. Cameron. Stevens appeals the district court’s 1 denial of his motion to suppress, *986 as well as his conviction for possession of crack cocaine with intent to deliver and possession of a firearm. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
We recite the facts in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict.
United States v. Selwyn,
Stevens was charged with possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Officer Radke, the police officer in charge of the investigation and the affiant on the search warrant, testified. Radke stated that a confidential informant (Cl), who had given reliable information over 100 times in the months leading up to the search, told Radke that he had personally observed both drugs and guns in Boyd’s residence in the past seventy-two hours. Radke testified that when he got this information, he immediately began to prepare the search warrant.
Radke testified that he had been doing surveillance on Boyd’s house and had observed a “moderate” amount of foot traffic. Radke asked for a “no-knock nighttime” search because the Cl had told him there were guns in the residence-including a sawed-off shotgun, and Radke had noticed during surveillance that drug trafficking at Boyd’s house took place during the late night hours.
At the time of the hearing, Radke had been a peace officer for seven years, and had been working narcotics for about seven months. He had executed “dozens” of search warrants during that time, and about half of those were “high risk”-involving some risk of danger due to weapons, the amount of drugs present, or the violent propensities of an occupant of a searched home.
The affidavit attached to the search warrant explained Officer Radke’s experience, and stated that the Cl had contacted him with the pertinent information about the drugs and guns; that the Cl had given reliable information in numerous other cases; and finally, that the Cl reported a sawed-off shot gun was in a common area of the residence. Further the affidavit related that Officer Radke had conducted the aforementioned surveillance on Boyd’s residence and noted activity consistent with drug trafficking.
Before trial, Stevens sought to suppress evidence found during the search, arguing that the search warrant was not supported by probable cause, and that a no-knock entry was unjustified. The magistrate judge denied the motion to suppress, finding that the affidavit established probable cause under the totality of the circumstances, because: the affidavit created an inference that the Cl reported that within the previous seventy-two hours he had observed a large quantity of drugs and a sawed-off shotgun at the residence; the affidavit’s attestation of the Cl’s reliability; and the officer’s corroboration of the Cl report with surveillance. The magistrate judge further found that the no-knock entry was justified based on the credible report of the sawed-off shotgun located in *987 a common area of the residence, despite the absence of an explicit statement in the affidavit concerning officer safety. The magistrate judge found that such concerns were implicit in the mere assertion that there was a sawed-off shotgun easily accessed in the place to be searched.
At trial, the evidence showed that on February 9, 2004, officers observed Stevens and the other man enter the apartment. Shortly thereafter, two other men arrived separately. Officers for the Emergency Response Unit (ERU) 2 approached Boyd’s residence at around 6:30 p.m. One of the officers saw an occupant look toward him out of the window and then quickly back away from the window. The officers then threw a “flash bang” device through the window, and a few minutes later, officers broke down the door and secured the apartment. Upon entering, the officers immediately noticed a sawed-off shotgun located close to the door, which they later discovered was loaded. The ERU officers secured the four occupants in the residence by handcuffing them in the kitchen, and the narcotics unit searched the residence for drugs. Officers recovered 279.98 grams of crack cocaine, packaged in numerous small baggies that were located in a larger bag. The larger bag was located in the northwest bedroom and had Stevens’ fingerprints on it. Also in the northwest bedroom were papers pertaining to Stevens, as well as clothing and shoes that matched Stevens’ size and the brand he was wearing on the day of the arrest. An empty box of 12-gauge ammunition was located in this same bedroom, and under the bed officers found a gun cleaning kit for a .40 caliber handgun. 3
Stevens was convicted on both the drug and weapons counts and was sentenced to 271 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s determination that there was probable cause for the search warrant and that there were adequate grounds for a “no-knock nighttime” search. He also asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction on both counts.
II. DISCUSSION
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
United States v. Solomon,
A. Motion to Suppress
In reviewing whether there was probable cause to support issuance of the search warrant, “[o]ur role is to ensure that.the evidence as a whole provides a substantial basis for finding probable cause to support the issuance of the search warrant.”
United States v. Terry,
Officer Radke testified that the judge who issued the search warrant relied solely upon the warrant application and affidavit when making the probable cause determination. Thus, we confine our probable cause review to the four corners of those documents.
Solomon,
We have no difficulty concluding that probable cause supported the issuance of the search warrant in this case. The Cl had given reliable information on numerous prior occasions, and Officer Radke’s surveillance confirmed activity consistent with drug trafficking. Stevens complains that there were no dates or time frames in the affidavit, and that the information was likely stale as a result. We disagree. The affidavit states that Officer Radke had been given information by the Cl within the last seventy-two hours, and Radke’s surveillance indicated ongoing criminal activity at the residence. We have no “fixed formula” for deciding when information has become stale, but we consider the nature of the crime being investigated and the property to be searched.
United States v. Kennedy,
Here, there was information indicating an ongoing and continuing narcotics operation, as evidenced by Radke’s surveillance. Furthermore, the place to be searched was a residence, rather than an automobile, as in Kennedy. Finally, while the narcotics might have been mobile, easily concealed, and consumable, we cannot say the same thing about the sawed-off shotgun. See United States v. Maxim, 55 F.3d 394, 397 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that information four months old, or even three years old, may supply probable cause for a warrant to search the home of a person suspected of illegal possession of a firearm, due to the continuing nature of the possession offense and the tendency for firearms enthusiasts to keep their weapons for long periods of time).
We defer to the magistrate judge’s view of the evidence unless it is unreasonable and impermissible, and we affirm the magistrate judge’s probable cause decision unless we are left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Kennedy,
We also affirm the magistrate judge’s conclusion that a no-knock
4
search
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was justified in this case, based on the presence of the sawed-off shotgun in a common area of the house, as reported by the reliable Cl. The common law requirement that officers must knock and announce their presence before entering is part of the Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
Wilson v. Ark.,
Here, the issuing judge had actually given permission for a no-knock entry. And the reason for the no-knock entry, the weapon, had not changed from the time Radke applied for the warrant and when the ERU executed it by entering the house. If anything, the circumstances became more exigent because there were four individuals in the house, as opposed to the two that the officers had expected.
See Doran v. Eckold,
B. Insufficient Evidence
Stevens’ final allegation on appeal is that there was insufficient evidence at trial to support both the conviction for possession with intent to deliver and for the firearm charge. We disagree. Based on the trial evidence, a reasonable jury could have convicted Stevens of both charges. With regard to the narcotics charge, Stevens’ fingerprint on a bag containing a large amount of crack cocaine, bagged for individual sale, and the presence of that bag in a bedroom which contained other of Stevens’ possessions, is enough evidence to sustain his conviction. Stevens argues that neither the apartment lease nor any of the utilities were in his name, that several young men had access to the apartment, and therefore the government did not prove a strong enough connection between the drugs and him. However, Radke testified that he had observed Stevens at the apartment several times while conducting surveillance. Stevens also presented these same arguments to the jury. Under our standard of review, we must presume that the jury believed the government’s version of the facts. We will not overturn the jury’s verdict because it is supported by substantial evidence.
United States v. Fitz,
Stevens’ arguments regarding the firearm charge also do not carry the day. To sustain a conviction on this charge, the government was required to prove that Stevens possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The government argues there was sufficient evidence that Stevens constructively possessed the firearm at issue in this case.
We have held that an individual has constructive possession of contraband if he has ownership, dominion or control over the contraband itself, or dominion
*990
over the premises in which the contraband is concealed.
United States v. Cruz,
Stevens’ fingerprints were not found on the sawed-off shotgun. But the government argues there was substantial circumstantial evidence from which the jury could reasonably infer Stevens’ constructive possession of this weapon. The evidence at trial showed that Stevens possessed a key to the residence, and was seen using that key to unlock the door and enter. The shotgun was located less than twenty-five feet from the same front door that Stevens unlocked. Finally, an empty box of 12-gauge shotgun shells, that would fit the sawed-off shotgun recovered, was found in the northwest bedroom where Stevens’ other belongings were found. Under our standard of review of the jury’s verdict, we agree with the government that this evidence is enough to show that Stevens constructively possessed the sawed-off shotgun at issue.
Further, the government also proved that this loaded, sawed-off shotgun was possessed in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. Our cases make clear that weapons in a “drug house,” in plain view, and close in proximity to the dealer and the drugs, supports the inference that the firearm was “possessed so as to be readily available to protect the drugs.”
United States v. Hamilton,
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the district court.
Notes
. The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minnesota, adopting the Report and Recommenda *986 tion of United States Magistrate Judge Arthur J. Boylan.
. The ERU performs the initial entry into a location when the search is deemed to be “high risk.” The search of Boyd's residence was considered high risk because of the presence of the sawed-off shotgun.
. Stevens stipulated to the fact that he had purchased and/or possessed two .40 caliber handguns in .2003.
. Although Radke asked for, and received, permission to execute the search warrant at night, and the parties describe the search as a "no-knock nighttime” search, it is apparently undisputed that, for purposes of Minnesota law, 6:30 p.m., when the warrant was executed, is considered "daytime.”