211 F. 724 | N.D. Ill. | 1913
(after stating the facts as above). The-fact that the defendant’s functions are limited to a terminal, switching, or interchange service, while not relieving, it from the obligations-of the statute, is of controlling importance, when considered with the
In the fourth case, No. 10,406, the car was in the possession of the defendant company something like five hours. In view of the stipulation that the ordinary time for performing the service was from one to two hours, this much longer time, if' unexplained, might well give rise to an inference of culpable delay. But the stipulation discloses. that such car was originally placed at one chute, and then it was discovered that the horses in the car were hot equipped with halters to enable unloading at that point—a condition necessitating their transfer to another chute. There is nothing to show that the first delivery •was made with knowledge of the situation, or that the defendant was in any respect culpable in not appreciating the uselessness of the original delivery. On the contrary, it.must be assumed that the reason for making the change was in fact a good reason, whose recognition was consistent with the proper care of the horses in the defendant’s charge, notwithstanding the obligation speedily to unload them.
It has been said that a failure “knowingly and willfully” to observe the statute means that a carrier, having a free will or choice, either intentionally disregards the statute, or is plainly indifferent to its re-'
Judgment may be entered for the defendant in each case.