United States v. Christopher C. Hayes
Case Information
*1 Before BARKETT and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and HOOD, District Judge. [*]
*2
PER CURIAM:
Upon consideration of Defendant-Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing, we vacate the prior opinion in this case, issued on August 24, 2010, and substitute the following opinion in its place. In this opinion, we replace an incorrect reference in the first paragraph of our original opinion to “possession of marijuana with intent to distribute” with “aggravated battery.” We do not change the opinion in any other respect. Accordingly, Defendant-Appellant’s petition for panel rehearing is granted.
Christopher Hayes appeals the enhanced sentence he received pursuant to
the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”),
As an initial matter, the Supreme Court recently held that the Florida crime
of battery on a law enforcement officer is not a qualifying crime under ACCA,
Johnson v. United States, -- U.S. --,
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.
To determine whether a prior felony conviction falls within ACCA’s
residual clause, we interpret the crime of conviction using a categorical approach,
*4
“read[ing] the face of the relevant statute itself to discern the crime as it is
ordinarily committed.” United States v. Harris, 608 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir.
2010) (quotations, citation marks, and original alterations omitted). We ask
whether the crime is “similar in kind and in degree to the enumerated crimes”
listed in subsection (B)(ii), namely, burglary, arson, and extortion. Id. (citation
omitted). To that end, we ask whether the conduct inherent in the commission of
the crime is “purposeful, violent and aggressive,” Begay v. United States, 553
U.S. 137, 146 (2008), “or, whether it is a more passive crime of inaction, such as
the failure to report to a penal institution or driving under the influence of alcohol,”
Harris,
Florida’s resisting arrest statute provides that “[w]hoever knowingly and
willfully resists, obstructs, or opposes any officer . . . in the lawful execution of
any legal duty, by offering or doing violence to the person of such officer or
legally authorized person, is guilty of a felony of the third degree.”
In this kind of case, we rely on “our own common-sense analysis of whether this conduct poses a serious potential risk of physical injury.” United States v. Alexander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1257 (11th Cir. 2010). Common sense tells us emphatically that “[t]he act of resisting arrest poses a threat of direct confrontation *5 between a police officer and the subject of the arrest, creating the potential for serious physical injury to the officer and others.” United States v. Wardrick, 350 F.3d 446, 455 (4th Cir. 2003).
Furthermore, the plain language of the statute reveals that the Florida crime
of resisting arrest with violence is “purposeful, violent, and aggressive.” Begay,
553 U.S. at 145. Commission of the crime requires, by its own terms, that the
defendant have knowingly and willfully resisted, obstructed, or opposed an officer
by offering or doing violence to the person of that officer.
We have no difficulty concluding that one who commits the crime of
resisting arrest by knowingly and willfully offering or doing violence to an
arresting officer has committed a “violent felony” for purposes of ACCA, and that
such a person is properly subject to ACCA’s fifteen-year mandatory minimum
sentence as an “armed career criminal.” Cf. United States v. Almenas, 553 F.3d
*6
27, 33-35 (1st Cir. 2009); Wardrick,
AFFIRMED .
Notes
[*] Honorable Joseph M. Hood, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
[1] Inasmuch as the statute plainly requires that the defendant have acted knowingly and
willfully, we reject Hayes’s argument that