United States v. Chapple

Aug 5, 2026
4:26-cr-00208

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. ECF No. 17. Having considered the Motion, relevant docket filings, and applicable law, the Court will DENY the Motion.

BACKGROUND

Defendant Antonio Chapple, who previously had been convicted of a felony punishable by imprisonment lasting over one year, was found by a grand jury in July 2026 to have knowingly possessed a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(8). Section 922(g)(1) provides, in pertinent part:

(g) It shall be unlawful for any person—(1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).

On July 27, 2026, Chapple filed a Motion to Dismiss the Indictment arguing that Section 922(g)(1) exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause. The Court now addresses that argument.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to “raise by pretrial motion any defense, objection, or request that the court can determine without a trial on the merits.” FED. R. CR. P. 12(b)(1). In deciding the motion, the Court should “take the allegations of the indictment as true.” United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. Hogue, 132 F.3d 1087, 1089 (5th Cir. 1998)).

ANALYSIS

In support of his Motion, Chapple asserts that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional under Congress’s commerce power.

Chapple argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits the possession of firearms by convicted felons, exceeds the scope of Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce.

The Fifth Circuit and other circuit courts have consistently upheld § 922(g)(1)’s constitutionality as a proper exercise of Congress’s commerce power. See United States v. Alcantar, 733 F.3d 143 (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Daugherty, 264 F.3d 513, 518 (5th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases holding that § 922(g)(1) is a valid exercise of the commerce power); United States v. Gateward, 84 F.3d 670, 672 (3d Cir. 1996) (“We therefore join eight courts of appeal upholding the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) as a valid exercise of the commerce power.“). The Court cannot look to the Fifth Circuit’s granting of a rehearing en banc as authoritative.

Chapple cites no binding authority that holds to the contrary. He even concedes that Fifth Circuit precedent squarely opposes his assertion. Thus, Defendant’s argument that § 922(g)(1) exceeds the scope of Congress’s commerce power fails.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby DENIES Chapple’s Motion to Dismiss the Indictment. ECF No. 17.

SO ORDERED on this 5th day of August 2026.

Mark T. Pittman

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE