United States v. Cheryl Dawn James

Suрreme notably, Most Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. McKeiver v. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 Gault, that, despite not re- held Peterson, (argued), Chaivoe Nick juvenile proceed- quired in state court Portland, Or., Peterson, Chaivoe & that, ings, pointing out appellant. yet however, Court, said “The Atty. Tommy Hawk, Asst. S.U. rights that all assured Hammersley, (argued), Richard Asst. D. crime also are to an adult accused of Portland, appеllee. Atty., U. S. Or. or made available to be enforced CHOY, Before HUFSTEDLER and in his Judges, SCHNACKE, ceedings.” (Opinion Dis of Mr. Justice Judge.* p. 533, Blackmun, trict at U.S. p. emphasis the SCHNACKE, Judge: District Court’s.) McKeiver, course, did not deal following Appellant, proceedings con- expressly with the FJDA. its ducted under the Federal Delin- Juvenile reasoning, particularly its concern that (the quency ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍FJDA), 18 U.S.C. § adjudged 5033, was tо be a possibility, “. . There is a linquent by virtue of two violations of least, jury trial, that the 111, consisting U.S.C. assaults precept, § as a matter upon agents of the juvenile proceeding Federal Bureau of remake Investigation. We affirm. fully adversary into a put and will appellant At time of offense, an effective end to has been what years age was seventeеn eli- prospect intimate, and thus the idealistic of * Sehnacke, sitting by designa- Honorable Robert California, H. United District of States District the Northern tion. protective proceeding.” authority apprehend offenders under

informal 1986.) may summarily 545, 91 S.Ct. federal or state law apprehend a and deliver him deserter fully applicable custody. into 808. To ac- der the FJDA as state court complish they may arrest enter Appeals for Court of premises where have reasonable Eighth held, Circuit has so Cotton to believe the cause deserter States, (1971), F.2d 107 States, found. Michael v. United agree. (10th Cir., 1968). This is cer- The balance of the relates tainly so if there is no force used and surrounding the circumstances the of- entry open door. with which fenses Dickey 332 F.2d 773 charged. summary, brief these are: (9th Cir., 1964). Having appel- been instructed to seek brother, James, military contention is that lant’s also made Charles a deserter, agents defendant four was not aware of official FBI went the occupied by appel- house status of the On sufficient evi Portland victim. family. dence, including proof of lant’s Outside a further as observed a answering description man sault at the time later arrest (and unquestionably proved when she Charles James knew the who later so agents’ be) status, judge entering properly trial house with others. agents event, any contrary. found to entered the house knowledge door, open by young the front of such left status is not an ele man preceded agents who had ment McEwen v. United offense. into the States, agents (9th Cir., house. identified them- selves, and arrested Charles At James. points by Other raised point they by were attacked Charles require insubstantial no discussion. James, family by other members and family dog. agent by One was judgment floored is affirmed. rolling pin by appellant, wielded then by kicked in the face Charles James. HUFSTEDLER, (dis- аgent Another then tried to control senting) : James, Charles and was kicked in the I dissent because I am convinced that by appellant. crotch of the Feder- al Juvenile Delinquency Act are uncon- Appellant urges agents that stitutional. unlawfully entered house, arrest illegal, Charles James was thus At the time of the offense was and, therefore, that defendant’s assault years old, given and she was agents on the was The con offense. choice between trial or adult trial tention is without merit. juvenile as a under the Federal Juvenile Agents of Delinquency the Federal Bureau of (“FJDA”, 18 U.S.C. §§ Investigation may 5031-37). arrests, make However, by the terms of having (18 §C. civil officer U.S.C. 50 §§ provides: 1. 18 § juvenile “In such event shall be juvenile alleged proceeded аgainst by “A to have committed information and no one or more acts in violation of a law criminal shall be instituted for punishable by alleged of the United not violation.” imprisonment, death or life not sur- state, rendered to the provides authorities of shall 2. 18 U.S.C. : proceeded against juvenile be delin- “District of the United Courts quent procedure, jurisdiction if he consents tо such shall have Attorney General, less the delinquents. in his discre- For expressly tion, purposes, directed otherwise. convened at applied have the Sixth Amend- her choice fa would could not exercise she guaranty ment to state consented vor of FJDA unless she ceedings; Justices the Act and tried as a fortiori rep applied jury. Cheryl, Amend- Sixth trial thus waived сounsel, requisite delinquency signed ment to federal resented concurred the re- court Mr. Justice Harlan The district consent and waiver. delinquent solely plurality sult reached be- that she custody that “crim- cause he adhered to view her committed and ordered inal trials are followed. This for 18 months.3 either as a mat- opinion’s majority reliance law due ter of Amendment Sixth Pennsylvania (403 process.” U.S. at 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 agreed 1992.) Mr. Justice Brennan Mc- misplaced for two reasons: particular plurality with the purport Keiver did hold or juvenile proceedings state were outside hint Amendment does guaranty, he the Sixth Amendment but guaranty Amendment, “Sixth observed courts who are tried federal applicable, where commands that these offensеs, protected particular constitutionality does not touch jury.” procedure, is, to induce FJDA’s 1990.)4 U.S. at by jury, sole consti- tutional to decide need If we had to decide whether the Con- here. compels giving stitution the by juveniles of trial to in federal McKeiver held that plurality in A the delinquency proceedings, by either the due clause of the Fourteenth by of command the Amendment or compel Amendment did not the states to III, 3,5 both, juveniles Article section clause or accord trials to in state meticulously more juvenile I would sift delinquency To the McKeiver dicta to extract all of the the opinions the extent juveniles instruction issue that there the bear the to of juvenile proceedings, case this does in federal available. probable opinions contrary turn on the of imply results the result to Su- majority’s preme conclusions. Court decision on issues that have yet Douglas’ been decided. do dissenting opin- not further Mr. Justice (Black, JJ., concurring) analyze Marshall, ion it offers no because place district, uphold time within a federal proceeding ceeding against chambers otherwise. or constitutional attack on jury. process grounds be without a shall consent Sixth Amendment or due quired juvenile were, given proceeding ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍practice, to be shall if the given writing significantly prose- be him before different from an adult of the District Court of United States cution. having alleged violation, opinions recognize juvenile cognizance of thе Both juvenile fully apprise woefully proceedings who shall of have often fallen consequences of such short of the benevolent aims of those who and of juvenile be movements. Such consent shall deemed initiated consent. opinions problems jury.” Both discuss waiver of a flexibility trying protect herent stayed 3. The district court execution of pur- juvenilе proceedings, state pose complete permit her sentence proceedings bringing those closer high term school. aims, trying simul- intended to their juveniles taneously protect from the opinion Mr. Justice Black- 4. Neither systems’ failures. worst (the Justice, Stewart mun Chief provides: part, pertinent White, concurring) specially JJ., clause nor the . shall opinion . concurring Trial all Crimes Mr. “The Justice White Jury.” support be conclusion that those Justices employed are issue that should be no more than are help drastic necessary to achieve the

dispositive of this case. ends, bargain fair to the together FJDA that fendant. by jury are of trial coerce a waiver (1968) who is a member A Jackson these: pro- qualified рotentially of the class pro- Supreme ceedings Act6 “shall be Court struck down under the juvenile delinquent penalty provision death the Federal ceeded (§ Kidnaping procedure” penalty he to such death consents Act. pro- 5032) ; juvenile delinquency authorized recommendation of jury. ceeding jury” (§ a The statute did not “shall authorize 5033) ; penalty the death for a defendant who consent “[t]he given pleaded waived a trial or who by guilty. held that statu- a waiver shall jury.” deemed tory impermissibly 5033).7 (§ burdened Al- defendant’s the federal scheme all Under though legitimate the Government had a juveniles charged who are mitigating punishment, subjected initially crimes unnecessary means used were to achieve pretrial proce- adjudicatory same ends: Government’s juveniles dures as All who adults. provision purpose juveniles “If the had no other quali- outside class of who to chill fy effect than the assertion of and all rights by penalizing who are class members them, to exercise sign choose but who fail consent patently then would be unconstitu- prosecuted waiver are as adults. Juve- But, notes, tional. prosecuted undoubtedly Government niles as adults limiting penalty the death to cases constitutionally guaranteed have a impo- where the jury. recommends its requires The statute objective: sition does another waive that constitu- avoids the more drastic alternative tional to enable him to invoke the mandatory punishment capital in ev- benеfits of FJDA. ery case. . The fact that a defendant crim- forego might inal have to one or “. . . . Whatever rights Congress’ more objectives, they said in order to can of- pursued by po- obtain benefits in not the form of lesser means that need punishment lessly inevitably tential does not chill the of consti basic rights. relinquishment mean that his of those tutional Cf. rights el, 258, 419, is Rob How- [88 invalid. U.S. ever, cоmponents “bargain” 508]; Tucker, of his L.Ed.2d Shelton v. subject judicial scrutiny. 488-489, 247, are close U.S. 5 L. [81 S.Ct. bargain govern- The will fail The unless Ed.2d is not 231]. securing chilling mental interest in the waiver is whether effect ‘inciden is legitimate compelling, intentional; ques- tal’ means rather than statutory statutory 6. The class consists of 7. The scheme also involves grand (§ attained their 18th birth- indictment days, 5032) public (§§ acts in whose violаtion a and a waiver of punishable by law are not death or im- I life do not reach the constitu- prisonment, posed by aspects who have not surrendered to tional issues these state, respect say FJDA, although of a authorities and with much of what Attorney concerning whom the General has not di- the coercive effect of stat- proceedings juvеnile. utory rected other than scheme on the to trial (18 5031, 5032.) equally applicable §§ co- seems to a important of these two consti- erced waiver rights. tutional effectively compelling public interest is unneces- that effect whether tion is inducing negotiated pleas, which sary therefore excessive. Implicit otherwise served. question is not be could to that answer case concept of these cases is in all Congress of course can clear. permeated balancing the cases capital pun- which has mitigate severity of personal adjudicating limiting collisions between goal ishment. rights by the secured Constitution penalty in which a to eases death governmental legiti- competing interests. entirely recommends goal can be But one. mate potential benefits de- penalizing those achieved without proceedings from FJDA guilty plead fendants who and the insubstantial means . . Whatever mand strong pressure on a exerts Congress impose a power by jury. nile to waive the Fed- penalty for violation death successfully pros- Cheryl, examрle, if Kidnaping cannot Act, eral possible adult, im- faced ecuted as impose penalty a manner years prisonment for a maximum of needlessly penalizes the assertion $15,000. fine of She and a maximum right. See Griffin of a constitutional felony conviction had a also have would California, [85 380 U.S. finding of delin- A her record. U.S. 14 L.Ed.2d 106].” however, FJDA, would quency ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍under 581-583, Footnote 88 S.Ct. at 1216. рotential subject her to confinement omitted.) (about years three old til she was 21 sentencing), and years from date bargaining trilogy plea The 1970 not be finding delinquency would (North Alford, Carolina v. criminal conviction. deemed a 162; Parker 91 S.Ct. 27 L.Ed.2d prosecution as an to choose between had Carolina, North 90 S.Ct. U.S. by jury and to trial adult Brady v. the statu- but with involved waivers of consti- juvenilе course promise tory expecta- tutional induced punitive. potentially much less penalties tion of lesser than those to requir- governmental they interests which the defendants knew that thought they be, ing be, waive his constitutional ex- would posed yielded rights. jury in order to receive had special treatment In each instance the benefits of the Court discussеd legitimate public encourag- difficult define. ing plea bargains, to the the need for reference these history legislative meager ducements to achieve the Attorney advantages bargain aims, in a letter from Act, Cummings, sponsor of the public to both the defendant. General case, incorporated the House majority in both In the context of each Reports: Senate Court concluded that waivers knowing, voluntary, intelligent, were delinquents are to “Juvenile and, case, under the facts each prosecuted by information and tried bargain was fair to the defendant at the judge, before a district time it was made. may that jury, hold court who place Jackson, purpose In within any the Court time could discern slight public legit- or otherwise. reaching district, interest in chambers in goal proceeding infringed imate of this kind which Informal means in- many con- dividual in the States been constitutional when al- attaining achieving ternative humane and means for same ducive goal legislation. readily objects Brady, were of such available. beneficient juvenile is, how- hand, perceived the other The consent of the legitimate governmental thing ever, prosecution as to a impairing destroying or the ex- juvenile delinquency in under the act terest right constitutional for the offense. ercise of a instead of substantive depriva- may Congress sincerely that believed held that minors has been right right a defendant’s to a tion of that was for the constitutional waive good. jury, in the same manner as own adults.” assumed, arguendo, Even if Congress constitutionally with- Cong., could (H.R.Rep. 3d No. 75th by jury right Sess., S.Rep. from all draw the of trial June No. offenses, juveniles charged Cong., Sess., 3d with federal June 1938.) will not the waiver device used FJDA challenge. en- survive There no can be doubt that the Gov- attempt acting Congress FJDA, did legitimate, compelling, ernment has a juveniles the adult to withdraw from fostering and even vital adjudicatory procedures pretrial system juvenile justice in which subject.8 Juveniles are now young offenders, profit who from single part of a as well as adults are a punitive methods, less correctional charged persons with federal class of penalties receive that are not as severe crimes, juveniles alike and adults imposed upon as those adults who were guaranteed right to trial guilty of similar offenses. FJDA, jury. only members Under such laudable aims can be achieved with- right to trial the class lose necessity out compelling qualify jury juveniles who are those nile to by jury waive his to trial consents and and who execute FJDA which he would be otherwise entitled jury The burden waivers of trials. prosecution his criminal anas adult sim- to trial ply giving option proceed him the incidental; as it it is direct with the criminal or to sub- was in Jackson. ject juvenile proceedings himself to by a here, fettered command that he There is not as there was waive a jury countervailing trial. plea guilty cases, le gitimate of the state which legislative Frоm the history, ap it chilling juvenile’s justify pears Congress’ inserting intent provisions trial. in FJDA was sole (Nieves unconstitutional.9 ly discourage juveniles from exercis (S.D.N.Y.1969, 3-judge v. United States ing their by jury. When People court) F.Supp. 994; C. aim of a statuto 27 N.Y.2d N.Y.S.2d provision ry discour-, is the defeat or the 261 N.E.2d cf. agement of the exercise of a constitu Jackson, supra, tionally guaranteed right, provision 138.) “patently (United unconstitutional.” Jackson, States v. Eighth I am aware that the Circuit in 1209.) There Cotton v. 8. If creating thereby imply enacted statutes I do not that all federal separate system juvenile justice must be tried practice nonjury system neither text nor in sub- or that no from the free stantially compelled similar to the adult criminal taint with- system if, part of that stand constitutional attаck. system, provided ju there shall not be Where trials have been afforded by jury, veniles, empirical the draftsmen the limited evidence good could find per overwhelming deal of reassurance from available shows that the opinions legis- centage (See their waive plan lative Pennsylvania, would survive constitutional at- v. ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍403 U.S. However, 561-562, (opinion tack. did not сome n. 91 S.Ct. 1976 drafting close to Douglas).) scheme in FJDA. Mr. Justice

1235 contrary. rests Cotton tois conclusory grounds, stated both two terms: the constitutional controls gives

issue, section 5033 intelligently which Cotton nile a choice analysis My of McKeiver exercised. ground ‍‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​‌‌‌​‌​​​‌‌​‌​​​‌‌‌‌​​‌‌‌‌​​​​​​​‌​‌‌‌‌‍is erroneous. first veals that ground the es- not meet does The second issue, con- which is sential

trolled Jackson.10 adjudicating the order

I would reverse

Cheryl delinquent the case and remand

for further consistent еxpressed. have herein views I America,

UNITED STATES Appellee, BLY, Appellant.

Lacount Aaron

No. 72-1008. Appeals,

United States Court of Eighth Circuit. 16,

Submitted June 1972. 2, Aug.

Decided 1972. 10. merely point theory possible ambiguity out one she was thered lier majority opinion. younger coming that un brother is true to the aid of (9th she der McEwen v. United and whom States Cir. had a heart murmur 1968) 47, choking. (United thought agent 390 F.2d cert. denied an 392 U.S. 2319, (3d 1971) F. 88 S.Ct 20 L.Ed.2d 1400 knowl v. Goodwin Cir. States identity edge 1152, 1156; v. Grimes of the official of the victim United 2d States 1379; (7th 1969) F.2d is not an essеntial element offense Cir. 1967) (2d Heliczer Cir. under 18 U.S.C. tiie stat United States denied, 241, 249, 388 U.S. ute does not eliminate mens rea F.2d cert. 1359; knowledge may (United be material. 87 S.Ct. (E.D.Wis.1969) (9th 1969) United v. Forrest States v. Kartmnn Cir. States 1013; 893, 894-895.) F.Supp. 1011, Morissette v. cf. The use of reason prevent injury able force to another 288; reasonably appears unpro 273, 276, 96 L.Ed. from what (1893) 148 violation v. United States voked attack is not a of Sec Pettibone 204-210, 111, and, L.Ed. es tion had been able to Rybicki (6th Cir. tablish she was unaware 601-602.) agents’ status, have fur- official

Case Details

Case Name: United States v. Cheryl Dawn James

Court Name: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

Date Published: Jul 26, 1972

Citation: 464 F.2d 1228

Docket Number: 71-1919

Court Abbreviation: 9th Cir.