Michael Brooks Bynum conditionally pled guilty to possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § § 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), reserving the right to appeal the district court’s 1 denial of his motion to *1136 suppress. Bynum now asserts that the seizure of a firearm from his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.
I.
On April 23, 2006, Minneapolis police officer Burns and his partner encountered a Bronco traveling about 50 in a 30 miles-per-hour speed zone. Following, they observed it turn right at a red light without stopping or signaling, and then turn left without signaling. The Bronco stopped in a driveway. The officers pulled behind it.
The driver, Bynum, looked over his shoulder at the officers, reached down to the floorboard, and exited the Bronco, looking in various directions and leaving the driver’s door open. Based on this behavior, Officer Burns believed that By-num might fight or flee, so he escorted him to the squad car, conducted a pat-down search, and found Bynum’s I.D. Officer Burns recognized Bynum’s name as a suspect in two gun-pointing incidents and as having a suspended license. Bynum admitted his license was suspended, and Officer Burns’s partner confirmed it. During the stop, the owner of the house informed Officer Burns that he did not know Bynum and questioned why the vehicle was in his driveway.
Officer Burns testified that it is Minneapolis Police Department policy to inventory, tow, and impound a vehicle unless it can be released to the registered owner who has a valid driver’s license. Because Bynum’s license was suspended, Officer Burns reapproached the Bronco to conduct an inventory search. However, before beginning the search (without getting into the Bronco), Officer Burns saw, through the open driver’s door, a semi-automatic handgun, knives, and vials of marijuana on the floorboard. He retrieved these items and arrested Bynum.
Bynum was charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm. He moved to suppress the firearm and any resulting statements, arguing that no exception to the warrant requirement justifies the warrantless search of his vehicle. The magistrate judge recommended, and the district court agreed, that Bynum’s motions be denied. Bynum entered a conditional plea of guilty, reserving his right to appeal, which he now invokes.
II.
This court reviews “the district court’s factual determinations in support of its denial of a motion to suppress for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.”
United States v. Poe,
Bynum argues that the warrant-less search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment. The “ ‘Fourth Amendment proscribes all unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is a cardinal principle that searches conducted outside the judicial process without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment— subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ”
United States v. Varner,
The act of looking through a car window is not a search for Fourth Amendment purposes because “a person who parks a car — which necessarily has transparent windows — on private property does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the visible interior of his car.”
United States v. Hatten,
Finally, Bynum appears to assert throughout his brief that Officer Burns’s testimony was not credible because he was “abnormally adversarial.” The magistrate judge and the district court relied on Officer Burns’s testimony in their fact-finding, and based on the record, Bynum has not shown that this reliance was clearly erroneous.
See United States v. Behler,
III.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
Notes
. The Honorable Richard H. Kyle, United States District Judge for the District of Minne *1136 sota.