UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Charles Earl WATSON, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 11-2338.
United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.
April 13, 2012.
III.
For these reasons, we affirm.
OPINION
DONALD, Circuit Judge.
Dеfendant-Appellant Charles Earl Watson appeals the district court‘s order denying his motion to reopen his detention hearing pursuant to
I. BACKGROUND
Charles Earl Watson was arrested on April 20, 2010, and charged with (1) possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of
After his arrest, Watson made statements to the police claiming possession of drugs and a bloodied gun seized from the home in which he was staying and indicated that the gun was used in a potential homicide in Detroit several days prior. Following a hearing on August 10, 2010, a magistrate judge ordered that Watson be released on bond. The Government appealed the bail determination to the presiding district court judge. On August 12, 2010, the district court ordered that Watson be detained pending trial due to the severity of the charges against him, his criminal history, his possible involvement in a potentially fatal shooting of a third party, and the danger he posed to the community.
On December 16, 2010, the district court1 suppressed the items found on Watson‘s person after his arrest, and on January 7, 2011, it supрressed Watson‘s post-arrest statements. The district court did not suppress the gun and drugs seized from the home. In light of the suppressed evidence, Watson filed his first motion to reopen the detention hearing on January 28, 2011. The district court denied the motion. On March 14, 2011, the Government filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the suppression of Watson‘s post-arrest statements. On May 27, 2011, Watson filed his second motion to reopen the detention hearing, but it was also denied. This appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
Under fedеral law, “a detention hearing may be reopened” if certain conditions are met.
B. Motion to Reopen Detention Hearing
A detention hearing may be reopened if 1) new information exists that was unknown to the movant at the time of the hearing; and 2) the new information has a material bearing on the issue of whether there are conditions of release that will reasonably assure a defendant‘s appearance at trial and the safety of any other person in the community.
Watson asserts that the first prong of
Next, Watson arguеs that the district court‘s suppression of evidence and statements is new information that serves as a basis to reopen the detention hearing. Watson cites to United States v. Peralta, 849 F.2d 625 (D.C. Cir. 1988), and United States v. Shareef, 907 F.Supp. 1481 (D. Kan. 1995), for the proposition that suppression of evidence provides a basis to rеopen the bond determination. In Peralta, the district court reopened the detention hearing after ruling against the defendant on his motion to suppress drugs and cash found on his person. 849 F.2d at 625. The court reasoned that the adverse ruling may make Peralta more inclined to flee and that repeated cocaine possession or sale had a material bearing on the safety of another person or the community as a whole. Id. Watson argues that the inverse of Peralta applies: the district court‘s grant of his motions to suppress makes him less likely to flee and diminishes the evidence against him. The district court found that while the suppressed evidence works in Watson‘s favor, suppression of evidence is not a basis to reopen a detention hearing. The district court did not abuse its discretion in mаking such a finding.
Shareef is distinguishable by virtue of the fact that all of the evidence in the case against that defendant was suppressed. 907 F.Supp. at 1483. Only Watson‘s post-arrest statements and the items found on his person were suppressed. The evidence seized from the home Watson was staying in was not suppressed. Thus, there was still admissible evidence on which the dis
Moreover, Watson cites Shareef as providing a “basis to reopen.” While a basis to reopen arguably exists, attention must again be turned to the use of the word “may.” See id. (“suppression of all the evidence in the case is information that may form the basis upon which a detention hearing may be reopened“) (citing Peralta, 849 F.2d at 625) (emphasis added). As previously mentioned, use of the word “may” indicates discretion on the part of the district court. Thus, there is no requirement to reopen a detention hearing on the basis of suppressed evidence.
Watson‘s insistence that the district court should have looked to factors in addition to
Given the foregoing, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Watson‘s motion to reopen his detention hearing.
C. Due Process
We next considеr whether Watson‘s continued pretrial detention violates the Due Process Clause. Pretrial detention violates the Fifth Amendment when it amounts to “punishment of the detainee.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). “Liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited excеption,” United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987). “A government‘s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an individual‘s liberty interest.” Id. at 748, 107 S.Ct. 2095. Whether a pretrial detention is unconstitutionally excessive is determined on a case-by-case basis. United States v. Orena, 986 F.2d 628, 630 (2d Cir. 1993). The district cоurt‘s factual determinations are reviewed for clear error, while the ultimate determination of whether due process has been violated is reviewed de novo. United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2000).
While this Court has not specifically addressed this issue, we find the Second Circuit‘s case law on thе subject to be particularly instructive. The Second Circuit has identified four factors to be considered in determining if the pretrial detention is unconstitutionally excessive: (1) the length of the detention; (2) the extent of the prosecution‘s responsibility for the delay of the trial; (3) the gravity of the charges; and (4) the strength of the evidence upon which the detention was based. See id.
The length of pretrial detention is not dispositive, and will, by itself, rarely offend due process. Id. at 79 (quoting United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1044 (2d Cir. 1993)). Watson has been detained awaiting trial since his аrrest on April 20, 2010. Courts have found lesser periods of detention to be a violation of due process, United States v. Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d 984, 1004 (2d Cir. 1986) (finding detention for eight months without bail on the grounds of dangerousness violated due process), but they have also found lengthier periods that were not in violation of the Fifth Amendment. El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 79-81 (finding that a detention period of 30-33 months did not violate due process where the prosecution bore little responsibility for the delay, trial preparation was
In addressing the second factor, the prosecution‘s responsibility for delay, we recognize that the Government‘s appeal of the district court‘s order granting of the motion to suppress Watson‘s post-arrest statements accounted for seven months of Watson‘s continued detention. Pursuant to
Concerning the gravity of the charges, Watson argues that Count I carries a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment and that Count II carries a maximum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. However, Watson has a prior conviction for intent to distribute marijuana and was serving a
While it is still to be determined which statutory guidelines will be used when Watsоn is sentenced,2 it is important to note that the district court mistakenly stated the sentencing mandatory minimums for some of the counts with which Watson was charged.3 But despite the district court‘s mistake regarding the sentencing range, the charges against Watson are still very grave and potentially carry considerable sentences. Moreover,
Lastly, we must consider the strength of the evidence. As previously mentioned, the district court‘s suppression of evidence and statements weighs in Watson‘s favor; however, the issue of dangerousness still exists based on Watson‘s potential connection to the ongoing homicide investigation.
Balancing all of the applicable factors, we conclude that Watson‘s pretrial detention is not unconstitutionally excessive and does not violate his due process rights.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court‘s order denying the defendant‘s motion to reopen his detention hearing and its finding that his prolonged pretrial detention is not excessive in violation of the Fifth Amendment is AFFIRMED.