United States v. BrownUnited States v. Brown
- Reporters:
- , ,
- Before:
- Davis
Thomas Charles Brown appeals from the district court’s denial of his initial petition for relief under
I.
Thomas Charles Brown was charged by indictment on July 29, 1993, with conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute “1,000 kilograms or more of marihuana” in violation of
The jury was charged in pertinent part as follows:
In the Indictment, it is alleged that a particular amount of quantity of drugs was involved. The evidence in the case need not establish that the amount or quantity of drugs was as alleged in the indictment, but only that a measurable amount of drugs was in fact the subject of the acts charged in the indictment.
Brown objected to that instruction insofar as the jury was precluded from finding the actual amount of marijuana alleged in the conspiracy. The objection was overruled, and the jury found Brown guilty.
On October 26, 1994, the district court sentenced Brown to 216 months’ imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, and a $50 special assessment. Brown appealed his conviction and sentence arguing that the district court erred in so charging the jury, because drug quantity constituted an element of the offense which the jury was required to find beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Castillo, 77 F.3d 1480, 1495-96 (5th Cir.1996). This court held that the jury was properly instructed and affirmed Brown’s conviction. Id. at 1496,1500.
On April 22, 1997, Brown filed a
II.
This court reviews a district court’s decision to allow amendment of the pleadings for an abuse of discretion.
See, e.g., Halbert v. City of Sherman,
33 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir.1994). The district court’s determination that Brown’s
Apprendi
claim was barred from consideration in an initial
III.
As a general rule, new constitutional rules of criminal procedure established in a Supreme Court decision are not applied retroactively to cases that become final before that decision is announced. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 1075, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). This rule advances the interest in finality of judgments in the criminal system. In Teague, the Supreme Court articulated two exceptions to this general rule. New rules of criminal procedure may be applied retroactively only if the new rule: (1) places “certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to proscribe” or (2) is a “watershed” rule without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished and which “alter[s] our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements” essential to the fairness of a proceeding. Id. at 311-314 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Brown does not argue that the first Teag-ue exception applies to the Apprendi issue.
Brown’s argument is threefold: (1)
Teague
is no longer applicable to a timely filed initial
A.
Brown argues first that the rule of
Ap-prendi
should not be analyzed under
Teag-ue,
because the rules governing habeas jurisdiction created by the Supreme Court in
Teague
were for the most part displaced when Congress passed the AEDPA and the new language in
A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—
(1) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;
(2) the date on which the impediment tomaking a motion created by governmental action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a motion by such governmental action;
(3) the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(4) the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
1) newly discovered evidence which, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found the movant guilty of the offense; or 2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable.
We read nothing in the revised language of
B.
Brown argues next that the new rule in
Apprendi
is substantive, rather than procedural. As
Teague
only applies to new procedural rules, he concludes that its restrictions do not apply to his case.
4
This circuit has stated that
Apprendi
requires courts to treat drug quantities under
In
Lopez,
we held that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Richardson v. United States,
526 U.S. 813, 119 S.Ct. 1707, 143 L.Ed.2d 985 (1999), should be applied retroactively. In
Richardson,
the Supreme Court held that a jury must be instructed to reach a unanimous verdict on each of the specific violations that comprise the alleged “continuing series of violations” charged in a continuing criminal enterprise under
A close reading of the Apprendi decision readily distinguishes it from the cases cited above. First, the Supreme Court described the issue in Apprendi as procedural: “The substantive basis for New Jersey’s enhancement is thus not at issue; the adequacy of New Jersey’s procedure is.” 530 U.S. at 475, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In discussing the need for a jury decision on all elements of an offense, it stated that the “ ‘reasonable doubt’ requirement ‘has a vital role in our criminal procedure for cogent reasons.’ ” Id. at 484, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (internal citations omitted, emphasis added.) Second, the opinion focused on the right to have a jury decide whether the sentence should be enhanced, not whether the enhancement was essential to a conviction.
We are persuaded that the decision in
Apprendi
is more analogous to
United States v. Gaudin,
515 U.S. 506, 115. S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), than to
Bailey
or
Richardson.
In
Gaudin,
the Supreme Court held that “materiality” for purposes of a conviction under
C.
Applying the
Teague
analysis, all seven circuit courts of appeals that have addressed this issue have held that
Apprendi
is not retroactive on collateral review of initial
This conclusion is buttressed by the Supreme Court’s decision in
United States v. Cotton,
- U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002). In
Cotton,
the Supreme Court held that a decision about drug quantity made by the judge under a preponderance standard rather than by the jury on a reasonable-doubt standard is not the type of error that undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.
Id.
at 1787. This holding strongly augers against a conclusion that the rights recognized in
Appren-di
are a “watershed” rule without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is
IV.
Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that
Teague
continues to apply to petitions made under
AFFIRMED.
Notes
. Brown’s original
. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989).
. The district court’s determination at sentencing that Brown was responsible for an excess of 1,000 kilograms of marijuana increased the statutory minimum from five years’ imprisonment under
. In his Reply Brief, Brown also argues that Apprendi is not a new rule, either substantive or procedural. This argument does not appear to have been made to the district court. The Memorandum Opinion notes that “It is undisputed that precedent existing when Petitioner‘s conviction became final did not dictate a ruling in his favor.” It also did not appear in his opening brief. This Court will not consider a claim raised for the first time in a reply brief. United States v. Prince, 868 F.2d 1379, 1386 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 932, 110 S.Ct. 321, 107 L.Ed.2d 312 (1989).
. The decisions in Doggett and Burton were rendered prior to tire Supreme Court‘s decision in United States v. Cotton,- U.S.-, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), and this court‘s decisions in United States v. Lon-goria, 298 F.3d 367 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc) and United States v. Gonzalez, 259 F.3d 355 (5th Cir.2002) (en banc). The landscape of this court‘s jurisprudence regarding Apprendi was substantially changed by these decisions.