226 F. 974 | N.D. Cal. | 1915
The indictment here is in two counts. The first charges that the defendant knowingly transported in interstate commerce by means of two automobiles running over the public highways of the United States from Wheeling, in the state of West Virginia, to San Francisco, in the state of California, a certain woman for an unlawful purpose, to wit, that she should live and cohabit with him as his mistress and concubine. The second count alleges transportation by the defendant by the same means and between the same points of the same woman, with the intent in the defendant that the said woman
This case appears to be the first one under the so-called White Slave Traffic Act to present this question. The act provides in its first, section :
“That the term ‘interstate commerce,’ as used in this act, shall include transportation from any state or territory or the District of Columbia to any other state or territory or the, District of Columbia.”
And in its second section it provides:
“That any person who shall knowingly transport or cause to be transported, # * iTl interstate * * * commerce, * * * any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose, * * ~ shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”
It is argued for the government that the recital in the first section, “that the term ‘interstate commerce’ shall include transportation from any state or territory or the District of Columbia into any other state or territory or the District of Columbia,” is conclusive of the question here, because it is a definition of “interstate commerce,” and such definition does not include in any way the element of a common carrier. But I do not think Congress defined or intended to define the term “interstate commerce” in this section, but only to declare that the territories and the District of Columbia should be included in the term “interstate,” as well as the various states. We must look elsewhere to determine what is meant by “interstate commerce.” It is evident that no transportation, other than a transportation in “interstate commerce,” is prohibited by tlie act quoted, and, indeed, Congress derives its power to enact the legislation in question from that grant of the Constitution which gives it the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.
The word “commerce,” as used in the Constitution, has never been given any fixed, definite, or circumscribed meaning by the Supreme Court; but it was said in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U. S. (9 Wheat.) 189, 6 L. Ed. 23:
“Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic; but it is something more — it is intercourse.”
And the transportation of persons has long been held to be commerce. Interstate commerce then is, among other things, the passage of persons
The demurrer will therefore be overruled, and defendant will plead to the indictment.