UNITED STATES OF AMERICA v. PABLO CASELLAS-TORO
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 13-cr-201
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO
June 4, 2014
JOSEPH R. GOODWIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 3:13-cr-00201-JRG Document 144 Filed 06/04/14
Pеnding before the court is the defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration of Court’s Ruling Denying Judgment of Acquittal as a Matter of Law Under
I. Background
On April 20, 2013, a grand jury indicted the defendant, Pablo Casellas-Toro, with three counts of making false statements to a Special Deputy United States Marshal in violation of
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts. (See Verdiсt Form [Docket 132]). On May 12, 2014, I granted the defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal on Count One. I found that the government had not presented evidence that the defendant had uttered the particular false statement charged in Count One—that the defendant said “he went to a shooting rаnge for target practice.” (Indictment [Docket 3], at 3). The defendant filed the instant motion on May 28, contending that the government similarly failed to present evidence that the defendant uttered the false statement charged in Count Two—that the defendant said “a person caused him to bring his motor vehicle to a stop.” (Id. at 4). The defendant asks that I reconsider my decision denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two because, without evidence that the defendant made the statement charged in Count Two, my decision was manifestly erroneous and clearly unjust.
II. Legal Standards
A. Motions for Judgment of Acquittal under Rule 29
Under
The burden is on the government to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). “Reasonable doubt exists when, after weighing and considering all the evidencе, using reason and common sense, jurors cannot say that they have a settled conviction of the truth of the charge.” United States v. Cleveland, 106 F.3d 1056, 1061 (1st Cir. 1997) (affirming jury instructions on “reasonable doubt” standard). Although this is a heavy burden, “it does not mean that a defendant’s guilt must be proved beyond all possible doubt. It does require that the evidence exclude any reasonable doubt concerning a defendant’s guilt.” Id.
B. Motions for Reconsideration
“[M]otions for reconsideration are appropriate only in a limited number of circumstances: if the moving party presents newly discovered evidence, if there has been аn intervening change in the law, or if the movant can demonstrate that the original decision was based on a manifest error of law or was clearly unjust.” United States v. Allen, 573 F.3d 42, 53 (1st Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Cintron, 724 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 2013) (same). “Motions for reconsideration are not to be used as ‘a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedurаl failures [or] allow a party to
III. Discussion
Before discussing the merits of the defendant’s motion, I will address its timeliness. The defendant’s initial motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two, filed at the close of the government’s case, was timely and proper. I denied that motion. The defendant has not renewed this motion, and the 14-day window for renewing such motions has expired. See
The defendant now asks the court to “reconsider” the denial of his Rule 29 motion. Despite the styling of the defendant’s motion, it can be construed either as a motion to reconsider or as a renewed Rule 29 motion. Under either interpretation, the motion is timely and may be considered on its merits.
I first consider the timeliness of the defendant’s motion if construed as a renewed Rulе 29 motion. At one time, Rule 29 motions were absolutely barred if brought outside of the timeframe established under Rule 29(c). See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 421 (1996) (“There is simply no room in the text of Rules 29 and 45(b) for the granting of an untimely postverdict motion for judgment of acquittal[.]“); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 396 (6th Cir. 2001) (“For a district court to have jurisdiction over a motion mаde under Rule 29 or Rule 33, the movant must comply with the seven-day period of the Rules.“); United States v. Gaydos, 108 F.3d 505, 512 (3d Cir. 1997). At least one federal appellate court following Carlisle held that the absolute bar on untimely Rule 29 motions also applied where a defendant moved to reconsider the court’s denial of a timely Rule 29 motion. See United States v. Gupta, 363 F.3d 1169, 1176 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[M]otions to reconsider or renew Rule 29 or 33 motions are not permissible if they are filed outside the seven-day post-verdict period[.]“).
However, Carlisle and its progeny were decided under a previous version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that expressly prohibited extensions of time for filing Rule 29 motions. At that time, Rule 45, which governs extensions of time limits, stated “the court may not extend the time for taking any action under Rules 29, 33, 34 and 35, except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.” Today, Rule 45 does not preclude courts from extending time to file Rule 29 motions. The current version of the rule stаtes that “[t]he court may not extend the time to take any action under Rule 35, except as stated in that rule.”
Under Rule 45, the court may sua sponte extend the time for renewing Rule 29 motions if it finds “excusable neglect.”
Alternatively, I can consider the defendant’s motion as it is styled: a motion to reconsider. Sevеral courts have suggested that reconsideration of a timely Rule 29 motion is appropriate where the motion meets the standards for reconsideration, such as “manifest error” or “clear injustice,” and does not make entirely new arguments. See, e.g., United States v. Cartagena, No. 10 CR 222-2, 2012 WL 2958175, at *3-4 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2012) (considering and denying motion to reconsider Rule 29 and 33 motions where defendant failed to show that the court overlooked controlling law or factual matters that were before it on underlying motions); United States v. Iacaboni, 667 F. Supp. 2d 215, 217 (D. Mass. 2009) (denying motion to reconsider Rule 29 motion where defendant made entirely new arguments and did not attеmpt to meet the standard for reconsideration in the First Circuit); United States v. Patterson, No. 04 CR 705-1, 2007 WL 1438658, at *12 (N.D. Ill. May 15, 2007) (“The court lacks the authority to entertain any argument in [motion to reconsider Rule 29 and 33 motions] that was not included in Defendant’s prior timely post-trial filings.“), aff’d, 397 F. App’x 209 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, the defendant argues that the government failеd to present any evidence that the defendant uttered the statement charged in Count Two. The defendant contends that my earlier denial of his timely Rule 29 motion—which was based on this same argument—was “manifest error” and “clearly unjust.” The instant motion thus clearly falls within the appropriate parameters of a motion to reconsider in the First Circuit.
Having determined that the defendant’s motion, however construed, may be considered, I move to its merits. To establish a violation of
In Count Two, the defendant is charged with falsely stating that “a person caused him to bring his motor vehicle to a stop.” (Indictment [Docket 3], at 4). To establish that the defendant made this statement, the government elicited the testimony of Rafael Diaz-Berrios, a Puerto Rican Police Officer and Task Force Agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigations. Diaz was deputized аs a Special Deputy United States Marshal and is the marshal identified in the indictment.
Diaz met with the defendant at the defendant’s home when the alleged false statements were made. (See Trial Tr. 4/29/2014 [Docket 138], at 8-10). On direct examination by the government, Diaz never testified that the defendant told him that a person caused him to stop his vehicle.
Mr. Gilfarb: All right. So then what happened? So he says, I got to the shooting range at 9:30. What else does he tell you?
Mr. Diaz: Upon arriving then at the shooting range gate, he heard some shots. He looked through the rearview mirror. He seеs the window broken, and sees two individuals that are following his van.
And immediately another third individual appears towards his left side, the driver’s side window, and tells him to move over to the passenger seat. He gives him his watch and his wallet. And the individual let[]s go of a shot, which impacted his left [sic] arm. Okay. Thе biceps on – his right arm. Corrected by the interpreter.
He attempts to open – he attempts to open the right-hand side door. It doesn’t open. So then he exits through the window, the glass of which was already broken. And then he gets out of the vehicle, and then goes into the shrubbery.
(Trial Tr. 4/29/2014 [Docket 138], at 14:12-15:3)
Thе government then again attempted to elicit the requisite testimony from Diaz.
Mr. Gilfarb: All right. And did he -- the person that pointed the gun at Pablo Casellas from the driver’s side, what did he say that person did? What did he say that person did? Yes.
Mr. Diaz: He took out a firearm, and told him to move over to the seat next to him, to the passenger seat.
Mr. Gilfarb: So when he got into the passenger seat -- strike that. Let me ask it a different way. You mentioned that he said that once in the passenger seat, he was shot, and then jumped out of the broken passenger window; is that correct?
Mr. Diaz: That’s correct.
Mr. Gilfаrb: Okay. Did he at any time ever say that he had gone back inside the car after he jumped out of the window?
Mr. Diaz: No.
(Id. at 20:5-18).
It is clear that Diaz failed to testify that the defendant told him that a person caused him to bring his vehicle to a stop. Accordingly, the government wholly failed to prove this fact. Even so, the government believes that this fact can be fairly inferred from the record. The government contends that the defendant’s car obviously was stopped when an individual approached the vehicle with a gun and forced the defendant to move to the рassenger’s seat. (See Gov’t’s Resp. to Def.’s Mot. for Recons. Re: Denial of Rule 29 on Count II of the Indictment [Docket 141], at 2). Whether or not the car was stopped during the alleged carjacking, and whether or not that fact can be inferred from the record, the government had tо prove that the defendant told Diaz that a person caused him to stop his car. The first element of a violation of
The government could have chosen to charge any number of false statements. In fact, the government focused much of its evidence on proving that the defendant had falsely reported certain firearms stolen. But the government did not charge statements related to stolen firearms. Instead, the govеrnment charged the defendant with falsely stating that “a person caused him to bring his motor vehicle to a stop.” (Indictment [Docket 3], at 4). Therefore, the government had the burden to prove that this particular statement was made. The government failed to do that. In light of the govеrnment’s failure to elicit any evidence establishing that the defendant uttered the statement in Count Two, I FIND that my prior denial of the defendant’s Rule 29 motion was manifestly erroneous and clearly unjust. I therefore GRANT the motion to reconsider and GRANT the defendant’s Rule 29 motion on Count Two.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, I now GRANT the motion to reconsider [Docket 140] and GRANT the defendant’s oral Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal on Count Two.
The court DIRECTS the Clerk to send a copy of this Order to the defendant and counsel, the United States Attorney, the United States Probation Office, and the United States Marshal.
ENTER: June 4, 2014
JOSEPH R. GOODWIN
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE