the district only if we determine to be right of his constitutional waiver Fed. plain error. See action constituted Marshall, free Finney, like present. 52(b). has described This court R.Civ.P. no explanation on bail. He has offered consisting analysis as plain-error during charge absence conference. his (1) actu whether an error inquiries: four claim, problematic more for his Mar Even (2) court, the district ally occurred present that he was dispute shall does not (3) error, whether obviousness when the district court (4) in the courtroom rights, substantial error affected pro at which court announced the time of substantial compromise whether fairness, day. the next We ceedings in would resume rights seriously affected judicial right that Marshall’s reputation pro therefore conclude tegrity public or Thomas, v. voluntarily United States trial was ceedings. present See be at his Cir.1993). 629-30 There is thus no by waived his conduct. lawyer’s his com need to address whether challenges the fact Marshall to the district court munication of waiver waiver lawyer communicated the that his valid, apply nor do we need without consent. judge to the Marshall’s note, any further. analysis error We plain cannot be based on It true that a waiver is if that even we had found error lawyer made a defendant’s statements during absent having in his been his or her has not first consulted with who conference, produced Marshall has charge Sowders, 5 F.3d client. Carter substantially that this absence no evidence (6th Cir.1993) (“Even if defense coun fairness of the rights his or the affected validly could have waived defendant’s sel proceedings. trial for the conclusion of right present to be trial, counsel did not consult where defense concerning the waiver
with defendant Sufficiency of the evidence D. consent, defendant’s did obtain challenges sufficiency next defendant.”). binding be on waiver will not the two supporting of the evidence Nevertheless, only inway this is not the convictions, currency-transaction- the false may right present to be which conviction, three report may also be have been waived. Waiver 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) con- money-laundering conduct. See implied from the defendant’s con- (Although Marshall was also victions. 858, 862 Finney Rothgerber, which violating 18 U.S.C. victed of (6th Cir.1985) (holding despite “knowingly engages person who punishes expressly failure to waive his defendant’s monetary in a trans- attempts engage “[i]t waiver was effected because presence, property of a criminally derived action peti wholly suggest incredible to $10,000,”resulting from greater than value bail, tioner, liberty on who was account with brokerage trial, opening of his opening attended the session $40,000 does not di- money, he of stolen at the trial duty present and had a to be appeal.) that conviction rectly challenge right doubts about his any ... entertained *11 536 omitted). In our review of that his claim there was and internal quotations It deter- “ 2113(c) §
insufficient
support
evidence to
his other mined that
reaches a different
i.e.,
convictions,
“whether,
group
wrongdoers,
we must
those who re-
determine
ceive the loot
viewing
after
the evidence in
from the robber.”
Id.
light
548,
Nonetheless,
from bank in violation of subsection ment is based on the lack of direct evi (b), knowing the to be property same dence that he was the one who took the which has been stolen shall subject be to money. (b) punishment provided in subsection “[cjircumstantial It is axiomatic that evi- taker.”). for the dence alone is sufficient to sustain a con-
The United States Supreme Court has viction and such evidence need not remove
held that
such dual conviction is improp-
every reasonable
except
hypothesis
that of
Gaddis,
er.
United States v.
424
guilt.”
Vannerson,
U.S.
United
786
(1976),
Cir.1986).
S.Ct.
L.Ed.2d
case,
In this
that,
the Court concluded
in enacting the circumstantial evidence supporting the
2113(c),
“Congress
trying to
jury’s
reach a
verdict is substantial. There were no
group
new
of wrongdoers,
to multiply
signs
ATM,
entry
of forced
into the
a fact
the offense of the bank robbers them-
strongly implicating
who
someone
had ac-
(citations
selves.” Id. at
ly after § conviction under 5313 and Marshall’s he day bills of two thousand 5324(a)(2) $20 on the infor- § was based false account, points also brokerage opened One, to officials at Bank gave mation he various witnesses Finally, guilt. to his a cashier’s check procured where he in- Marshall’s evasive testified about $40,000 in for the stolen cash. exchange to the with reference consistent statements by The form filed the bank listed Weston a few at Olde Discount brokerage account cash, with Marshall as as the owner of the money was taken from days after the There employ of Weston. a courier ATM. a that this information was dispute is no the facts. Al- misstatement of material evidence, taken to- circumstantial This han- supervisor who dridge, the Bank One ra- a more than sufficient for gether, was transaction, testified at trial dled this find, a reason- beyond fact to tional trier of form, I believe I you “if look on the doubt, guilty was that Marshall able courier, and that he was the checked off larceny. Accord United States bank if places have been in both his name would Cir.1988) (8th Mundt, cash.” also the owner of the She he was (affirming guilty a verdict for bank “[h]e told her that said that Marshall that the defendant on evidence based currency, that he of this not the owner difficulties, financial experiencing been money off for merely dropping the money and the had access to the that he customer, Weston, and it this other John steal, that his wealth opportunity money.” was not his immediately after the suddenly increased on this claim of error based con- Accordingly, although his larceny). challenge to the simply is evidence 2113(c) § is violating 18 U.S.C. viction for Aldridge’s jury assigned that the weight aside, conviction we affirm Marshall’s set said denies that he ever testimony. He 2113(b). § violating 18 U.S.C. for official, or to the Bank One things these any misinformation that he communicated filing a false The conviction for 2. check. This the cashier’s procuring when report currency transaction not, therefore, challenge is claim of error file requires a bank to Federal law Rather, sufficiency of the evidence. to the report with the currency-transaction the determination challenging is every cash Secretary of Commerce Aldridge. to believe $10,000 in which of more than transaction made credibility determination A participates. See that financial institution fact, rarely is the finder of filing of a (requiring 31 U.S.C. Mattner, Bueno v. error. See reversible report for a transac currency-transaction Cir.1987) 1380, 1384 829 F.2d whatever greater amount than tion an (“[W]here permissible there are two (2) views proceeds are activity; unlawful evidence, of the the fact finder’s choice knowledge that the proceeds funds are clearly between them cannot be errone- (3) unlawful activity; and conduct or at- ous.”) (citations and internal quotations tempt transaction, to conduct a financial omitted). Accordingly, we find no error in knowing that the designed transaction is Marshall’s conviction causing Bank part source, whole or in disguise the ... One to a currency-transaction file report ownership or control proceeds.” containing material misstatements. Prince, United (6th Cir.2000). At issue in appeal this 1956(a) (l)(B)(i)
3. element, the third the intent to disguise laundering convictions *13 the funds that Marshall Society stole from Marshall was convicted on three counts Bank. of money laundering in violation of 18 Sanders, In United States v. 928 1956(a)(1)(B)®, § U.S.C. on pur- based (10th Cir.1991), F.2d 940 the Tenth Circuit watch, bracelet, chases of a Rolex a tennis addressed the question of how much and and expensive wine. challenge to what kind of evidence is sufficient sup convictions,
these Marshall asserts that port a money laundering conviction under government proffered insufficient evi- 1956(a)(1)(B)®. § Sanders involved the support jury’s dence to against verdict purchase defendant’s of using two cars him. illegally money. obtained The defendant The statute under which Marshall was personally was involved in both transac provides convicted as follows: tions and readily identifiable to the (a)(1) Whoever, knowing that the prop- sales representatives. Although the de erty involved a financial transaction fendant put the title of the second car in represents proceeds of some form of name, his daughter’s the fact that she was activity, unlawful conducts or attempts present sale, at the shared the same last to conduct such a financial transaction defendant, name as the and that the defen which in fact proceeds involves the of dant used the car conspicuously after it specified activity— unlawful purchased, all the gov “undermine[d] ernment’s argument ... that the Lincoln
(a)(1)(B) knowing that the transaction is purchase involved the requisite design of
designed in
part-(i)
whole or in
to con-
Sanders,
concealment.”
the statute’s
history
sug
shall be sentenced to a fine of not gest that Congress did not intend to crimi
$500,000
more than
or twice the value of
every
nalize
using
transaction
illegally ob
the property
transaction,
involved in the
Therefore,
money).
Sanders,
tained
under
greater,
whichever is
imprisonment
or
government
produce
must
more evi
for not more than twenty years, or both.
dence than the simple fact of a
pur
retail
§
18 U.S.C.
using
1956. A
chase
illegally
violation of
obtained
1956(a)(1)(B)®,
§
then, consists of the
prove
fol- order to
the “intent
to disguise”
“(1)
lowing three elements:
1956(a)(1)(B)®.
use of
funds
element of
attention; depositing illegal profits
type”
“most obvious
of ev
avoid
account of a
busi-
finding
legitimate
the bank
support
would
idence
ness;
irregular
features of the
highly
of unlawful
disguise
proceeds
intent
transaction; using
parties
third
to con-
employing
party
a third
activity is “that of
owner; a
identity
defendant’s
ceal the real
series
unusual
to conceal the
order
Lovett,
cumulating
financial moves
trans-
others.” United States
(10th Cir.1992);
action;
expert testimony
practices
n.
ac
Beddow,
of criminals.
cord United States
(6th Cir.1992)
(holding that the
(citations omitted).
Id. at 1475-76
Accord-
the source
disguise
intended to
defendant
ingly,
analysis
because we believe that the
part
based in
on evidence
proceeds,
reflects
Sanders
Garcia-Emanuel
purchase
“front men” to
that he used
proper
statutory interpretation
issue).
The fact that a defendant
items
1956(a)(l)(B)(i),
adopt
holdings
we
in a
engages
transaction with
personally
appropriate
ap-
those cases as the
rule to
identity,
trying
disguise
his or her
out
ply
money-
to the intent element of
negate
the effect of
does
laundering conviction.
to an intent
pointing
other evidence
*14
government’s only
The
direct evidence
3;
Lovett,
inference becomes more difficult Prince, ed States v. 750-54 draw. (6th Cir.2000) (applying the definition of Id. at 1475. Accordingly, although “a 1956(c) “transaction” from to each trans- reasonably suspect could that on some lev- fer of within an elaborate wire- el [the defendant] is motivated scheme). desire fraud Accordingly, the fact that to convert his cash into a legitimate more the source of buy used to form,” the Tenth Circuit held that even in watch, bracelet, and wine constituted a *15 cases, these difficult government must separate § violation under 1957 has no produce more evidence than the invest- bearing on whether purchases the latter ment value of the item purchased in order satisfied prong intent of support to a jury’s conclusion that 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). § See United intent element was satisfied. Id. at 1474- Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d agree. 75. We Cir.1994) (“[T]he mere fact that a defen dant was convicted money laundering government’s argument other arising out of some transactions is not in support claim its that there was sufficient to sustain a money laundering sufficient support evidence to jury’s transactions.”). conviction involving other verdict regarding the purchases three We thus conclude that Marshall’s convic question was that the funds used to ac pursuant tion § to 18 U.S.C. 1957 for the quire these items all came from the brokerage-account transaction is an insuf $40,000of stolen cash that placed Marshall ficient basis on which support to a finding into the Olde Discount brokerage account. of intent to further conceal that money This brokerage account was the basis for a when portion he used a of the funds to separate unlawful monetary-transaction purchase the items in question. conviction § under 18 U.S.C. a con viction which Marshall is not directly (invest- chal Without these two inferences lenging in appeal. this According to the ment value and derivation from another government, then, pool if a money transaction), illegal government has created money-launder violation of the produced absolutely no other evidence to statutes, ing every subsequent purchase support the jury’s conclusion that Marshall the wine the source of the funds. The wine conceal the tennis bracelet purchased money purchased by expen- Marshall was indeed intent to conceal with the pur- purchased greater Bank. Both in a somewhat Society sive he stole by person past dealings made Marshall than in his with this quantity chases were name, merchant, own valid credit cards but there was no using same evidence readily apparent identity any fact to indicate motivation beyond this fact, had salesperson. consumption. each beyond personal Marshall’s from the same previous purchases question made to a response offhand affirmative Although the fact that wine merchant. by government asked recross-exam- party to make Marshall did not use third purchased ination as to whether he attempt to dis- or otherwise purchases, an wine as an investment is not indication himself, negate not counter- guise would that he did not intend to consume it. A conceal, evidence of an intent balancing acknowledgment pur- that a defendant’s was no such additional evidence there equally an investment could be chase is case. present any acquisition immediately applied to we Mar- Accordingly, consumed. set aside are opinion We also of money laundering shall’s convictions for of wearable or con purchases few isolated purchases tied to the of the tennis bracelet directly by wrongdoer sumable items that no rational and the wine on the basis money-laundering trans type is not the convict Marshall of vio- trier of fact could in mind when it Congress had action 1956(a)(1)(B)© these cir- lating under 1956(a)(l)(B)(i), especially enacted cumstances. relatively of the items is where the value in relation to the amount stolen small conviction for Sanders, the defendant. laundering purchase on the based (“This ... its applies] n. 3 section presents watch a somewhat closer Rolex transactions that can be coverage to those watch, Regarding the Marshall lied case. the core of laun said constitute when he said that Miller to Weston designed to conceal or dering-transactions This gift it as a for Marshall. purchased source, nature, location, own disguise the some evidence of Marshall’s provide does proceeds, or control of criminal ership, money. In disguise purloined intent *16 reporting cash Federal or State evade Garcia-Emanuel, 14 F.3d United States Report requirements.”) (quoting Senate (10th Cir.1994), the court ad 99-433, accompanied the Senate which No. in which the dressed a similar situation in eventually bill codified version of the misrep a horse and purchased defendant 1956). § the source of resented to the seller complete use to characterizes cash that he would Although the dissent held, $1,700 The court and transaction. purchase Marshall’s of between misrepresenta that this $3,000 it is true “[w]hile of wine as a “collectible” worth into an element of concealment transaction, brings tion nothing we find record that, transaction, not believe we do intended to hold the to indicate that Marshall in the face of other standing alone and an investment for these bottles of wine as single misrep present, § this can circumstances applying 1956. One purposes evi can amount to substantial not imme resentation say every purchase loosely investment, designed dence that the transaction an but diately consumable is contrast, the funds.” Id. In illegal conceal of a item such as acquisition consumer in a later case that held an to Tenth Circuit no indication of intent provides wine where a defendant engaged in a series of Because all seven of his convictions result- complex transactions in purchase order to ed in sentences of the length same to be a house with illegally money, obtained mul served concurrently, disposition this will tiple misstatements about the source of the not affect the overall time of Marshall’s money to bank responsible officers for the incarceration. question
transactions in did constitute suf COLLIER, ficient evidence of an intent disguise District Judge, concurring source of the money. See part and dissenting part. United States v.
Lovett, 1034-36 Cir. I II.A, II.B, concur in parts II.C, and 1992). II.D.2 majority’s well-reasoned and Lovett,
Unlike and similar to Garciar- well-written decision. I separately write Emanuel, Marshall made only one mis- to explain more my completely concur- statement regarding the II.D.l, watch. Further- in part rence and because I must more, in contrast to the situation both respectfully dissent from majority’s Garcicb-Emanuel, Lovett and Marshall lied holding part II.D.3 respect with to the to an individual completely unrelated to money laundering counts under 18 U.S.C. purchase in question, 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). § even this I agree with the facts was after-the-fact. Although such a mis- and the law as set forth the majority’s statement might support a finding of in- opinion; however, I disagree their tent to conceal when combined with addi- conclusion “no rational trier of fact could evidence, tional this one lie is insufficient convict violating standing support alone to 1956(a)(l)(B)(i)” a rational § trier on the basis the evi- of fact’s conclusion that Marshall violated presented dence at trial. 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) § purchased when he
Rolex watch. We therefore set I. aside Mar- Marshall’s Conviction Under 18 2113(c) shall’s conviction for money laundering U.S.C. based on the Rolex watch transaction for I concur with the majority’s conclusion the same reasons we do inso relation to that conviction, pursuant to sec-
the tennis bracelet wine. 2113(c), tion for receiving or possessing stolen goods, should be vacated and re-
III. CONCLUSION manded for dismissal the district court. For all of the reasons above, forth believe, set I however, that explana- further we VACATE Marshall’s 18 U.S.C. tion of the reasoning this behind result will 2113(c) conviction for possession of sto- prove helpful in the future to courts ad- len money all three of his dressing question. this As stated earlier 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) money-laundering con- by majority, in United States Gad victions, and REMAND dis, with instructions U.S. 96 S.Ct. *17 for the district court to a judgment enter (1976), L.Ed.2d 222 the United States Su acquittal on these counts of the indict- preme Court held person “[A] convicted of ment. We AFFIRM the remaining three robbing a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. convictions bank larceny for §§ under 2113(a), (b), 18 (d), and cannot also be 2113(b), § U.S.C. engaging in an unlawful convicted of receiving or possessing the money transaction under 1957, § 18 U.S.C. proceeds of robbery in violation of 18 and causing a bank to file a 2113(e).” false state- § 547, U.S.C. Id. at 96 S.Ct. at ment on a currency-transaction report un- 1026. “Receipt possession or pro der § 31 5324(a)(2). § 5313 U.S.C. and ceeds of a robbery bank in violation of
543
2113(c)
§
simply
is
not a lesser included
By
case.
its verdict
jury
found on
offense within the total framework of the
the basis of adequate evidence that
robbery
bank
provisions
§of 2113. Rath-
Moore robbed the postal employee and
er,
2113(c)
§
reaches
‘different group of
later
pieces
of mail from the rob-
ie.,
wrongdoers,’
‘those who receive the
bery in his possession. These findings
”
loot from the
548,
robber.’
Id.
96 S.Ct.
are of course perfectly consistent with
1023. The rule
Gaddis,
enunciated in
one another. The reason they will not
when applied to the
case,
facts of this
thus
support convictions for both robbery and
precludes Marshall’s conviction on both
possession
ais
legal one:
will
we
Counts 1 and 2. He
only
should
have been
impute to Congress an intention to pun-
convicted of one or the other.
ish the thief
This,
twice.
obviously, is a
reason for vacating the conviction
held,
Gaddis Court further
where
the possession that inevitably
follows the
evidence
introduced
trial was clearly
but,
robbery
equally obviously, not
insufficient to
support a conviction under
requiring a new trial.
2113(c),
section
but was adequate with re
gard to the
conviction,
theft
the appropri
(citations
Id. at 1032
and
omitted).
footnote
remedy
ate
on appeal was simple vacatur
In reaching that holding, the Seventh Cir-
2113(c)
of the section
conviction. The
cuit distinguished Milanovich:
theft conviction could be allowed to stand.
Moore relies upon Milanovich v. United
549-550,
Id. at
count, possession for the conviction jury returned robbery. used the validi- on the absolutely no doubt “casts guilty as all defendants finding conviction,” a verdict and a new robbery ty of the of the the two counts charged in each of Id. at 551- required. not be trial should indictment. Stewart did 53, at 1028. Justice 96 S.Ct. interpreta- White’s 1126, Justice States,
not disclaim F.Supp. Gentry v. United opinion. majority tion of the (E.D.Tenn.1974). The evidence 1127-28 to establish both therefore sufficient Id. theft, well in the as Gentry’s participation States, 533 F.2d Gentry United of stolen subsequent possession as his (6th Cir.1976), panel a 998, 999-1000 the panel held appeal, property. On Gaddis, Court, peti- held the applying this his convic- him to vacatur of error entitled bank rob- for both dual convictions tioner’s 2113(c) justi- but did under section tion of stolen possession or bery receipt robbery and the fy a new trial on both be allowed could not property bank counts: receipt possession convictions had the dual even where stand regard controlling with find Gaddis We the sen- sentencing because impact at no that he is entitled Gentry’s contention to be each count were imposed on tences Milanovich, supra. under to a new trial “Although Gentry has concurrently: run Gaddis, showed the evidence As consequences specific adverse not shown in the participant a Gentry was direct if conviction and might arise which no evidence robbery and there is bank are not charge possession on the sentence from proceeds that he received aside, that ‘It is under- we note well set the error robber. Thus different bank im- multiplicity of sentences that a stood allowing him to judge of the district pardon opportunities pairs prisoner’s 2113(c) ” violation of be convicted for Id., (citing Hibdon v. United parole.’ or vacating that fully corrected can be (6th Cir.1953); 834, States, conviction, and sen- and his conviction Machibroda, and United 2113(d) under 18 U.S.C. tence Cir.1964)). 947, The eviden- robbery must stand. armed convic- for the defendant’s tiary foundation F.2d at 999. Gentry, 533 present to that Gentry was similar tions here: case, at submitted In this the evidence support Marshall’s trial was sufficient the case the evidence the trial of
Upon
1 and 2.
under
Counts
Decem-
convictions
both
clearly
upon
most
reflected
is also consis-
on both counts
and his co- The evidence
petitioner
ber
tent, i.e.,
believe
a reasonable
could
defendant,
auto-
Clayton, using a stolen
burglar and
was the
mobile,
and wear-
both that Marshall
shotguns,
armed with
masks,
possessed or concealed
gun point
that he later
ing ski
robbed
-
$194,200.00
presented
funds.
If the evidence
as
stolen
security officer of
bank
with re-
mutually
exclusive
of deliver-
trial
been
process
officer was
counts,
is,
if a
two
January
spect to these
Upon
ing cash to the bank.
have found
juror could not
(cid:127)reasonable
led to the recov-
search warrants
ruling
also
the thief without
$88,100.00
of the Marshall was
proceeds
ery of
subsequent
possibility
he was
home and
out
robbery
petitioner’s
from the
only a new trial
then
$84,000.00
pro-
possessor,
receiver
recovery
error.
correct
substantive
the home of would
robbery
ceeds of
Here, however,
con-
erroneous
co-defendant,
Clayton, together with
*19
545
viction on
Count
does nothing to cast
ciency of the evidence adduced at
trial
doubt on his larceny conviction. Conse- must
whether,
determine
viewing the trial
quently, the appropriate remedy in this
testimony and exhibits in
light
the
most
case, according to the rule announced in favorable to
prosecution, any
the
rational
Gaddis as
interpreted
Gentry and trier of fact could have found the essential
Moore,
2113(c)
is vacatur of the section
elements of the
beyond
crime
a reasonable
(Count 2),
conviction
rather than remand
doubt. Jackson Virginia,
307,
443 U.S.
for a new trial on Counts 1
319,
and 2.
2781,
99 S.Ct.
(1979).
II. Marshall’s Convictions Under 18 evidence, reevaluate the credibility of wit 1956(a)(l)(B)(i) U.S.C. nesses, or substitute judgment its for that I do disagree with of jury. the facts and the the United Hilliard, (6th law as set forth in portion Cir.1993). the of the impor Most opinion majority’s dealing tantly, the reviewing Marshall’s court must look at money laundering the convictions. I evidence as a whole. Where Powers v. Bay part company with the majority liner is in Marine Corp., Cir.1996) significance relative I believe (holding should be jury verdict must be placed on of absence examined in light evidence indicat- of entire record when intent, ing an determining part, whether it may con- be allowed to stand). ceal identity at the each time of the disputed consummated, transactions was Marshall was convicted on Counts and on whether those transactions were and 6 with money laundering violation ordinary commercial transactions or in- of 1956(a)(1)(B)®: U.S.C.
vestments.1 Although Appellant empha- Whoever, knowing that property in- sizes his brief the absence of evidence volved in a financial transaction repre- indicating an intent to identity, conceal his sents proceeds form some un- I do not believe it is dispositive here. lawful activity, conducts or attempts
On appeal, Marshall claims the evidence conduct a such financial transaction presented during his trial was insufficient which in fact involves proceeds to support his three convictions for money specified unlawful activity ... knowing laundering. I find it necessary at this transaction is designed in whole point to reiterate the standard review to or in ... part to conceal or disguise the applied be in this context. An appellate nature, location, source, the own- court reviewing a challenge to the suffi- ership, the control of the proceeds of Although 1. majority Yes, characterizes Mar- A. I do. wines, purchase shall’s Q. a Rolex you Did purchase that wine as in- an diamond tennis bracelet as a "few isolated vestment? purchases items," of wearable or consumable purchased A. I it and the watches as an I think the evidence was sufficient to allow investment. That’s correct. jury to conclude Marshall pur- made each testimony This constitutes direct evidence investment, chase as an supports fact which Marshall saw the wine Rolex as in- the conclusion Marshall’s was to inLent con- only vestments. purchase Since the other vert "dirty” larceny proceeds bank into bracelet, issue involved the diamond tennis "clean” assets that could not be traced direct- one presume could logically plural ly to his crime. Marshall himself admitted as "watches” includes bracelet. during much testimony at trial: Q. you purchased, Just the you wine said you still it? have
546 to conceal part or in in whole designed be activity ... shall unlawful
specified location, nature, the the the disguise or crime]. aof [guilty of the control source, ownership, or the is3 for Count conduct underlying The activi- unlawful specified of proceeds the Count the Rolex. of purchase Marshall’s the that is no contention There ty. the diamond of purchase his out of stems the was not the car buy to money used bracelet, involves and Count tennis activity. unlawful specified of proceeds has majority The the wine. of purchase is, rather, there was contention The ele- essential the three correctly stated to dis- intended that Norman proof no crime: of ments the source, location, nature, own- the guise of (1) proceeds that are funds of use We money. of the control ership, or activity; unlawful the whether is not point The disagree. pro- funds are (2) the knowledge that as to who the car is deceived of seller activity; unlawful of ceeds by chang- was, rather that Norman but to conduct (3) attempting conducting or activity of unlawful ing proceeds the transaction, knowing that a financial (or, prop- more form of from the in whole or designed is transaction use account) through the a erly, bank — nature, disguise or to conceal part ac- other, business undisclosed source, ownership or control location, automobile, form of an counts—into proceeds. difficult for it more made Norman Prince, States United trace what to of the true owner Cir.2000). my fellow with agree I it. to happened are elements first two that the panelists to cases, this is sufficient our Under Rather, chal- here. at issue not of the statute. out a violation make a lack of asserts to convictions lenge these was, case, the In this evidence element, 377. Id. at the third to pertaining evidence a con- likelihood, allow insufficient in all disguise. or intent conceal by a desire motivated Marshall was clusion presented the evidence viewing After identity during his own to conceal whole, light most favorable trial as record, howev- The issue. transactions concluded, and a I have prosecution, to the Marshall er, supports a conclusion amply found, would the record have jury could at- in an in those transactions engaged element on the third finding support a connection disguise his conceal or tempt to The Mar- fact doubt. beyond reasonable law en- from larceny proceeds identity from not to conceal shall chose his former forcement, victim bank and al- purchases, he made whom those employer. consideration, is dis- not though a relevant an analysis an sim- is argument my response starting point positive. here, evidence by Appellant totality of the presented to that ilar examination for the in- Appeals logical and the jury Court States before the placed United v. Nor- drawn from have United could Eighth Circuit ferences (8th Cir.1998), I starting point, a case man, F.3d 375 this evidence. With in isolation. transaction by majority, stated: at each cited do look purchases Instead, the three I see each there require that does not The statute evidence. of all the the context the within design to conceal any be intention whole, this the evidence aas the Viewed dealing with person identity of juror a reasonable allow instead, would case requires, It property. motivated, im- conclude the transaction know that defendant mediately after the robbery until at least Marshall acted with that design to conceal August by a desire to distance him- the transactions involved here. *21 self from the larceny proceeds, is, to In support of its holding, the majority “conceal disguise nature, [and] the the lo- relies in part on the fact Marshall pur- cation, source, the the ownership, or the chased the wine and the diamond bracelet control” of the larceny proceeds. 18 using valid credit cards issued in his own 1956(a)(l)(B)(i). U.S.C. For example, on name. Viewing this fact in light the most 5, 1994, January when attempted Marshall favorable the government, to however, I to exchange a large portion of the think it just weighs as heavily in support proceeds into a cashier’s check so he could of affirming the money laundering convic- open a brokerage account girl- his tions. Marshall had enough money name, friend’s he suspicion encountered brokerage account to purchases make the and thorough questioning from the bank Instead, directly. after using credit cards teller. He also large learned transactions to make purchases, the Marshall used had to reported be to the govern- federal funds from the brokerage account pay to ment. the credit account balance. evidence,
From this the jury could This have evidence would have allowed a rea inferred a motive on sonable to part jury to conclude Marshall made an convert the cash into other effort to place forms of appre- distance between ill- ciable gotten assets gains because he knew if placed he from the larceny and the proceeds bank, in a assets purchased he he might to replace have to the cash. Norman, answer See some questions uncomfortable F.3d at 377 (holding about money’s intent to conceal origins. Furthermore, could be inferred by fun in response neling of money to questioning through about several his identi- sources ty prior to funds, the source ultimate purchase). Moreover, Marshall proceeded the use of the produce credit his card docu Florida identifi- created cation, mentary evidence rather than of how license, acquired his Ohio he assets, and paper informed the trail could teller be used to belonged to mislead an investigator. step-brother. his later, Garcia-Ema Months August nuel, 14 F.3d at when 1476-77 (finding such Marshall learned the F.B.I. evidence probative was had of intent been asking questions conceal about the bro- and supported money account, kerage laundering convic he told his step-brother to tions). In the event enforcement, law make account “disappear.” Taking bank, or Marshall’s former employer had into account all the evidence of this nature purchases discovered the or inquired record, about I jury believe a could have them, Marshall would have been able to it probative determined was type answer he made the purchases with his “design to conceal” both the assets them- credit card and produce credit card selves as well as illegal their origins, which receipts to support story. the United States Appeals Court of for the Tenth Circuit found relevant in United I Additionally, am unable to agree with Garcia-Emanuel, States v. the majority’s characterization of ac- (10th Cir.1994), another case cited quisition watch, a Rolex a diamond ten- the majority. Once reached this nis bracelet, and several thousand dollars conclusion, it could have logically inferred worth of wine,2 collectible within a relative- 2. Although Marshall admitted purchased investment, the wine supra as an see note not consume consumption and fact did “few larceny, as a period of the
ly short
immediately,
rather intended
or consum
but
of wearable
the wine
purchases
isolated
within,
investment,
he
fall
an
as
admitted.
that do not
hold it as
able items”
instance, Mar
§ 1956. In each
also indicated Marshall
purview of
The evidence
“dirty” proceeds
purchased
converted the
collectible
previously
never
shall
robbery into a “clean” asset
the bank
the diamond
purchased
he
wines. When
period
held for
substantial
bracelet,
could be
clerk he
told the store
depreciation
significant
time without
in whose
girlfriend,
it
buying
*22
subsection
A
focus of
central
value.
brokerage
to hide the
attempted
name he
(a)(1)(B)®
conversion
to criminalize the
account,
nothing in the record
yet
indicates
way of
as a
goods
into
services
of cash
Again,
to her.
given
was ever
the bracelet
disguising
wellspring
concealing or
concluded, on the basis
have
could
Jackson,
v.
United States
the cash. See
record,
had never
that Marshall
of the
(7th Cir.1991),
cited with
841
935 F.2d
to
bank
purchase prior
made
similar
Samour, 9
in United States v.
approval
larceny.
(6th Cir.1993),
overruled
F.3d
535
watch,
in the
of the Rolex
Similarly,
case
Reed,
v.
77
by United States
grounds
other
presented
to indicate
no evidence
Norman,
(6th Cir.1996);
F.3d 139
U.S.
purchased
ever
such a watch
Marshall had
(8th
Cir.1998); see also
F.3d
377
143
Although Marshall was
prior to the theft.
Cencer,
90 F.3d
States v.
United
purchase,
watch after the
wearing the
seen
Cir.1996)
(6th
bar
(holding evidence
1106
deny
in a
position
he
still
to run his busi
drug proceeds
used
owner
and the
relationship between the watch
laun
support money
was sufficient
ness
he used
larceny proceeds,
part
because
conviction).
dering
buy
watch. More-
credit card to
purchases as
viewing
than
these
Rather
over, in
additional
Mar-
light of
evidence
or as “or-
or consumable items”
“wearable
to conceal the source
sought
shall
transactions,” entered
dinary commercial
watch, by
gift
it was a
saying
from
bene-
“present personal
for Marshall’s
into
juror
have
a reasonable
could
girlfriend,
fit,”
at the evi-
jury, looking
I
believe
watch,
purchased
concluded Marshall
to the
light
most favorable
dence
items, with an intent
along
the other
considering Marshall’s
government, and
the bank
proceeds
to convert
from
stand,
have found
on the
could
admissions
immediately
traceable
into assets
“invest-
purchases
the three
involved
long
that could be held for
his crime
ments,”
Tenth
said
of which the
Circuit
into
time and then
period of
reconverted
hand,
“On the one
cases
Garcia-Emanuel:
though
arose. Even
cash when the need
illegal
made with
involving investments
to the
subsequent
made
the statement was
the stat-
close to the core of
proceeds are
watch,
jury could have
purchase of
criminalizing changing
purpose
ute’s
was indicative of
the statement
concluded
form,
‘ostensibly legitimate
into an
cash
trans-
intent at the time of the
loans,
profits
such as business
before
action.
using
personal
those
benefit.
funds for
’”
original).
(emphasis
...
F.3d
contrary to the
reaching
In
a conclusion
here,
majority
I
has relied
one
reach
indicated
The evidence adduced
trial
upon
particular,
two
United
the wine for
cases
purchase
Marshall did not
may fairly be
testimony
characterized
and the
that these wines
is clear
Marshall's
it
merchant,
testimony
Koly,
as "collectible.”
of Ron
the wine
Sanders,
Cir.1991),
cash,
back into
could also be conducted
previously
and the
cited Garcia-Emanuel.
privately. The
present
circumstances
here
While I
disagree
do not
with the majority’s
are thus
probative
more
of an intent
interpretation
cases,
of these two
I do conceal, than was the situation in Sanders.
believe the cases may be distinguished fac-
Norman,
both a greater quantity of activity and
ready
by
owned
defendant
activity of
qualitatively
different nature
Sanders,
wife.
Sanders defendants in also differs those cases from had in this in conducted case past. the car purchases contrast, Here in involved in Marshall had Sanders public were and conspicuous. never before made purchases also such as the Rockelman, 49 result, F.3d at 422. As a three supporting his money laundering the transactions were less useful convictions. Although as a he bought wine means for hiding ill-gotten wealth. from the same Mar- previously, merchant he purchases, however, shall’s involved had never purchased items collectible wine. The hidden, could easily be transported or fact Marshall had never conducted similar Any stored. future transfer of ownership, transactions previously, when viewed for the purpose converting the items the context of the other evidence discussed by a motivated, part, least were his convictions
above, in favor of weighs disguise the or intent to conceal design or counts. these source, location, owner- nature, sentiment, expressed with the agree I of the bank control ship or majority and the court the Sanders Furthermore, reasons for the money proceeds. is a case, that section this by the statute, “monéy spending stated, cited not a I the cases believe laundering the evi- Had F.2d at 946. are statute.” conclusion of its support majority to establish only sufficient been dence hand, case from the factually distinct with consumables purchased Marshall of Marshall’s vacatur not mandate and do support- instead of also larceny proceeds, Conse- laundering convictions. invest- making he was a conclusion ing dissent respectfully I must quently, majority’s join the ments, gladly I would va- opinion majority’s portion had established If evidence opinion. 3- on Counts convictions cating Marshall’s straightforward merely made Marshall 5. I larceny proceeds, pin-chases vacating con- these considered would have joined in the have might also I III.
victions. Conclusion if the evidence to vacate decision I, part reasons discussed For the clearly expressed established forth put the reasons above, and for disguise to conceal and intent desire in the decision I majority’s opinion, concur *24 and his connec- larceny proceeds both conviction Marshall’s to REVERSE and after both before them tion with prop- dis- bank might concealing I not have stolen Finally, possessing purchases. had not 2113(c). if the evidence in this case sented I of 18 U.S.C. erty violation a reason- beyond prove, been sufficient II.A, II.B, parts generally with also concur doubt, how he lied about able majority’s opinion. II.C, and II.D.2 his rea- lied about Rolex acquired however, dissent, respectfully I must bracelet. the diamond purchasing sons for to Mar- holding respect majority’s with the evidence my opinion, under convictions money laundering shall’s my concurrence precludes this case 1956(a)(1)(B)®, as I would 18 U.S.C. to this is- holding respect majority’s for the reasons those convictions AFFIRM sue. II, above. part stated in Garciar- stated As the Tenth Circuit jury, we had sat on the we Emanuel: “If defendant] [the convicted not have
might reviewing But in laundering. we are unable appeal, conviction [his] unrea- conclusion was jury’s that the hold (internal quota- at 1478 sonable.” omitted). re- carefully After marks tion trial, I developed viewing record evidence, when viewed believe government, light most favorable jury to conclude rational would allow a Rolex, the dia- purchases of bracelet, wines the collectible mond