UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Carl O‘Neil HAMRICK, Appellant, and First National Bank; G. Wayne LeMaster, Executor of the Estate of Maggie C. Swofford; Agrico Chemical, Defendants.
Nos. 82-2050, 83-1013
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Argued June 9, 1983. Decided Aug. 2, 1983.
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Appellee concedes that the disclosure form in question contains these variations from the requirements оf Regulation Z. However, it contends that Huff was not misled and was given a meaningful and correct disclosure of crucial credit terms as required by the Act and Regulation Z. Furthermore, appellee argues that the amendments to the Act and the revisions to Regulation Z reflect the view that creditors should not be exposed to liability due to technical violations under the original Regulation Z when there is no damage or harm to the consumer.
At trial, fоllowing the denial of both parties’ motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the violations in the disclosure form were technical in nature and that Huff suffеred no damage or actual injury due to this. Based on the district court‘s conclusion that the disclosures made by the appellee were more than sufficient, judgment was entered for appellee against Huff. From these orders of the district court, Huff appeals.
II.
This case raises the exact issue found in Mars v. Spartanburg Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. аnd First National Bank of South Carolina, 713 F.2d 65 (4th Cir. 1983), decided this same date. For the reasons set forth in that opinion, we reverse the district court decision in the instаnt case.
As Huff was charged $138.17 in finance charges, he is entitled to receive $276.34 in statutory damages.4 Further, the case is remanded to the district court fоr a determination of costs together with a reasonable attorney‘s fee to which Huff is entitled.5
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
section, using the term “unpaid balance of cash price.”
(4) All other charges, individually itemized, which are included in thе amount financed but which are not part of the finance charge.
(5) The sum of the amounts determined under paragraphs (c)(3) and (4) of this section, using thе term “unpaid balance.”
(6) Any amounts required to be deducted under paragraph (e) of this section using, as applicable, the terms “prepaid finance charge” and “required deposit balance,” and, if both are applicable, the total of such items using the term “total prepaid finance charge and required deposit balance.”
(7) The difference between the amounts determined under paragraphs (c)(5) and (6) of this sеction, using the term “amount financed.”
James D. McCoy, III, Asst. U.S. Atty., Greenville, S.C. (Henry Dargan McMaster, U.S. Atty., Columbia, S.C., on brief), for appellee.
Before WIDENER and MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.
PER CURIAM:
Here we may well have only a case in which due adherence to appropriate procedure has a temрorary victory over substance. Carl O‘Neil Hamrick, a farmer under a Government program designed to assist those of his calling, borrowed substantial sums of mоney ($171,000.00 and $25,810.00) on two mortgages. The mortgagee in each case was the Farmers Home Administration. The Farmers Home Administration on March 29, 1982 began proceedings to foreclose following failure by Hamrick to abide by his undertaking to apply proceeds from crop sales to the obligations under the mortgage notes and his resulting conviction under
Pursuant to
The district judge affirmed the decision of the magistrate to whom the matter had been referred.2 The judge and magistrate each refused any relief to Hamrick on the grounds that (a) Hamrick had never met his responsibility to apply for moratorium relief and (b) his claim was not meritorious, which we take to mean that the prospects of relief were so remote that they might be disregarded. We gather that the court assessed Hamrick‘s likelihood of success in the light of violation of his undertakings when he sold crops without applying the proceeds to obligations under the mortgages.
It may well be that the district judgе will prove correct in his assessment of Hamrick‘s chances if and when Hamrick applies for moratorium relief. Nevertheless, the
Accordingly, we vacatе and remand, directing the district court to set a reasonable time in which Hamrick may seek a moratorium, the outcome, should he timely apply, to abide the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and any proceedings which may eventuate therefrom.
VACATED AND REMANDED.
WIDENER, Circuit Judge, concurring:
While I concur in the result, I do not сoncur in the per curiam opinion except footnote 3 thereof, in which I do concur.
Were it not for the new regulations mentioned in note 3, I would deny all relief, for Hamrick had sold about $40,000 worth of crops out from under mortgages in favor of the government without consent and without applying the proceeds to his loans. I thus think the foreclosure is postponed only by the new regulations and otherwise he would not be entitled to any relief.
I think it is а mistake for the per curiam opinion to declare the policy of the government, for matters of policy are properly detеrmined first by the legislature and only in the absence of any such determination by the courts. Twin City Company v. Harding Glass Company, 283 U.S. 353, 51 S.Ct. 476, 75 L.Ed. 1112 (1931). Until the new regulations were promulgated by the Secretary pursuаnt to Congressional authority, I do not think the plaintiff was in the class of debtors Congress intended to permit to make application for relief.