11 F. 449 | D. Cal. | 1882
This is a bill in equity to vacate and annul five several patents issued by the United States to the defendant, under the act of congress granting land to aid in the construction of the Central Pacific Bailroad, for something over 14,000 acres of land in the aggregate, on the ground that the patents were issued by mistake for lands not embraced in the grant by congress.
The patents respectively bear date April 9, 1870, April 3, 1872, February 28, 1874, November 23, 1875, and June 6, 1879. The lands are all odd sections, and lie within the limits of the grant designated in the act of congress. On September 22, 1852, Andreas Pico presented to the boa,.rd of land commissioners for settling titles to
In 1852 and 1853, the township lines were run by the United States surveyor general, laying off all these lands within the boundaries of the Moquelamos grant, as claimed, into townships. In 1855 the section lines were run, and plats of the surveys filed in the proper land-office, for all lands lying east of said range line, between ranges 7 and 8. From the time of the survey and filing of the plats, these lands, east of said range line, were treated as all other surveyed public lands by the United States land-office, and all government offices having anything to do with them; and pre-emption claims, and, after the passage of the homestead laws, homesteads, were recognized, proved up, allowed, and patented. In February,— on the fifteenth and sixteenth of February, 1859, — upon public proclamation made by the president of the United States, these lands were offered at public sale at the land-office at Stockton, and some sold and patented; and, after such public sale, the lands wore open for private entry, to any parties desiring to purchase in the same manner as all other surveyed public lands are open to entry, after having been offered at public sale in pursuance of proclamation by the president, and many of them were so entered. In September, 1864, Messrs. Stanley & Hayes, attorneys for the claimant in the case pending in the United States courts, for confirmation of the Moquelamos grant, addressed a communication, bearing date September 22, 1864, to the surveyor general of the United States for the state of California, notifying him that the case was pending on appeal to the United States supreme court; that the land claimed lay on the Moquelamos river, and “includes and covers the land embraced in township (2) two north, ranges five, six, and seven east, Mount Diablo meridian; also township (3) three north, ranges five, six, and seven east, Mount Diablo meridian; also township (4) four north, range 6 east, Mount Diablo meridian; part of township south of Moquelumne river; also township (4) four north, range seven east, Mount Diablo meridian; part of township south of Moquelumne river; also township (4) four north, range five east, Mount Diablo meridian; part of township south of Moquelumne river.”
They further notified the surveyor general that the lands thus described were “not subject to entry or pre-emption,” and requested him to suspend all proceedings in regard to pre-emption of “said lands, or any part thereof, until the final determination of the claim”
The answer alleges, and the uncontradicted testimony also establishes the fact, that all the lands included in the patents in question were conveyed by the Central Pacific Bailroad Company to bona, fide purchasers before the filing of this bill. And it also appears that a
In 1876 the supreme court decided the case of Newhall v. Sanger, 92 U. S. 761, in which it was held that the odd sections within the exterior boundaries of the alleged Mexican grant called Moquelamos, the claim for confirmation of which had not been finally determined at the time of the withdrawal of the lands by the secretary of the interior in January, 1865, for the Central Pacific Railroad Company, were not “public lands” within the meaning of the act of congress granting lands to that corporation, and were, therefore, not included in that grant, — a majority of the justices taking a different view of that question from that taken, and still confidently entertained, by me, and reversing the judgment of this court on that ground. That decision settles the law upon that point, so far as this court is concerned, and is controlling in all cases to which it is fairly applicable, and it is probably applicable to all those lands embraced in the patents now in question lying west of the range line between ranges 7 and 8. I think, however, that it ought not to be held applicable to those lands situated to the east of said range line. The description of the Moquelamos grant is not very definite as to its eastern boundary. There is no diseno to make it definite. The quantity is limited to 11 square leagues, and its southern boundary is the land of Mr. Gulnac; and the .eastern exterior boundary, as claimed by complainant, would carry it some nine or ten miles east of the eastern boundary of Gulnac’s claim, while there is nearly twice as much land west of the range line between ranges 7 and 8, which has, in fact, Gulnac’s land for a southern boundary, as is necessary to satisfy the grant. Besides, the government of the United States surveyed the lands east of said range line as public lands, and in all its departments treated them in all respects like other surveyed public lands, opening them to pre-emption, offering them for public sale upon proclamation by the president, and afterwards to private entry and for homesteads, and actually patented all, or nearly all, which had gone into second and still other hands before this bill was filed, and reserved an ample amount within the undisputed exterior boundaries for the satisfaction of the grant.
In this case there was a claim for the unconfirmed Moquelamos grant pending before the board of land commissioners, which, “in the gradual extension of the lines of the public surveys,” the surveyor general seems to have found “within the immediate sphere of his operations, and zvhich he was satisfied ought to be respected and actually surveyed in advance of confirmation.” He accordingly surveyed it, leaving an ample quantity of by far the best and most valuable portions of the land west of the range line mentioned to more than satisfy the grant, sectionizing and platting the surplus — being that part situate to the east of said range line — as “public lands,” subject to be treated as other public lands, and returning the surveys and plats to the proper land-office. This proceeding seems to have been authorized by the provision of the statute cited, and to have emancipated that portion of the land lying to the east of the range line, between ranges 7 and 8, from any further claim under the Moquelamos grant. If that be the effect, then, there can be no question that these lands, at least, were subject to, and embraced in, the congressional grant to the Central Pacific Eailroad Company.
The claimant of the grant himself, also, as we have seen, by his counsel, limited his claim to the lands so reserved for the purpose lying west of the said range line, so that all parties in interest acquiesced in limiting the eastern exterior boundary of the land out of which the grant was to be satisfied to the said range line. Certainly, if the doctrine of estoppel applies to any case as against the United States, it ought to be made applicable here, where all parties, including the claimant himself, for so many years acquiesced in accepting said range line as the eastern exterior boundary of the land within which the grant was to be located. Besides, as before suggested, there is no sufficient legal evidence, as against the defendant, that the eastern exterior boundary is, in fact, east of that line. But
Upon the facts disclosed in this ease, it seems hardly consistent with good faith on the part of the United States, and scarcely worthy a great nation, at this late date, and after these lands have passed into the hands of numerous citizens as purchasers, to seek to vacate the patents upon which their titles rest. To many of these lands, especially to the west of the range line mentioned, a second patent has already been issued by the United States, and some of the occupants, it is generally understood, as a means of security from further annoyance, have acquired the title under both patents.
The reservation of the lands by which they were taken out of the railroad grant is not made in express terms by the statute itself, but it is worked out by construction from implications as to the policy of the government, drawn from other statutes relating to other objects, containing express reservations as to those particular objects, which to my mind are not very apparent, and are wholly unsatisfactory; and which did not command the assent of all the justices of the supreme court who sat in the case. Down to the decision in Newhall v. Sanger, the United States courts for the district of California, and the supreme court of the state, — and they may be reasonably supposed to have been somewhat familiar with the condition of these matters, — held the lands in question to be within the congressional grant. Sanger v. Sargent, U. S. C. C. in pamphlet, decided in September, 1874, and other cases in that court; C. P. R. Co. v. Yolland, 49 Cal. 439, and other cases. So, also, some of the justices of the United States supreme court itself, including the justice from this circuit, took the same view; and the executive department of the national government had early adopted and for many years prior thereto acted upon that hypothesis. Even under the decisions of the supreme court, had the withdrawal for the railroad occurred two weeks later, the congressional grant, under the law as it is, would have taken effect upon these lands. Ryan v. C. P. R. Co. 5 Sawy. 261, affirmed; 99 U. S. 382. Yet the only difference in the condition of the lands and the laws, as they were on the twelfth and four
These observations are not made by way of criticism upon, or to question the propriety of, the decision of the supreme court, to which I yield implicit obedience, but to point the suggestions made respecting the consideration due from the government to the parties holding titles under the patents now in question.
Accepting the decision of the supreme court as correct, still considering these facts, and the action of the government itself upon the opposite construction for a long term of years, — more than 20 years, — the people who purchased are excusable if they supposed these patents carried a good title. They ought, certainly, to be entitled to some consideration at the hands of the government. And even as to the lands west of the said range, line, the government, as well as the courts, state and national, from the date of the rejection of the Moquelamos grant till the case of Newhall v. Sanger, — a period of 10 years, — took the view and acted upon it, that the odd sections were embraced in the railroad grant; otherwise, there would have been no occasion for this, or other suits, to vacate the patents issued in pursuance of that view.
But however the case may be on the merits, under the decision of Newhall v. Sanger, as to the lands lying east of the range line, between ranges 7 and 8, there is anqther point upon which the present bill must be dismissed, as to all the lands and patents in question. The Central Pacific Bailroad Company is the only defendant, and before
The bill must be dismissed on this ground, if on no other, and it is so ordered.